THE

HISTORY

OF THE LATE

WAR IN GERMANY,

BETWEEN THE

KING of PRUSSIA,

AND THE

EMPRESS of GERMANY and her ALLIES.

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OF THE LATE

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3

THE HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR IN GERMANY,

BETWEEN THE

KING OF PRUSSIA,

AND THE

EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES:

CONTAINING

The CAMPAIGNS of 1758, and 1759.

WITH

A correct MILITARY MAP of the SEAT of WAR; and PLANS of the SIEGE of OLMUTZ,

AND OF THE BATTLES OF

ZORNSDORF, HOCHKIRCHEN, PALTZIG,
CUNNERSDORF or FRANKFURT, and MAXEN.

By MAJOR-GENERAL LLOYD,
Who ſerved ſeveral Campaigns in the Auſtrian Army.

Publiſhed from the GENERAL'S MANUSCRIPTS, under the Inſpection of an ENGLISH OFFICER,
And illuſtrated with NOTES CRITICAL, HISTORICAL, and EXPLANATORY.

Bellum maxime memorabile omnium, quæ unquam geſta ſint, me ſcripturum, quod Annibale duce Carthaginienſes cum populo Romano geſſere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter ſe civitates gentesque contulerunt arma: et haud ignotas belli artes inter ſe, ſed expertas primo Punico conſerebant bello, et adeo varia belli fortuna, anceps que Mars fuit, ut propius periculo fuerint, qui vicere, odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt, quam viribus. LIV.

VOL. II.

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M DCC XC.

MUSEUM
BRITANNICUM

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS

FREDERIC,

DUKE OF YORK AND ALBANY,

&c. &c. &c.

SIR,

THE laſt Sheets our Author lived to publiſh, were dedicated to YOUR ROYAL BROTHER THE PRINCE OF WALES; to whoſe Patronage then could the Remainder of the Work be with ſo much Propriety addreſſed as to that of YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS? But You have a ſtill better Title, Sir, to this Homage; it is to Your Royal Highneſs that the Britiſh Army looks up as the future Reſtorer of that uniform Syſtem of Military Diſcipline, which diſtinguiſhed it under Your Great UNCLE of glorious Memory; without which, in ſpite of its native Valour, it will always fall far

ſhort

ſhort of Perfection, and which, Experience has proved, can in this Country never be long maintained but under the Auſpices of a Prince of the Royal Family. Deign then, Sir, to read, and to protect this poſthumous Work of the almoſt only original Military Writer of our Country; his Precepts were written for Princes, and are worthy of them.

THAT Your ROYAL HIGHNESS may one Day have an Opportunity of applying them to the ſolid Advantage of the Nation, the increaſed Luſtre of its Arms, and Your own immortal Glory and Renown, is the ſincere and ardent Wiſh of him, who has the Honor to ſubſcribe himſelf, with the warmeſt Attachment, and the moſt profound Reſpect,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's

Moſt obedient, and devoted Servant,

THE EDITOR.

THE EDITOR's PREFACE.

THE following Sheets are printed from a Manuſcript in General LLOYD's own Hand Writing, which he left nearly ready for the Preſs. Little elſe was wanting than ſupplying ſome Minutiæ of Detail, ſuch as Orders of Battle, et cætera, and the neceſſary Topographical Illuſtrations; theſe the Editor has furniſhed from the beſt Materials he could procure, and further than this he has nothing to boaſt. The Author's Stile he has left as he found it, referring the Reader to the General's own Excuſe for it, contained in his Preface to the firſt Volume. With reſpect to the Obſervations the Editor has hazarded in the Notes, he has rather detailed the Author's Ideas than obtruded any

any of his own; nor ſhould he have ventured to do even that, but under the Conviction, that Truth and Knowledge are to be produced only by Diſcuſſion, like Fire by Colliſion; and that by inſpiring a Taſte for Military Criticiſm into his Brother Soldiers, he might render an eſſential Service to his Country, ſince in correcting his Ideas, they muſt almoſt neceſſarily purify and enlarge their own.

EXPLANATION of PLATE II.

A. Ruſſian camp in front of Cuſtrin from the fifteenth to the twenty-third of Auguſt.

B. Ruſſian barricade of waggons.

C. and D. The firſt poſition of the Ruſſians after they had raiſed the ſiege.

E. and F. Second poſition of the Ruſſians.

G. and H. The poſition of the Ruſſians on the twenty-fifth of Auguſt.

Figure 1. The Pruſſian advanced corps.

2 and 3. The Pruſſian army the night before the battle.

4 to 11. The advance of the Pruſſians.

12 to 16. Their formation for the attack.

PLATE III. FIGURE 1.

I. and K. The Ruſſian baggage and cavalry after having moved out of the ſquare.

Figure 17 and 18. Second poſition of the Pruſſian cavalry.

19 and 20. Advance of the Pruſſian vanguard and batteries, which were afterwards advanced to 22.

23. Attack of the vanguard.

Plate III. Figure 2.

L. Advance of the Ruſſian right wing in purſuit of the Pruſſian grenadiers.

M. Advance of their cavalry for the ſame purpoſe.

N. The right of the Ruſſian ſquare after it was broken.

O. The new flank formed by the Ruſſians.

P. Q. R. S. The Ruſſian cavalry which attacked the Pruſſian batteries.

Figure 25. The broken Pruſſian grenadiers.

26. The Pruſſian cavalry attacking the Ruſſian.

27. The Pruſſian cavalry attacking the Ruſſian infantry.

28, 29, 30, 31. Second advance of the Pruſſian army.

33. Attack and defeat of the Ruſſian cavalry on the Pruſſian right.

32. 34. 35. The Ruſſian cavalry attacking the battery on the Pruſſian left, and the flight of thirteen Pruſſian batallions.

Plate III. Figure 3.

T. The breaking of the Ruſſian left.

U. V. The Ruſſian infantry and cavalry which formed in the evening and defended themſelves.

Figure 36 and 37. The Pruſſian cavalry, part of which took up the ground the thirteen batallions had quitted, and part drove back the Ruſſian cavalry; the whole afterwards advanced againſt the ſquare with the infantry.

38 and 39. The Pruſſian infantry of the right wing attacking and routing the Ruſſians, in conjunction with the cavalry.

40. The

40. The Pruſſian infantry, after having changed its front to the left, endeavouring in vain to force the Ruſſian troops which had formed again in U and V.

41. The Pruſſian cavalry ſtationed near Zornſdorf and Wilkerſdorf to cover of battle againſt the Coſſacks.

Plate III. Figure 4.

W. and X. The Ruſſian poſition on the twenty-ſixth of Auguſt.

Y. and Z. Their poſition on the twenty-ſeventh, where they fired a *feu de joie*.

Figure 42 and 43. The king's poſition on the twenty-ſixth of Auguſt.

44 and 45. His majeſty's poſition on the twenty-ſeventh, when the Pruſſians fired a *feu de joie*.

Explanation of the Battle of Hochkirchen, Plate IV.

A. Camp of the Auſtrians on the ſeventh of October.
B. A corps commanded by the Prince of Baden Durlach.
C. Heights occupied by light troops under General Laudohn.
D. Woods occupied by troops under General Brentano.
E. General Retzow's camp on the Weiſſenberg.

F. The

F. The King of Pruſſia's camp at Hochkirchen.

G. Five batallions of Auſtrian grenadiers under General Siſkowitz, poſted on the Stromberg, and four others under Colonel Count Brown, poſted at Kloſſen.

H. Poſition M. Daun's right wing took up on the tenth.

I. Abbatis made in the wood, which was afterwards opened to let the columns paſs.

K. Place where the right wing of the reſerve encamped on the night of the thirteenth, after retreat, beating whilſt the whole army marched off in the moſt perfect ſilence.

L. Place where the cavalry of the left, under O'Donel, aſſembled and paſſed the night.

M. March route of the ſame.

N. Place where all the infantry of the left, commanded by General Sincere, aſſembled with the regiments of Ligne, of Brown, eight batallions of grenadiers, and ſixteen ſquadrons of carabineers, and horſe grenadiers.

O. Route which all theſe troops took during the night to arrive at the place of rendezvous.——N. B. The regiments of Waldeck and Arberg marched by the ſame route to join the corps of Generals Laudohn and Brentano.

P. Poſition during the night of twelve batallions of the right of the firſt line, commanded by the Duke of Aremberg.

Q. Route by which they marched, as alſo four regiments of cavalry, commanded by General Baron de Buccow.

R. Poſition of eight batallions from the right of the ſecond line, and one regiment of cavalry, during the night.

S. Route by which they marched under the orders of Lieutenant General Duke d'Urſel and General Prince Kinſky.

T. Poſition of ſix batallions of the reſerve and a regiment of cavalry during the night, under General Count de Coloredo.

U. Poſition of two regiments of cavalry and ſix hundred drafts from the infantry, under the orders of General Wiſe.

W. Four batallions of the reſerve, and one batallion of grenadiers, poſted in reſerve on the Stromberg, under General O'Kelli.

X. Poſt

X. Poſt where General Laudohn's corps paſſed the night.

Y. March of this corps in two columns.

Z. Place of its formation, together with the cavalry of the left wing.

Aa. Diſpoſition of three columns iſſuing from the woods at four o'clock in the morning of the fourteenth, and marching to the attack of the Pruſſian redoubts, under the command of Marſhal Daun himſelf,

Bb. Firſt formation of theſe columns during the time the regiments who had been at the head of them in conjunction with the grenadiers, kept puſhing the enemy already in diſorder, and attacked the church-yard of Hochkirchen.

Cc. Pruſſians defending themſelves on the heights.

Dd. Firſt formation of the carabineers and horſe grenadiers.

Ee. A regiment of cavalry from the left wing.

Ff. General Laudohn's Croats cannonading the Pruſſians.

Gg. Second poſition of Marſhal Daun's attack.

Hh. Heights where the Pruſſians formed, from whence they made a very heavy cannonade.

Ii. Various poſitions of the cavalry of the left wing.

Kk. Diſpoſition of the attack of the right, under the Duke of Aremberg.

Ll. Diſpoſition of the attack of the corps marked R. under the Duke of Urſel and Prince Kinſky.

Mm. Diſpoſition of ſix batallions of fuſileers and one batallion of grenadiers, detached during the night from the corps under the Prince of Durlach.

Nn. Second poſition of ditto; the grenadiers take poſſeſſion of redoubt on the right flank of the Pruſſian camp.

Oo. Four regiments of cavalry, two of which attack the enemy in Pp.

Qq. Second poſition of the corps Mm, where it cannonades the Pruſſians.

Rr. Firſt poſition of General Retzow, after he had paſſed the Läbauer Waſſer.

Ss. Corps commanded by the Prince of Durlach advancing to Wieche.

Tt. Poſt to which three regiments of cavalry and four batallions, commanded by the Prince of Lowenſtein, followed General Retzow's retreat from the Weiſſenberg.

Uu. Heights where the Pruſſians re-aſſembled in force to cover their retreat.

Vv. Attack between the King of Pruſſia's gardes du corps and the regiment of Lowenſtein cavalry.

Ww. Different attacks made by General Laudohn's Croats.

Xx. Laſt poſition of General Retzow's corps covering the king's retreat.

Yy. Some infantry attacked by the Pruſſian cavalry, and ſuſtained by a regiment of cavalry from the left wing.

Zz. Laſt poſition of two regiments of cavalry under General de Wiſe.

tZ. Third poſition of Marſhal Daun's corps purſuing the retreating enemy.

&c. Prince of Wurtemberg's poſition on the heights between Belgern and Dreſſe.

Explanation of Plate V.

A. March of the Ruſſians from Bouc to Palzig.

B. March of the Pruſſians from Zullichau towards Palzig in ſeveral columns, ſome of them paſſed through Moſe and Kay.

C. Pruſſian army in order of battle.

D. Ruſſians in ditto; their right flank *appuyée* on a height which cut off the Pruſſians from the road to Croſſen, by which one of their columns E attempted to paſs but too late, the Ruſſians having already occupied that paſs with a battery of cannon at

F. The Pruſſians commenced the action at two o'clock in the afternoon by a briſk cannonade, which laſted till half paſt three; they then tried to force the Ruſſian army through its front, but the ground, and the poſition they had taken, permitted only a ſmall part of their left wing to attack, beſides the Ruſſian artillery.

G. Was ſo advantageouſly poſted that they could not gain any ground; at four o'clock the fire of muſquetry ſucceeded to that of the cannon, the Pruſſians attacked the left of the Ruſſians near their center, but without

out ſucceſs; the muſquetry ceaſed for ſome time, and the Ruſſians thought the day already their own, but the huſſars and coſſacks at the entrance of the wood were compelled to give way, after which the Pruſſians advanced in three columns H as far as the little eminence.

I. Where being arrived, they deployed to right and left in K, and the action became general; the fire of the ſmall arms laſted two hours.

L. Four regiments of Pruſſians which attacked the flank of the Ruſſian right wing with fury, and made every exertion to penetrate, but were compelled by the heavy fire of artillery to retire to the main body of their army.

M. Spot where the Ruſſian cavalry was attacked and driven back to N.

O. Cuiraſſiers.

P. Huſſars and Coſſacks purſuing the Pruſſians.

Explanation of PLATE VI.

AB. Ruſſian army in their intrenched camp.

CD. Pruſſian army.

EFG. March of their columns.

HI. The king's firſt poſition.

KL. Second poſition.

MN. Third poſition.

O. Attack of the Pruſſian cavalry which failed.

P. Second attack of the Pruſſian cavalry, which was equally unſucceſsful.

QQ. Laſt poſition of the Pruſſians.

RR. General Laudohn's corps.

SS. The ſame, which took poſt behind the Cowbottom, and repulſed the Pruſſians.

TT. Ruſſian troops forming acroſs their camp.

V. Attack of the enemy's cavalry upon the right flank of the Pruſſian army, which decided the battle.

X. Battery

X. Battery on the Spitzberg.
Y. Auſtrian and Ruſſian cavalry forming to oppoſe the firſt attack of that of the king.
Z. Ruſſian Waggonbourg.

References to Plate VII.

A. Sincere's corps near Maltern.
B. Brentano's corps near Rochrſdorf.
C. Sincere's corps, in the rear of Reinhardſgrimme.
D. Its advanced guard.
E. Its march in four columns.
F. Second poſition of Brentano's corps.
G. Sincere's corps advancing by Reinhardſgrimme.
H. Deployement and order of battle of this corps for the attack.
I. Its attack in columns.
K. Attack of the height of Maxen.
L. Deployement of the troops upon this height.
M. Attack of the cavalry.
N. Approach of Brentano's corps.
P. Troops of the army of the empire, under the command of Generals Palfy and Kleefeld.
Q. Corps under the command of the Prince of Stolberg.
R. Light troops of the army of the empire, in the rear of the ravin.
S. Light troops of Sincere's corps.
T. Surrender of Fink's corps.
(a) General Wunſch, near Bloſchwitz.
(b) General Platen, near Reinhardſgrimme.
(c) Fink's corps, uear Maxen.
(d) General Platen, at Hauſdorf.
(e) Poſition of Fink's corps, oppoſite General Brentano.

(f) General

(f) General Platen retired and poſted in line.
(g) Two Pruſſian batallions deſcending the mountain, to take the Imperial grenadiers in flank.
(h) Situation of the baggage, which was afterwards conducted to
(i) Its ſecond poſition.
(k) Reinforcement of the right wing
(l) Reinforcement of the left wing } to ſupport the heights of Maxen.
(m) Attack of Brentano's corps by the Pruſſian cuiraſſiers.
(n) Poſt where they rallied.
(o) Second poſition of Fink's corps.
(p) Laſt poſition of Fink's corps.
(q) Ground where the Pruſſian cavalry attempted to eſcape.

ERRATA.

Page	Line	
7	21	for conveyed read convoyed.
7	25	for Cretkowitz read Czetkowitz.
8	8	for Nameſt read Namieſt.
10	26	for ſo read as.
22	10	after Schnabellin read and.
35	27	for attached read attacked.
77	20	for Ruſſians read Pruſſians.
77	32	for Chivaux read Chevaux.
89	11	place the full ſtop after the word Campaign.
113	19	for Battale read battle.
114	29	for perſued read purſued.
122	1	for Sagau read Sagan.
126	27	for riſe read raiſe.
127	10	for Glogiau read Glogau.
128	22	for Tokells read Tokelli.
129	1	for Prince read Pruſſians.
137	18	for twenty read two, and for forty read four.
	19	for twenty read two.
193	21	for Collin read Kolin.
204	17	for marched off read formed.
215	18	for Count read Court.

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR in GERMANY.

CAMPAIGN of 1758.

CHAP. I.

Of the Operations of the Pruſſians till the Taking of Schweidnitz.

THE king of Pruſſia commanded at Breſlau during the months of December, January, and February: the fifteenth of March he left that city, accompanied by his brother March. prince Ferdinand, prince Maurice of Anhalt Deſſau, prince Eugene of Würtemberg, and ſeveral other generals, to contract his quarters, and aſſemble his troops in the neighbourhood of Landſhut, in order to cover the ſiege of Schweidnitz, with which he propoſed beginning the operations of this campaign, which would enable him to undertake ſome other expedition of greater conſequence in Bohemia or Moravia, before the enemy could approach his frontiers. His majeſty's head-quarters were at Creyſau, with ſix regiments of infantry, and ſome batallions of guards. His light troops, ſupported by ſome regular infantry and cavalry as circumſtances required, were continually employed in harraſſing the Auſtrian poſts in the mountains, and driving them back, in order to prevent them from approaching Schweidnitz. Several expeditions were undertaken and executed with various ſucceſs,

of little or no advantage to either party, and always attended with great loſs of men, particularly in winter: generals are too laviſh of the blood of light troops, which are counted for nothing; they harraſs them continually in marches, and counter-marches, in attacking poſts, &c. I am of opinion, that no operation whatever ſhould be attempted, or poſt attacked, unleſs the poſſeſſion of it be abſolutely neceſſary to facilitate ſome capital enterpriſe. I would alſo recommend that the new recruits, on coming to the army at the beginning of the campaign, ſhould be employed in the advanced poſts with the light troops, to accuſtom them to ſee the enemy often. This in a ſhort time would inure them to labour, and inſpire them with courage and coolneſs equal to the veterans.

April. The neceſſary preparations being made for the ſiege of Schweidnitz, which had been blocked up during the winter, lieutenant general Treſkow, with five thouſand men infantry, two companies of miners, and thirty-five ſquadrons of cavalry (in all about nine thouſand ſix hundred men) opened the trenches before that place in the night between the firſt and ſecond of April. In a few days nine batteries were erected, four of four cannon, and four howitzers, three of five mortars, each placed behind the former, one of five mortars, and one of eight twenty-four pounders. The thirteenth and fourteenth a new bomb battery oppoſite the Waſſar fort, and on the fifteenth at night took the Galgen fort by aſſault, which reduced the governor lieutenant general Count Thierhaimb to ſurrender the ſixteenth. The garriſon conſiſting of two generals, one hundred and ſeventy-three officers, three thouſand four hundred and thirty-ſix ſoldiers, one thouſand three hundred invalids, were made priſoners of war. Beſides the cannon which the Auſtrians had found in the place, when they took it the preceding year, there was found belonging to the Auſtrians twenty twelve pounders, three twenty-four pounders, three of ten, eight mortars, ten pounders, one of thirty, ten of ſixty, all braſs, and ſix iron of ſixty, in all fifty-one pieces, cannon and

and mortars. The loſs of the Pruſſians was two officers, three under officers, one bombardier, ninety-one ſoldiers, and five common men killed; fourteen officers, ten under officers, two bombardiers, two hundred and thirty-one ſoldiers, and four men belonging to the army wounded.

This place is by no means ſtrong; it was taken the preceding year by the Auſtrians in nearly the ſame ſpace of time. In one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſixty-one Laudohn took it in a few hours ſword in hand, without opening the trenches; and it was finally retaken in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſixty-two, after a defence of ten weeks. Whence proceeded this very great difference? From the difference of characters, and abilities of the different perſons, who conducted the ſiege and defence, in the different periods. The laſt ſiege was remarkable for the noble defence the place made owing chiefly to the ſuperior abilities of M. Gribauval, now a lieutenant general, and I believe at the head of the department of artillery in France. We ſhall therefore in the ſequel give an exact plan of the place, and its environs, with the poſitions of the reſpective armies during the ſiege, and a journal of it, with ſome remarks of our own, on that event, which concluded the war, for no other enterpriſe of conſequence was afterwards undertaken or executed.

The retaking of Schweidnitz reduced the ſtate of the war to what it was at the breaking out of it; the fatal battle of Leuthen was the cauſe. Had the Auſtrians avoided it, being in poſſeſſion of Glatz and Schweidnitz, and their army powerful, this campaign might and ought to have begun with the ſiege of Glogau, which the approach of the Ruſſians would have facilitated. Neiſs muſt have fallen of courſe. The war was finiſhed; Sileſia conquered: the Pruſſians could not pretend to defend Brandebourg and Pomerania after the taking Glogau, when attacked and ſurrounded by the Auſtrians, Ruſſians, and Swedes.

CHAP. II.

Of the Operations of the Pruſſians and Auſtrians after the taking of Schweidnitz, till the retreat of the former from Olmutz into Sileſia, with Reflections.

AFTER the taking of Schweidnitz, the king of Pruſſia intending to penetrate into Moravia, and beſiege Olmutz, ordered the troops which were to compoſe that army, to aſſemble near Reichenbach, and from thence to proceed towards Neiſs. General Ziethen, with a corps of about eight thouſand men, was detached towards Upper Luſatia*. General Fouquet, with about an equal number, was left in the county of Glatz, from whence he ſent troops to occupy the mountains on his right towards Friedland, which effectually covered the march of the former. In the mean time the king viſited the county of Glatz, and ordered the roads leading to Landſcron and Habelſchwerd to be repaired.

The Auſtrians quitted their quarters on the nineteenth of April, and went to occupy the camp, which had been traced for them at Skalitz (on the frontier of the county of Glatz) where the head quarters was eſtabliſhed. General Boſcow with a conſiderable corps, was placed at Trautenau on the road which leads from Bohemia to Landſhut and Schweidnitz in Sileſia. The duke of Aremberg, with the corps of reſerve was poſted at Nachod, and general Laudohn with his light troops at Lewin. Before we proceed further in relating the operations of this campaign, it will be right to give a ſtate of the Pruſſian forces, and how and where they were employed.

* The king ſays, he was ſent to Landſhut, and rejoined his army before Olmutz, about the 10th of June.

ORDER

ORDER OF BATTLE of the PRUSSIAN ARMY commanded by the KING in Perſon, in the Beginning of May 1758, when it entered Moravia.

General Field Marſhals - Prince Maurice, Keith.
Lieutenant Generals - Seidlitz, Prince Ferdinand, Retzow, Ziethen
Major Generals - Schöneich, Krokow, Bredow, Kahlden, Goltz, Wedel, Bulow, Geiſt, Krokow, Schmettau, Lentulus

	Schöneich	Krokow	Bredow	Kahlden	Goltz	Wedel	Bulow	Geiſt	Krokow	Schmettau	Lentulus
	Schmettau, Seidlitz	Kyow, Krokow	Heyden, Rath, Unruh, Rohr, Wedel	Wangenheim, G. B. Carlowitz, Old Brunſwick	Lattorf, Retzow, Guards	Wedel, Itzenplitz	Kannacker, Geiſt	Mg. F. Charles, Kremzow, Haak; Grenadier Battalions: Benkendorf, Diringhofen	Schoneich	Bredow, Carabiniers	Gens d'Armes, Garde du Corps
Batallions	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1 / 1 / 1			
Squadrons	5 / 5	5	5	1 / 1	1 / 1	2	2	2	5	5 / 5	3 / 5

SECOND LINE.

General of Infantry - Markgrave Charles.

Lieut. Generals - Pr. of Wurtemberg, Forcade, Hereditary Prince of Heſſe Caſſell, Pr. of Wurtemberg
Major Generals - Meier, Bannſtadt, Kannacher, Kreutz, P. C. of Bevern, Czettritz

	Meier	Bannſtadt	Kannacher	Kreutz	P. C. of Bevern	Czettritz
	Dragoons: Young Platen, Bayreuth	Raumeiſter, Kleiſt, Schenkendorf, Bivering	Nimſchefsky, Manteufel; Grenadier Battalions	Wunchow, Kalkſtein, Affeburg, Forcade	Manteufel, Prince Royal	Young Krokow, Normann, Czettritz; Dragoons
Batallions		1 / 1 / 1 / 1	1	2 / 2 / 2	2	
Squadrons	5 / 10					5 / 5 / 5

RESERVE.

Le Noble F. C.	1
Salenmon	1
Ziethen H.	10
Putkammer	10
Werner	10
Two Companies of Foot Jagers	

Batallions 1
Squadrons 10

General Fouquet's Corps.

2 Batallions	Bornſtadt.
2 ———	Prince Ferdinand.
2 ———	Prince Henry.
2 ———	Markgrave Henry.
2 ———	Fouquet.
2 ———	Neuwiedt.
2 ———	Pannewitz.
2 ———	Young Brunſwick.
16	
5 Squadrons	Würtemburg's Dragoons.
10 Squadrons	Möhring's Huſſars.
15	

Army of the Siege of Schweidnitz.

2 Batallions	Münchow.
1 ———	Turſel.
2 ———	Dierke.
1 ———	Bulow.
1 Grenad. Batallion	Kreutzen.
1 ———	Burgſdorf.
1 ———	Oſterreich.
4 Garr. B.	Sydow.
4 ———	Manteufel.
1 ———	Lattorf.
18	
5 Squadrons	Drieſer.
5 ———	Prince of Pruſſia.
5 ———	Markgra. Frederick.
5 ———	Old Krokow.
5 ———	Ryaw.
5 ———	Schoneich.
5 ———	Bredow.
35	

General Ziethen's Corps.

2 Batallions	Old Kreutz.
2 ———	Turſel.
2 ———	Dierke.
2 ———	Bulow.
1 G. Bat.	Borgsdorf.
1 ———	Arnim.
1 ———	Oſterreich.
1 Free Battalion	Angenelly.
12	
10 Squadrons	Seydlitz's Huſſars.

Garriſons left in Silesia.

Glogau	-	1 Batallion	Langen.
Breſlau	-	4 Ditto	Sydow.
		3d and 4th	Mitſchephal.
Schweidnitz		4 Ditto	Manteufel.
Glatz	-	4 Ditto	Quaadt.
Brieg	-	1 Ditto	Lattorf
		4 Ditto	Blankenſee.
		1 Do.	Firſt Regt. Guards
		2 Ditto	Treſkow.
Neiſſe	- -	1 G. B.	Billerbeck.
		1 Ditto	Baehr.
		2 Young	Kreutz
Koſel	-	2 Lattorf.	
		2 Mitſchephal.	
Total		31	

9 Batallions

The ARMY under Prince Henry, including the Reinforcement * General Drieſſen brought him out of Sileſia, which was compoſed as follows, viz.

1 Gren. Bat.	Lubath.	1 Free Batallion	Meyer
1 ———	Bornſtadt.	1 ———	Monjow.
1 ———	Billerbeck.	1 ———	Wunſch.
3 Batalions	Rahlden.	3	
2 ———	Hulſen.		
2 ———	Finch.		
2 ———	Putkammer	5 Squad.	Life Cuiraſſ.
2 ———	Goltz.	5 ———	Drieſſen.
2 ———	Grabow.	5 ———	Pr. of Pruſſia.
2 ———	Caſſel.	5 ———	Pr. Frederic.
2 ———	Salmuth.	5 ———	Meynike Drag.
2 ———	Ingheim.		
2 ———	Knoblauch.	25	
2 ———	Leſtwitz.	10 ———	Szekully Huſſars
2 ———	Brandeis.	5 ———	Belling Huſſars.
2 ———	Bredow.		
30		15	

* This reinforcement conſiſted in two Batallions of Foot, fifteen Squadrons of Cuiraſſiers, and five of Huſſars, which marched for Saxony the ſeventeenth of April, immediately after the ſiege of Schweidnitz.

The ARMY under Count Dohna, intended to act againſt the Ruſſians in Pomerania, was compoſed of the following Corps, viz.

INFANTRY.		CAVALRY.	
1 Gren. Bat.	Willomeny	10 Squadrons	Schorlemmer's Dragoons.
1 ———	Neſſen.	5 ———	Platen.
1 ———	Loſſow.	5 ———	Plettenberg.
1 ———	Petersdorf.	20	
2 Batallions	Sewald.		
2 ———	Dohna.	8 ———	Rueſch Huſſars
2 ———	Kanitz.	7 ———	Malachowſky.
2 ———	Below.	35	
2 ———	Rauter.		
2 ———	Pr. Maurice.		
2 ———	Pr. of Bevern		
18			
2 Free Batallions	Hordt		

The following Detachment was ſent to the Allied Army, which conſiſted of

5	Squadrons	Holſtein's Dragoons.
5	———	Finkenſtein.
2	———	Rueſch Huſſars.
and 3	———	Malachouſky's.

So that the Pruſſian Forces diſtributed in the ſeveral Countries which formed the Theatre of this Campaign may be claſſed as follows, viz.

	INFANTRY.		CAVALRY.	
In Sileſia	- 22	G. Batallions.	43 Squadrons	Cuiraſſiers.
	- 58	Batallions.	35 ———	Dragoons.
			50 ———	Huſſars.
	3	G. Batallions.	20 ———	Cuiraſſiers.
In Saxony	- 27	Batallions.	5 ———	Dragoons.
			15 ———	Huſſars.
	4	G. Batallions.	20 ———	Dragoons.
In Pomerania	14	Batallions.	15 ———	Huſſars.
In the Allied Army	-		10 Squadrons	Dragoons.
			5	Huſſars.

The Pruſſian army deſtined to beſiege Olmutz being aſſembled at Neiſs, marched in two columns, and in three days that led by the king arrived at Troppau, and the other led by Marſhal Keith, who was to command the ſiege at Jagerndorff, theſe two columns entered the plains of Olmutz the third of May, one by Sternberg, and the other by Gibau. Part of theſe troops paſſed the Morave at Littau, and went to encamp near Mariſch Neuſtadt; General de Ville who had commanded the troops in Moravia during the winter, threw the greateſt part of his infantry into Olmutz, and with his cavalry retired to Proſnitz. The king ordered a detachment of two regiments of huſſars under Colonel Werner to march to Olſchan, where the Auſtrians had ſome magazines covered by a ſmall detachment which retired without loſs. The Pruſſians ſupported by his majeſty in perſon, with a corps of infantry and dragoons, advanced towards Proſnitz, from whence General de Ville retired with his cavalry, and occupied a ſtrong poſt at Predlitz, on which prince Eugene of Würtemberg, with four regiments of dragoons, one of huſſars, and ſome batallions of infantry occupied Proſnitz.

General Fouquet obſerving by Marſhal Daun's motions, that he propoſed marching towards Moravia, having reinforced the garriſon of Glatz, went with the remainder of his corps to Neiſs, and from thence conveyed the ammunition and artillery deſigned for the ſiege of Olmutz towards that place, and on the twelfth of May arrived at Gibau, upon which the king, then at Littau at the head of about ten thouſand men, went to join the prince of Würtemberg, who commanded about eight thouſand men at Cretkowitz. Theſe two corps were formed in two lines, the artillery of reſerve was placed on a high ground between them, general Fouquet with the heavy artillery, ammunition, &c. replaced the troops which had been drawn from Littau by prince Maurice of Anhalt Deſſau.

The king, with a great body of troops, chiefly cavalry, left Czetkowitz, paſſed by Proſnitz, advanced to attack General de Ville at Predlitz.

Predlitz. This laſt retired towards Wiſchau: there was a ſmart action at the village of Driſſitz, in which, after ſome loſs on both ſides, the Pruſſians were repulſed by Count St. Ignon, who commanded the Auſtrians. The day following the king retired to his former camp near Proſnitz*. Soon after the Pruſſians began to contract their different poſts, in order to beſiege Olmutz; Markgrave Charles occupied Neuſtadt; prince Maurice, Littau; general Wedel, Nameſt; the king, the heights between Proſnitz and the Morave. The trenches were opened before Olmutz the twenty-ſeventh of this month, on the ſide of Tobitſchau, beyond the river; a regiment of dragoons, five hundred huſſars, and two batallions were ſent to inveſt the place on that ſide.

General Laudohn, who conducted the avantgarde of Marſhal Daun's army with about five thouſand men, chiefly light troops, quitted his poſt at Lewin the ſecond of May, and marched to Reichenau. The main army on the third likewiſe left the camp of Skalitz, and went to Wodierad. A conſiderable body of troops commanded by general Harſch, was poſted at Nachod, to cover Bohemia on that ſide; while Marſhal Daun advanced to Chotzen on the fourth, and the day following encamped at Leitomiſchel. In the mean time general Laudohn advanced to Landſcron, and being informed that General de Ville had retired towards Proſnitz, advanced to Hohenſtadt, where he arrived on the ſixth, and immediately occupied the poſts of Auſſee and Muglitz, from whence ſtrong parties were continually detached to obſerve and reſtrain thoſe of the enemy. In the mean time general Jahnus, with a conſiderable body of light troops, took poſt at Schildberg the ſixth, and ſent detachments to Schomberg and Grunberg, from whence he would obſerve the motions of the Pruſſians, and interrupt their communication with Troppau and Upper Sileſia. On the nineteenth this general took poſt at Aller Heiligen, near Muglitz, and from thence ſent

* See Note A.

ſent detachments on the enemy's communications towards Bährn and Hoff, which alarmed their poſts, attacked ſeveral with ſucceſs, and deſtroyed and took ſeveral of the tranſports ſent into the country to collect forage, &c. in all which ſkirmiſhes the Auſtrians obtained great advantages. The progreſs of the ſiege was greatly interrupted by theſe continual attacks; for which reaſon the king, at the head of ten battallions, fifteen ſquadrons of cavalry, and two of huſſars, with ſome artillery, marched at eleven o'clock in the night, between the twenty-firſt and twenty-ſecond of May, and at break of day began a terrible fire of artillery againſt the poſts, which general Laudohn had at Namieſt and Belvedir, which laſted till ſix in the evening; when general Laudohn advanced with two regiments of huſſars to ſupport his poſts, on whoſe appearance thoſe of the Pruſſians halted, and ſoon after returned to their camp, having loſt ſome men in their retreat; a batallion of their grenadiers was attacked by the Auſtrians ſword in hand, and ſuffered very conſiderably; the Auſtrians loſt two captains, a lieutenant, and thirty men on this occaſion*.

On the twenty-third of May: the army under Marſhal Daun, left Leitomiſchel, and encamped at Zwittaw, and the next day marched to Gewitſch, where it occupied a very ſtrong camp, the right flank being poſted at the town and ſtretching from thence to a village called Kornitz, on the road which runs between Droſnitz and Tyrnau; it turned off there in a potence formed by the cavalry belonging to the left wing. The corps of grenadiers and carabiniers occupied the height in front of the town between Jarmeritz and Biſkupitz, the reſerve encamped on the right of the army with its left to Gewitſch, and its right to Oppatowitz; a ſmall rivulet with marſhy banks covered the front, and ſome dykes the left flank. Here the Marſhal remained till the ſixteenth of June. Meanwhile the corps commanded by General Harſch marched to Mariſch Tribau: the country between theſe poſts and thoſe of the Pruſſians was filled by the troops under Generals Laudohn, Jahnus, and de Ville, ſo that not a day paſſed without many ſkirmiſh-

* See Note B.

es; and though in ſome of them the Auſtrians were forced to retire, upon the whole they always reaped the advantage, by interrupting the operations of the enemy, and forcing him to contract his poſts, ſo that he could draw little or no forage or other ſuccours from the country itſelf; every thing muſt come from Troppau, about forty miles off, which road was continually infeſted by the ſeveral detachments poſted in the neighbouring mountains. One of theſe attacked a conſiderable convoy on the twenty-eighth near Heidenpiltſch, diſperſed the eſcorte, took about three hundred waggons with moſt of the horſes, and carried them off. Laudohn attacked the Pruſſians at Laſkow with ſucceſs. Möhring's huſſars were totally diſperſed, and loſt many men and horſes. Colonel le Noble, at the head of eight hundred men and ſome cannon, was attacked by Lieutenant Colonel Lanius near Sternberg, and totally routed, having loſt four hundred men taken priſoners with three pieces of cannon, the convoy deſtroyed, himſelf wounded with about two hundred men only eſcaped. On the fifteenth of June Marſhal Daun ordered General
June. St. Ignon with a ſtrong detachment of cavalry to advance towards Prerau on the left of the Morave to reſtrain the enemy's parties from plundering the country. The ſame day the Marſhal having made his diſpoſitions for the march of the army on the day following, went off in the evening, though late, to examine the camp he propoſed occupying; accordingly the army broke up before day break, and proceeded in five columns to the camp marked out, near a village called Prodivanow, where it arrived at ſix in the evening, the march having been retarded by heavy rains which broke the roads, which were otherwiſe very bad, ſo they paſſed through great and difficult mountains, paſſes, &c. The heavy baggage was left behind. The ſeventeenth the march was reſumed in the moſt ſecret manner, and the army proceeded in three columns, the Marſhal at the head of the van compoſed of the grenadiers and carabiniers, that he might form his diſpoſitions according to the circumſtances which might occur during the march, being near the enemy (a method which all Generals ſhould imitate in ſuch caſes).

This

This march, like that of the preceding day, was difficult, on account of the mountains, ravins, &c. through which it paſſed. The army halted in coming out of the laſt paſſes that the whole might come up, which being done, it proceeded to occupy the camp traced between Prödlitz and Evanowitz, and was there joined by the corps under General de Ville.

Theſe fine and deciſive marches were planned with ſuch wiſdom, and conducted with ſuch ſecrecy, that the enemy had not the leaſt intelligence of them, inſomuch that their troops were then foraging in that neighbourhood, when the army arrived.

On the eighteenth General St. Ignon attacked a Pruſſian poſt at Hollitz, conſiſting of two batallions and two ſquadrons of Bareuth's dragoons, and three of Putkammer's, and forced them to abandon it with great loſs. Count Stainville, brother to the duke of Choiſeul, who attacked the enemy's left, took a pair of ſilver kettle drums, killed near two hundred men, and made one hundred and five priſoners; thoſe on the other wing had equal ſucceſs. This affair being happily concluded, Count St. Ignon was returning with his detachment to his former poſt, and was about a league from Hollitz, when a dragoon came from Olmutz to inform him, that the garriſon made a ſally, and that they had ſhut up the enemy at the village of Wiſternitz, whom they deſired the Count to attack. On which, though the troops under his command were extremely fatigued, the Count, without heſitating a moment, wheeled about; on approaching Wiſternitz he perceived ſeven ſquadrons of the enemy which ſeemed diſpoſed to attack him in his rear; he ordered his detachment to wheel right about, and inſtantly charged them, and though ſupported by a batallion of infantry, and two pieces of cannon, they were totally deſtroyed, having loſt near eight hundred men killed and wounded; among the latter was general Meyer, who commanded them.

The regiment of light horſe had been raiſed during the winter, and greatly diſtinguiſhed itſelf on this occaſion, like our Elliot's, though it was the firſt action of conſequence in which it had been engaged.

It is obſervable that new raiſed infantry do not in general behave ſo well as new raiſed cavalry; the reaſon I believe is, that the former being placed in a line, and moving ſlowly has too much time to reflect on the danger of its ſituation; when cavalry being inſtantly brought to action, moreover incited by emulation, goes on with more vigour than the old regiments. If there is not in the troops a ſenſe of honour, *fear* then prompts them to act with the utmoſt vigour, which is regarded as the only means to finiſh the danger.

This action does much honour to the zeal, valour and wiſdom of Count St. Ignon and his officers. It is an example worthy to be imitated, and we therefore recommend it to our brethren.

The new poſition taken by Marſhal Daun ſo near the Pruſſians, obliged his Majeſty to contract his poſts that he might be in ſufficient force, either to attack him or defend himſelf in caſe he was attacked; he therefore recalled the corps poſted at Neuſtadt and Littau, and placed them in the camp near Proſtnitz and Czetcowitz. On the twentieth his Majeſty at the head of ten or twelve thouſand men, advanced on the hills beyond Prædlitz in order to reconnoitre Marſhal Daun's camp, and at the ſame time to cover a foraging made in the village on his right; theſe two objects being fulfilled, he returned to his camp at Proſtnitz.

On the twenty-firſt Marſhal Daun detached General Baron Bülow with twelve thouſand men, with orders to march by Prerau into Olmutz, which he executed the day following without loſing a man.

The Pruſſians made a great foraging on the twenty-third, abandoned the mountains of Rumback near Littau, retired to Klein

Senitz

Senitz and reinforced their poſts at Laſkow, with two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry drawn from the corps at Proſnitz, and from that which made the ſiege of Olmutz. They alſo withdrew the reſt of their troops from Littau, and concentered their forces near Olmutz; and to prevent the Auſtrians from paſſing the Morava, broke up their bridges on that river at Nenakowitz, and Dub. The twenty-ſixth the corps which carried on the ſiege were reinforced by about eight thouſand men chiefly cavalry, which occupied Wiſternitz, Teinitz, Hollitz, etcætera, on the left of the Morava to prevent the Auſtrians from throwing any more ſuccours into the place on that ſide, while the king with the main army did the ſame on the other ſide.

On the twenty-ſeventh after dinner, Marſhal Daun unexpectedly ordered his army to march to Dobromielitz, his right came towards Klenowitz, and his left at the former place, both covered by two ſmall rivers. His motives for taking up this new poſition were probably as follows; in the firſt place, to draw the king's whole attention to his own ſafety, under the perſuaſion that he was on the point of being attacked, and conſequently preventing his Majeſty from making any conſiderable detachments. In the next place, to cover the march of a corps that he ſent acroſs the Morava, under the command of General Ziſkowitz; for the Marſhal being informed that a great convoy conſiſting of ſeveral thouſand waggons, loaded with ſtores, money and proviſions, eſcorted by twelve or fourteen thouſand men commanded by general Ziethen, was advancing from Nieſs by Troppau, to the camp at Olmutz, determined to attack it, accordingly he detached general Laudohn, who was poſted at Willinow with about ſix thouſand men, to fall upon it on that ſide, and General Ziſkowitz with the ſame force to do the like on the other. Theſe two generals came up with the convoy between Bautſch and Domſtättle and inſtantly attacked, diſperſed and defeated

the

the eſcorte, which loſt about three thouſand men. General Laudohn made priſoners, general Putkammer, two majors, twenty officers, two hundred ſoldiers, with ſix pieces of cannon, and near one thouſand waggons, while general Ziſkowitz took thirty officers, two batallions of eight hundred men each compleat, ſix pieces of cannon, and near one thouſand waggons; General Ziethen was forced back to Troppau, a very ſmall and trifling part of the convoy arrived in the camp before Olmutz. This remarkable action deſerves to be tranſmitted to poſterity, with all the particulars of it, as it will furniſh an uſeful leſſon to ſuch officers as may be employed on ſimilar occaſions. We ſhall therefore give here a tranſlation of the different accounts publiſhed of it, by both parties.

Though this ſiege was conducted as all others, which I believe differ only in a greater or leſſer degree of vigour ſhewn on both ſides, the mode of carrying it on muſt be the ſame, the points of attack alſo muſt be regulated by the poſition of the place, and the greater or leſſer facility of approaching it, on one ſide rather than on the other, all places being conſtructed on the ſame principle, the method of attacking them is determined by rules analagous to the trenches, parallels, ſaps, mines, galleries, batteries, &c. and their conſtructions; contrary to cuſtom, the beſieged ſhewed more vigour than the beſiegers. We ſhall therefore give the journal of the ſiege, and the more ſo as it will ſerve to explain ſome other tranſactions*.

* The Journal alluded to, as well as the accounts of the deſtruction of the convoy, as publiſhed by the reſpective parties, not having been found among the Author's papers, the Editor has ſupplied that deficiency by an Extract from Colonel Templehoff's very accurate Work.

JOURNAL

JOURNAL of the Siege of OLMUTZ.

AFTER general Fouquet's corps had joined the camp at Krenau, Field Marſhal Keith took upon himſelf the command of it and the conduct of the ſiege; he had under his orders lieutenant general Fouquet, and Major generals Schenkendorf, prince Francis of Brunſwick and Rebentiſch. The king came to the camp from Proſnitz, and after he had reviewed the army of the ſiege, and the train of artillery, he rode out accompanied by the general officers and engineers, to reconnoitre the fortreſs and its environs, and gave out the neceſſary orders reſpecting the ſiege. The corps appointed to carry it on, was ordered immediately to inveſt the town on the ſide of Droſnitz, and to form a chain of poſts in ſuch a manner, as that that whole extenſive ſpace might be occupied. The right wing was on the Morava and had Neuſtift before its front, and Nimlau in the rear; the left extended itſelf beyond Krenau, and had this village in its rear; the Field Marſhal's head quarters was in Schnabellin, and was occupied by the batallion of Lattorf, and the two companies of miners. Near this village was placed the artillery, and the depot of all the other neceſſary ſtores for carrying on the ſiege in Horcke, a village on the left. Near a foreſt, was placed the bakery, to which were attached two hundred and fifty waggons of the Proviant-train, and here alſo was a depot of meal and forage, and the field hoſpital belonging to this corps; two companies of the batallion of Naumeiſter were poſted to protect theſe, and the two others on the bridge of Chometau. On the right wing, near the regiment of Pannerwitz, was a bridge thrown over the Morava, to facilitate the communication with the country on the other ſide of that river; this was occupied by a corps under the command of general Meier of the dragoons, which was poſted

as

as follows: the batallion of Naimcheffky in Lodenitz, two hundred jagers in Druſſowitz, ten ſquadrons of Bareuth dragoons, and two ſquadrons of Seydlitz's huſſars in the neighbourhood of Starnau, and Bauniowitz; this little corps was ſo diſtributed, in order to maintain the communication with Sileſia, with which view alſo the free batallions, Le Noble and Salenmon occupied Sternberg, in order to cover the ſiege; his Majeſty poſted himſelf at Proſnitz, with a corps conſiſting of the following regiments.

INFANTRY.

1	gren. bat.	Haake.	2	batallions,	old Brunſwick.
1	ditto	Kremzow.	2	batallions	of guards.
2	M. B.	Charles.	1	batallion	Retzow.
2	——	Kannaker.	1	gr. bat.	Carlowitz.
2	——	Itzenplitz.	1	ditto	Wedel.
2	——	Wedel.	1	ditto	Diringſhofen.
2	——	Lattorf.	1	ditto	Benkendorf.

CAVALRY.

5	ſquadr.	Gardes du corps.	5	ſquadrons	Seidlitz.
5	——	Gens d'Armes.	5	——	Norman dragoons.
5	——	Carabiniers.	5	——	Czetteritz.
5	——	Krokow.	5	——	Young Krokow.
5	——	Schmettau.	5	——	Young Plathen.
10	——	Ziethen's H.	10	——	Werner's H.
10	——	Putkammer.	10	——	Möhring.

Total 21 batallions.

88 ſquadrons.

The generals attached to this corps were to the infantry; lieutenant general Prince Ferdinand, major generals Geiſt, Bülow, Kahlden, Wedel—to the cavalry, lieutenant generals Prince of Würtemberg, Ziethen,

Ziethen, and Seydlitz, and major generals Lentulus, Bredow, Schmettau, the Younger Krokow, Czetteritz, and Putkammer. The bakery, with two hundred and fifty waggons of the proviant-train, was in Drehowitz.

In the camp near Littau, or Aſchmeritz, were poſted the following corps under the orders of Prince Maurice, who ſucceeded in this command to Field Marſhal Keith.

2 batallions,	Prince of Pruſſia.	2 batallions,	Aſſebourg.
2 —	Forcade.	2 —	Munchau in Littau.
2 —	Manteufel.		
1 gren. bat.	Schenkendorf.	1 gren. bat.	Rath.
1 —	Rohr.	1 —	Heyden.
5 ſquadrons	Schöneich.	5 ſquadrons	Kyau.
5 —	Bredow.	200	Ziethen's huſſars.

Total 15 batallions.
15 ſquadrons.

The generals attached to this corps were, lieutenant generals Forcade and Neuwied, and major generals Prince Charles of Bevern, Lattorf, Saldern, and Kreutz, to the infantry; Schöneich and Krokow, to the cavalry. The bakery for theſe troops was in Littau, together with the field commiſſariat, the military cheſt, the magazine of meal, and other proviſions, the hoſpital, and four hundred and fifty waggons of the proviant-train.

In the camp of Neuſtadt, under the Markgrave Charles, were

1	grenadier batallion,	Beverling.
1	——	Manteufel.
1	——	Unruh.
2	M. B.	Geiſt.
2	——	Kalkſtein.
7	batallions.	

And 3 ſquadrons of Seydlitz's huſſars.

The generals with theſe were, lieutenant generals the prince of Heſſe Caſſel and Retzow, and major generals Kannaker, Bornſtädt, and Goltz. This corps drew its ſubſiſtence from Littau.

The Auſtrians on their ſide were alſo ſeparated into ſeveral corps; Marſhal Daun, with the grand army, encamped near Leutomiſchel, and general Harſch having quitted his poſt at Nachod on the ſeventeenth, was advanced as far as Nikel; general Laudohn, with his light troops, was ſtationed near Konitz, and extended his poſts to Willinow, Namieſt, Laſkow, Ptin, and ſo on, to keep up his communication with De Ville, who with a ſtrong corps of cavalry, was poſted on the road to Brinn; general Janus occupied the heights of Allerheiligen, near Muglitz, with his light troops, who poſſeſſed themſelves alſo of Seren, Loſtitz, the caſtle of Buſow, and Auſſee. Colonel Lanius, with about a thouſand light troops, was at Friedland and Lobnick, to obſerve and moleſt the road of communication with Sileſia.

The numbers of their light troops (the greater part of whom are compoſed of men who are to be depended on, and who are accuſtomed to a very hardy courſe of life), gave the Auſtrian generals a conſiderable advantage; and they are obliged to them for the ſucceſs of many of their enterprizes, which otherwiſe they perhaps never would have riſked. They profit by this ſuperiority in light troops, to draw round their encampments a chain of a prodigious extent, conſiſting not merely of ſingle poſts, but of ſmall corps, ſo that the grand army is not only perfectly ſecured from ſurprizes, but is enabled behind this curtain to make various movements, without their opponents receiving the leaſt intelligence of their motions, till they are drawn up and ready to attack him; all their marches are by this means covered, and it is abſolutely impoſſible to attack them on the move, ſince it commonly happens that a chain of theſe troops is drawn quite from the camp they quit to that which they are to take up; deſertion for the

ſame

ſame reaſon can never be very great among them, although an Auſtrian army contains as many foreigners, or perhaps more, than any other. Their opponents on the contrary are expoſed to various little accidents, which though they decide nothing on the whole, are nevertheleſs very troubleſome to the troops. They muſt pay the ſtricteſt attention to render ſecure the communications with their detached corps and magazines, the enemy's light troops infeſting the whole country, and watching every opportunity to ſnap up ſomething, wherein they are very often ſucceſsful.

Between the king's army and the corps under prince Maurice at Littau, there was a conſiderable ſpace left entirely open; and this circumſtance gave general Laudohn an opportunity through his detachments poſted at Willinow and Namieſt, to render the communication between the two extremely inſecure; this was the more troubleſome inaſmuch as the conſumption of the bakery in Drehowitz was to be ſupplied from the magazine in Littau, and to this end tranſports were conſtantly paſſing to and fro. The king determined hereupon to drive Laudohn away. With this view, in the night of the twenty-firſt and twenty-ſecond of May, he put himſelf in motion with a ſtrong corps of troops in three columns; the firſt under the command of the prince of Würtemberg, conſiſted of the grenadier batallion of Diringſhofen, five hundred dragoons, and five hundred huſſars, of Werner; they moved forward to Blumenau, and there remained to cover the march of the others againſt the corps under De Ville. The ſecond under Ziethen, which conſiſted of the ſecond batallion of Lattorf, and five hundred dragoons, was deſtined to take the enemy in the right flank; and with this view marched by Roſtelitz, Starechowitz, and Czech, to Premeſlowitz: in the third column, under generals Geiſt and Putkammer, was the grenadier batallion Carlowitz, the ſecond batallion of Markgrave Charles, the ſecond of Kannaker, and the ſecond of old Brunſwick; they took their march by Czech, and from thence over

the mountains ſtrait to Namieſt. At the ſame time prince Maurice had received orders to detach prince Charles of Bevern with the grenadier batallion, Schenkendorf, the ſecond batallion of Manteufel, and the ſecond of Aſſeburg, with fifty huſſars, ſtrait to Willinow and Namieſt, to come on the left flank and the rear of the enemy; all theſe columns marched off in ſuch a manner as to arrive at the ſame moment at day-break at their ſeveral poſts; the ſucceſs meanwhile did not anſwer theſe excellent diſpoſitions.

General Laudohn had received timely intelligence of the king's approach, as well from his advanced poſts as from his ſpies, among whom you might reckon almoſt every peaſant in the country round about; beſides this, the detachment under the prince of Bevern, arrived earlier than the other columns, and put the enemy in motion. The ſmall advanced detachments did not loſe a moment in falling back on their main body, leaving the greater part of their baggage behind them; and the mountainous and woody nature of the country (of which the light troops knew every foot path) gave general Laudohn the means of gaining the heights behind Konitz; without any conſiderable loſs. Indeed Ziethen's huſſars found an opportunity to take priſoners one captain and one lieutenant of Croats, and one captain and one lieutenant of huſſars, with forty-eight Croats, and to cut ſeveral more in pieces. There was on both ſides a good deal of cannonading, but without effect; the enemy keeping conſtantly at a diſtance, where there was no getting at them. The king followed them as far as Konitz, but when he ſaw that no eſſential advantage was to be obtained from purſuing them any further, he ſent back his troops to their poſts again.

As ſoon as Marſhal Daun received advice that the army of the ſiege, with the neceſſary ammunition, and other ſtores, was come before Olmutz, he thought it was then time to approach the king, and to deviſe ſome means of relieving the fortreſs. With this deſign he broke

broke up his camp at Leitomiſchel, on the twenty-third marched to Zwittau, and on the twenty-fourth to Gewiez; at the ſame time general Harſch advanced from Nikel, and the ſame day encamped near Müglitz, on the heights of Allerheiligen; General Jahnus on the other hand poſted himſelf near Loſtiz, and compelled the out-poſts of prince Maurice's corps, which occupied Remnitz and Neuſchloſs to retire nearer to the camp. General de Ville advanced once more with his corps as far as Wiſchau, and general Eſterhazi was ſent with ſome light troops to Ptin, to preſerve the communication between him and the grand army; the vanguard of this, under the prince of Lowenſtein, took poſt near Konitz to ſuſtain General Laudohn, who, notwithſtanding the little check he had received, ſtill continued his expeditions.

In Olmutz General Marſhal was indefatigable in carrying on his preparations for the defence of the place, on the capture of which the deſtiny of the campaign ſeemed to depend. So ſoon as he was aſſured that the ſiege was ſeriouſly undertaken, he cauſed part of the ſuburbs to be burnt, part to be demoliſhed; the works to be repaired in many places, new ones to be conſtructed, and all holes, ditches, and hollow ways in front of them to be filled up, however ſmall the advantage might be, which the beſiegers could derive from them. He cauſed likewiſe ſome thouſand faſcines and gabions to be prepared in the neighbouring foreſt to ſerve for the reparation of the damaged works during the ſiege; and laſtly, he laid under water the greateſt part of environs on the ſide of the convent called Kloſter Hradiſch. Within the city he gave the neceſſary orders to the burghers for the preſervation of the police, and for their conduct in various accidents to which they muſt be expoſed during the ſiege; the uſeleſs mouths were likewiſe ſent away, and all the cattle and other proviſions collected together from the neighbouring villages, in order to guard againſt famine, an evil far more dreadful to a beſieged town, than all the cannon

non ſhot of the beſiegers. In ſhort, he provided for every thing, and diſplayed ſo much prudence and ſkill in his conduct, that in any event he was aſſured of the approbation of his maſters, and the eſteem of his enemy; whether through his ſteady and courageous oppoſition he preſerved the place, or were in the end compelled to give it up with honour, after a brave defence. The beſiegers on their part were not leſs active; and by the twenty-fifth every thing, whether faſcines, gabions, or whatever other preparations are neceſſary, either for the engineers or artillery, were collected together in the depot at Schnabellin, a line of circumvallation drawn about their camp from the Morava as far as the wood of Horka.

The engineers diligently examined the ground round the town to determine upon the fitteſt point of attack; they found that the greater part might be laid under water, excepting what lies between Hatſchin and Neuſtift, which riſes continually as you leave the town. It was therefore immediately determined that the attack muſt be made on this ſide; but againſt which part of the works it might be directed with the greateſt advantage, this remained ſtill to be determined on.

About fifteen hundred paces from the fortreſs goes the road to Proſnitz, called the Imperial road, over a ſmall height which is named the Tafelberg, and loſes itſelf in the plain by degrees as it approaches the town; over this height ran a hollow way, ſome hundred paces in length, parallel with the works of the town, and afterwards turned and wound about in ſuch a manner as to form natural approaches to the town. Colonel Balby, of the engineers, to whom the conduct of the ſiege was entruſted, promiſed himſelf great advantages from the ſituation of this hill, a man being able diſtinctly to overlook from it every part of the enemy's works; beſides, he thought the artillery could not eaſily find a more commodious ſpot to place the ricochet batteries in the firſt parallel; and as he was looked upon as a man of more than ordinary ſkill in his profeſſion, and having been preſent

ſent at various ſieges, as Bergen op Zoom for inſtance, had joined practice to his theory; his opinion was liſtened to, and it was determined to employ this poſt to the beſt advantage. After this point was ſettled, there ſtill remained the queſtion, whether it were better to go with the firſt parallel to the right of the hill down to the Povalka, a ſmall branch of the Morava, over againſt Neuſtift, or to the left, till it met the river not far from Hatſchin; if the latter were choſen, nothing was to be feared from the works enfilading the trenches; but on the other hand, it was apprehended that they might be flooded by the time the ſap was brought to the foot of the Glacis: of this there was truly no danger in the former caſe; but then one expoſed the trenches and parallels during the continuation of the work, to the danger of being taken in flank and enfiladed along their whole extent by the works which the enemy had conſtructed in the iſlands near the place called Salzergut, and which from hence were known to the beſiegers by the name of the Water-Fort.

Theſe works could during the continuance of the ſiege be ſtill further augmented, and they were by ſo much the more dangerous, as they lay very low; made a *feu raſant*, the moſt dangerous of all, and were ſcarcely expoſed to be injured, or their fire ſilenced, by the artillery of the beſiegers.

This circumſtance appeared however to Colonel Balby to be of no importance. He thought to be able to cover himſelf from them to the rear, and even hoped to ruin the works themſelves by his bombs and grenades. It was therefore determined to conduct the attack on this ſide, and the night of the twenty-ſeventh and twenty-eighth of May was appointed for opening the trenches.

At five o'clock in the afternoon, the batallions appointed to cover this operation aſſembled, as did alſo one thouſand three hundred and twenty-five working men from the regiments, who being provided with the neceſſary inſtruments, waited for the time of breaking ground;

ground; it was propoſed not only to draw the firſt parallel, and the communications leading thither, but alſo to compleat in the firſt night, a battery of twelve cannons, and two mortar batteries, one of twelve and the other of four pieces. The working men were divided into four parties; the firſt was commanded by Colonel Balby, it conſiſted of one major, two captains, and four lieutenants of engineers, fifteen miners, and two hundred working men of Markgrave Henry's regiment, theſe were appointed to prepare one half of the parallel, from the middle of the Tafelberg, about four hundred paces on to the right hand, as alſo an epaulement for the cavalry.

Colonel Wredel of the engineers commanded the ſecond diviſion, which conſiſted of two captains, four lieutenants, fifteen miners, and two hundred working men from prince Henry's regiment, theſe were ordered to compleat the remainder of the parallel.

Lieutenant colonel Embers with the third diviſion, conſiſting of three captains, three lieutenants, thirty miners, two hundred men of prince Francis's regiment, as many of Fouquets, with three hundred peaſants, was appointed to draw the communications, and extend them to their opening into the approaches; the remaining five hundred and twenty-five men, were attached to the artillery for the conſtruction of the batteries.

As ſoon as it was dark, the covering batallions marched out in two columns, obſerving the greateſt ſilence; they were followed by the different diviſions of working men. As ſoon as the former were come to the ſpot appointed, they formed themſelves in a line, with conſiderable intervals, in front of the parallel, to be opened; and each batallion detached two platoons, two hundred paces forwards, which laid themſelves on the ground, and ſent out their out poſts about eighty paces further, who alſo lay down. Behind each flank of the parallel were placed eighty dragoons, to be at hand to repel any attempt of the enemy's cavalry; the engineers traced

traced the parallel and approaches, the artillery their batteries; and the work advanced ſo briſkly, that in the courſe of this night, the greater part was ſo far compleated, that the troops who at day break, drew back to wait for the relief, remained in them under cover. Notwithſtanding the enemy's cavalry encamped in front of the Thereſian gate, and ſtrong picquets of infantry were poſted all round the town, and the field poſts alſo of the cavalry were advanced quite to the foot of the Tafelberg; yet the commandant was not informed of the opening of the trenches, ſooner than four o'clock in the morning, he fired then ſome few cannon ſhot; but which hurt nobody.

In order to draw off the enemy's attention to another ſide, general Rebentiſch received orders to attack the village of Repſchin, at two o'clock in the morning; which the commandant had occupied with two hundred croats, as alſo Hatſchin, Kowalkowitz and the convent of Hradiſch, with other troops. To this end the batallion of Nimſcheſſky had detached two companies to Horka, while the batallion of Naumeiſter, which was poſted there, made this attack; after that ſome cannon ſhot had been fired at the village, the volunteers advanced and marched ſtrait up to it; the enemy quitted it without making the ſlighteſt reſiſtance, left their field equipage, knapſacks, and a great quantity of arms, and retired into the town; the village was ſet on fire, and then it was perceived that the cavalry in front of the Thereſian gate, continued perfectly quiet in their camp, on which prince Francis ordered a howitzer, and two ſix pounders to be brought into the parallel, whoſe fire ſoon drove them from that poſt, and compelled them to retire into the town. The commandant who perceived very plainly, that from the diſtance at which the parallel was traced, he could do little damage to it with his fire, thought it not prudent to waſte his powder, which he intended to employ hereafter to more advantage, and there-

fore on that day made very little firing. The beſiegers in conſequence of this loſt no more than one ſingle man, from the opening the trenches to the hour of relief on the twenty-eighth in the afternoon.

On the thirtieth the firſt parallel was entirely completed, and the artillery ready with ſix batteries. In the crochet on the right flank ſtood three twelve-pounders, then followed a mortar battery of twelve pieces, then a battery of nine twelve-pounders, and four ten pound howitzers; further on a battery of three twelve-pounders, and after that one of eight four-and-twenty-pounders, and on the left of the whole one of three mortars. All theſe began to play on the thirty-firſt in the morning, but it was ſoon apparent that it was without effect, and ſerved only to waſte the ammunition which was already by no means ſuperabundant; the diſtance in a direct line to the Thereſian gate was reckoned at fifteen hundred paces, but the works againſt which the attack was directed, lying to the right of that near the Povalka, it might fairly be called eighteen or nineteen hundred paces from the batteries to them. The greater part of the bombs ſcarce fell on the Glacis at furtheſt, and the cannon ſhot being fired at an elevation, either went away clear over the works, or ſtruck firſt and ſo flew over, or buried themſelves ſo deep, that they never after roſe, and conſequently did not in the leaſt endamage the artillery on the ramparts. For the ſame reaſons the fire from the fortreſs had not the ſmalleſt effect, notwithſtanding that the beſieged enjoyed an advantage, which had the diſtance been leſs conſiderable, would have been of the greateſt importance.

The ſmall extent of the parallel which did not exceed ſeven hundred paces, crowded the batteries very near each other, and the front of attack extending nearly in a ſtrait line, with baſtions of a very obtuſe angle, enabled the enemy to employ almoſt the whole of his artillery againſt our works, on which all his fire was united as in a central point, which muſt naturally give him a great advantage over the beſiegers.

ſiegers. On this day one thouſand two hundred and twenty cannon ſhot were fired, and three hundred and eight bombs and twenty-ſix grenades thrown, without diſmounting one ſingle cannon from the ramparts. At leaſt as many ſhot were fired from the town, and the whole loſs ſuſtained by the beſiegers conſiſted in four killed and as many wounded, without a ſingle battery being damaged, a ſingle platform broken, or a ſingle gun diſmounted. But on the other hand the mortars and howitzers ſuffered uncommonly on account of the great diſtance they fired from; the beds of four mortars were ſo much damaged in the great battery, that they were forced to be repaired, and one was rendered wholly uſeleſs; in the others three were rendered unſerviceable, and one mortar ſplit; all the platforms, without exception, ſtood in need of repair. The reaſon of this was, that the mortars were forced to be charged with three pounds of powder. Now whoever is acquainted with the effects of powder, will eaſily perceive that in this caſe at the ordinary elevation of forty-five degrees, the ſtreſs upon the mortar beds and platforms is too great for them long to reſiſt. It would have been better not to have fired at all; experience, the beſt inſtructreſs, now taught us to our coſt, that the approaches were commenced at too great a diſtance from the works.

Field Marſhal Keith inſiſted therefore with colonel Balby, that he ſhould no longer loſe time in finiſhing the firſt parallel, but go on forwards with his approaches, that the batteries might be brought nearer to the town, and might be employed with more effect. The firſt parallel was upon this lengthened about ſeven hundred paces to the right hand out from the crochet, and another battery conſtructed of eight pieces of cannon, to damp the fire from the water fort, which took this parallel in flank; but as this battery muſt neceſſarily expoſe its own flank to the other works, it was conſtructed *en cremailliere*. On the fourth of June we were ready with our ſecond parallel; notwithſtanding that, it being almoſt entirely enfiladed by the water fort,

we were obliged to fill it with traverſes. The artillery did not loſe a moment in forwarding the conſtruction of new batteries, under whoſe protection the approaches might be carried on with more ſafety and expedition, for we had now got within eight hundred paces of the works.

Colonel Balby however was not of this opinion; he conceived the batteries on the Tafelberg to be much better calculated to protect the advancement of the work, than all thoſe which were propoſed to be conſtructed in the ſecond parallel, and this for no other reaſon than that from the former one might diſcover near two thirds of the height of the works; whereas on the contrary, in the ſecond parallel the fall of the ground ſcarce permitted you to ſee the embraſures; and as to the ſmall progreſs we had hitherto made in deſtroying the defences and artillery of the beſieged, this he imputed merely to an ill-judged parſimony in confining the charge of our twenty-four pounders to ten, and of our twelve pounders to five pounds of powder, whereas he maintained they ought to have been conſiderably augmented, and that we ſhould carry the firſt to fifteen, and the ſecond to ſeven pounds, if we wiſhed to produce the effect intended. He would not have maintained theſe opinions if he had been better acquainted with the effects of artillery, nor have fallen into the error, that the range of a ſhot increaſes always in proportion to the charge of powder. This principle was held as long as artillery was treated rather as a handy-craft than as a ſcience, but men ſoon learnt from experience that three-eighths of the weight of the ſhot was at all times the propereſt charge, and generally ſpeaking, far from being too weak. Beſides, the range of a cannon ſhot does not depend upon the charge alone, but on the angle of elevation, the length and ſtrength of the piece, the reſiſtance of the air, and various other ſmall circumſtances, which a man muſt take into his calculation, if he would avoid falling into conſiderable errors on the ſubject of gunnery.

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As the progreſs of the works advanced, we were more and more convinced that what had been conſidered as a mere trifle, would be attended with the moſt ſerious conſequences. The fire from the water fort became every hour more deſtructive, and as it enfiladed a part of the ſecond parallel, we were obliged there alſo to conſtruct traverſes for the protection of the men, and a battery on the right flank to check the vivacity of its fire. Many difficulties attended the execution of this latter work. The water fort lay ſo far detached from the other works of the town, that being able to flank the whole front of attack, it was conſequently impoſſible to attack it without expoſing one's flank to the town; this rendered the progreſs of the work very tedious, and coſt us very many men. I myſelf have been often preſent whilſt ſuperintending the working men, when a ſhot from the water-fort has gone through them, and has croſſed another from the town, which has taken off a whole rank of workers. Nothing is more capable of deſtroying all courage and good-will in the troops, either for working or fighting, than a flanking enfilading fire, though the imagination perhaps repreſents the danger as being greater than it really is. It is therefore with reaſon eſtabliſhed as one of the firſt principles of our profeſſion to avoid this fire, and it will ever be conſidered as a capital fault in the conduct of this ſiege, that we ſhould have expoſed ourſelves to it, when we might have avoided it by giving another direction to our parallel.

At length on the eighth of June the batteries on the left, and on the twelfth the great battery on the right, were ſo far advanced as to admit of ſeveral pieces being brought into them. Till this was done the fire had been very much interrupted, as it was determined for the above-mentioned reaſons to fire no more from the batteries on the Tafelberg, which had been found to be an unneceſſary waſte of ammunition; by this means the engineers were hindered in the advancement of their works, which the very heavy and deſtructive fire from the town abſo-

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lutely ſtopped, and ſo found themſelves obliged to employ ſeveral days in remedying the original errors committed in the choice of our attack. On the ninth the king himſelf came from Kleinlaten, to which place he had removed his head quarters from Schmirſitz, and reviewed the ſtate of the ſiege; he ſoon diſcovered where the fault lay, and was extremely diſpleaſed with the ſmall advancement of the approaches. This drew a very ſharp reprimand upon colonel Balby; the colonel however would by no means admit that it was to be imputed to the exceſſive diſtance at which the parallel had been traced, nor yet to the direction choſen for the approaches, but ſolely to the batteries having been removed from the Tafelberg.

In the letter which he wrote on the tenth to Field Marſhal Keith and General Fouquet, he ſays, among other things, "They took away "all the artillery from the Tafelberg. In all that part therefore of "their works which were within reach of the left flank of our ap- "proaches, the enemy were at liberty to do whatever they pleaſed, and "to bring the whole of their artillery to bear upon that point; hav- "ing nothing to hinder them or divert their attention. If only ſix or "eight guns had been left me there! but no, they took every one "away. His majeſty is much diſpleaſed that the works do not ad- "vance more rapidly. On the contrary, any man who is acquainted "with the principles on which a ſiege ought to be conducted, would "rather impute it to me as a great fault, that I ſhould have advanced "my approaches ſo imprudently, without having the protection of "the batteries, and without having in any degree damped the fire "from the enemy's ramparts. I proceed to-night ſtill further with "my approaches; and your Excellency knows that on the right flank "there is not one battery yet in readineſs, and probably will not be "for ſome days to come; however, I ſhall carry on the ſap under a "moſt dreadful fire, but I will not be anſwerable for the conſe- "quences if the enemy ſhould profit by this advantage. A man

"muſt

"must have cannon, mortars, and howitzers; a man must have "powder, ſhells, and cannon ſhot; a man muſt keep up an unin- "terrupted fire, and ſuperior to that of the fortreſs, if he expects a "ſiege ſhould be carried on with vigour.—Nothing of this is the "caſe; I therefore will anſwer for nothing."—So much for colonel Balby's ideas on gunnery.

After the batteries in the ſecond parallel were in readineſs, the ſap went on rapidly, notwithſtanding the heavy fire from the town; and on the twenty-ſecond it was carried as far as the foot of the Glacis, and we ſhould have reached it ſooner had we not been compelled by the fire from the water fort, (which took the workmen in flank,) to make a double ſap inſtead of a ſingle one, which conſiderably delayed the work. This parallel then became the firſt, and what was the firſt ſerved only as a communication; from hence one may judge how conſiderably the works would have been advanced, if on the firſt night we had approached to within eight hundred paces of the town; we ſhould then have been ready on the twelfth, or at lateſt on the ſixteenth of June, to begin working on the third parallel, and this would have had a very conſiderable influence on the ſucceſs of the undertaking. I have already ſaid that the advantages expected to have been derived from the ſituation of the Tafelberg, determined colonel Balby to depart from principles which he ſufficiently underſtood, and had himſelf employed at the ſiege of Schweidnitz.

But this alone was not all his reaſons, the enemy had ſeveral picquets of infantry before the town, and parties of his cavalry were poſted at the foot of the Tafelberg; now it was apprehended that we might have been diſcovered by them, and ſo prevented from finiſhing our parallel on the firſt night by the fire that diſcovery would have drawn upon us; but even had we been ſo diſcovered, that conſequence does not neceſſarily follow; it ſcarce ever happens that a parallel is drawn about a fortreſs without diſcovery, and yet it is always

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pretty conſiderably advanced; at three ſieges of Schweidnitz this was the caſe, and particularly at the laſt; nevertheleſs the work was ſo far advanced during the firſt night, and that too without any conſiderable loſs, that on the following day the men were completely under cover from the enemy's cannon ſhot; indeed this parallel was traced at a thouſand paces diſtance, and conſequently further off than was neceſſary; and it is plain from hence, that in the preſent inſtance we might have advanced without danger, at leaſt within this diſtance of the town. Then I may add how watchful ſoever general Marſhall might be, however prudently he may have taken his meaſures, it would all find a parallel in the conduct of General Guaſco's defence of Schweidnitz.

But the great error was in carrying the approaches to the right towards the Povalka; for every one knew that we *muſt* have the fire of the works raiſed in the iſlands there, otherwiſe called the Water-Fort in our flank. This openly broke through all the rules of art: but admitting that the attack could not be carried on, on the ſide of Hatſchin and Repſchin, on account of the inundation to which the third parallel might be expoſed, ſtill it did not neceſſarily follow that it muſt therefore be undertaken on the oppoſite ſide; beſides, this object of our apprehenſion deſerved a ſomewhat ſtricter enquiry than was given to it, to diſcover whether in fact it were as well grounded as it appeared to be. It was by no means probable from the elevation of the ground in that quarter, that the inundation could reach the Thereſian gate; but ſuppoſe it even could have reached it, the enemy would ſcarcely have had recourſe to this expedient for his protection, ſince having countermines under his Glacis, which in that caſe would have been alſo overflowed and rendered uſeleſs, he would have thereby loſt one of his beſt means of defence.

It will immediately ſtrike any engineer who examines the plan of this town, that the attack ought to have been carried on upon the

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ravelin on the left of the Thereſian gate, looking from the fields, and on both the baſtions which defend this ravelin. Thereby we ſhould not even have loſt the imaginary advantage of the Tafelberg, we ſhould have received no fire in our flank, and we might have advanced directly on the capital of the ravelin; inſtead of which by turning to the right hand, we loſt five days in altering the direction of our approaches. Indeed the Povalka ſeemed to cover the right flank of the parallels, but that in this inſtance is no very important advantage, as great as it is in the ſituation of camps and other poſts, a redoubt on either flank, and a few field pieces in it, would have anſwered the purpoſe full as well.

I ſhall now proceed no further with the journal of the ſiege, which any man may find in the publications of that time. Except two great ſallies and various ſmall ones made upon the workmen at the head of the ſap, (which like all others ended in ſpiking up a few cannon, and a trifling loſs in killed, wounded, and priſoners on either ſide), there happened nothing worthy our notice. Whoever is in any degree acquainted with the theory of ſieges, will very eaſily ſupply this gap in our narrative. The beſiegers completed their third parallel in ſpite of all chicanes the enemy could oppoſe to them, and kept ſtill advancing, though with tedious ſteps, till at length other circumſtances rendered it neceſſary to raiſe the ſiege. But as theſe belong to the operations of the two armies who continued obſerving each other, I ſhall now return once more back to them.

Both armies were in a poſition which ſeemed to promiſe ſomething deciſive every day, but Marſhal Daun did not find it prudent to commit himſelf with the king, and determined to remain a quiet ſpectator of the ſiege, till he had drawn together all his reinforcements, and till circumſtances afforded him a fair opportunity of hazarding ſomewhat, notwithſtanding that the weakneſs of the Pruſſian army, and their repartition into various ſeparate corps, between whom the communica-

tions were at no time perfectly ſecure, ſeemed to invite him to more activity. The king made no eſſential alteration in the diſpoſition of his troops, on the approach of the enemy's grand army; he ſought only to procure more ſecurity againſt the incurſions of their light troops, for his communications with the corps under Prince Maurice, near Littau. To this end, General Wedel was detached on the twenty-fifth of May, with the grenadier batallions Benkendorf and Bieverling, the ſecond batallion of Münchow, Putkammer's Huſſars, and two hundred men of Le Noble and Salenmon's free batallions; and he pitched a camp on the hill named Hrad, between Namieſt and Laſkow. By this diſpoſition General Laudohn was more reſtrained, but not abſolutely prevented from moleſting this little corps, though without any advantage obtained; ſo that it was forced, during the whole time it remained in that camp, to ſtand under arms nearly the whole night through. Now as the great diſtance of four German * miles between the army at Schmirſitz, and the corps under the Princes, might tempt Marſhal Daun to attack the one or the other, while in the mean time another body of troops marched ſtrait upon the army employed in the ſiege; his majeſty ordered them to join him inſtantly, if he himſelf ſhould be attacked; and in caſe the enemy marched againſt them, then the king was in like manner to march to their ſupport. But if timely advice was received of the enemy's intentions, then in that caſe, both corps ſhould march towards each other, and unite at Groſs Sehnitz. But the one caſe happened no more than the other; for except ſome ſmall ſkirmiſhes with the out poſts, and the uſual nightly viſits of the Croats, from which they often carried back broken pates, nothing went forwards worth relating. Notwithſtanding the opportunities General Harſch had of diſturbing the road leading

* About eighteen or twenty Engliſh.

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out of Sileſia, the convoys paſſed as regularly, as if he had not been there. The batallion of Kleiſt which was ſtationed in Troppau, eſcorted on the tweny-ſixth of May, ſome hundred Winſpels of meal into the camp, and returned back without ſeeing one ſingle enemy.

Again, on the eighth of June, General Putkammer arrived in camp, with a conſiderable convoy of waggons laden with meal, ammunition, and other neceſſaries and proviſions, under the eſcorte of three thouſand Convaleſcents, Kleiſt's grenadier batallion, and the free batallion of Rapin, which was raiſed for the moſt part from the French priſoners, at Magdebourg, and deſerters, without the loſs of one ſingle waggon. Kleiſt's batallion returned back immediately to Troppau, but that of Rapin was quartered in Holitz, on this ſide of Olmütz. The two free batallions, Le Noble and Salenmon, ſuffered ſomewhat in this.

In order to cover this convoy, General Meyer was ordered to occupy a place called Sauberg, near Döllein, with the grenadier batallion of Nimſcheffky; and to draw a chain of poſts from Chometau to Gibau, with a detachment of Bayreuth's dragoons; the grenadier batallions of Unruh belonging to the Markgrave Charles's corps, occupied Sternberg; and the free batallions poſted there were advanced as far as Bährn. Here Colonel Le Noble received intelligence, that the convoy was already paſſed through Gibau; and without more enquiry whether this really had any foundation, he immediately recommenced his march back to Sternberg. In the mean time Colonel Lanius, who was poſted in the mountains, had poſſeſſed himſelf of the woods and heights by Deutch Lodnitz, and attached the free batallions in the defilé, near Siebenhufen; and as they had been compleated by a conſiderable number of Auſtrian deſerters and priſoners, ſo the greateſt part of them went over immediately to the enemy, who obtained ſuch an advantage from the ſuperiority of numbers they derived from theſe traitors,

that it was no difficult matter for them to take from us three pieces of cannon, and three hundred priſoners, the reſt cut their way through.

All theſe trifling advantages however could have very little real influence on the deſtiny of Olmutz; this would have been eaſily decided if Marſhal Daun had determined to attack the king with all his forces; but this the Marſhal's wary character did not permit; he would not be induced to hazard a chance which it was at any time in his power to recur to, till he had tried every other means that appeared conducive to the accompliſhment of his object; of theſe, one was to open his communication with the fortreſs without expoſing himſelf to the danger of being forced into a battle by the king while on his march; the other was to compel his adverſary to relinquiſh his enterprize by cutting off the convoys of whatever was neceſſary for carrying on the ſiege, which he was ſtill obliged to draw out of Sileſia.

Now a communication with Olmutz was to be obtained by theſe two ways; in the firſt place, if whilſt general Harſch marched round the corps of Markgrave Charles at Neuſtadt, taking his route by Sternberg, the Marſhal in the mean while had followed with the main army by the way of Müglitz, and ſo the two corps might unite between Sternberg and Olmutz; this the corps of prince Maurice at Littau in conjunction with that of the Markgrave was ſtill too weak to prevent; the king himſelf muſt have fallen back from Proſnitz with the greateſt part of the corps he had there, and united himſelf with them both before he could make head againſt the enemy on that ſide; now Daun by this very movement became maſter of all the roads which lead into Sileſia, it is probable therefore that the king would have attacked him, and beſides alſo his communication with the magazines in Leutomiſchel and further on into Bohemia would thereby have been, if not utterly

utterly loſt, at leaſt rendered very difficult, he therefore determined to try the other mode and poſt himſelf oppoſite the king, waiting till he found an opportunity of effecting the deſigns he had formed upon Kremſir and Prerau. He hazarded nothing by this meaſure. I have already obſerved that he had drawn an impenetrable chain of different corps of light troops from Müglitz to Wiſchau; theſe occupied all the defilés and paſſes in the mountains between Gewicz and Wiſchau, ſo that the grand army could make any kind of movement behind them with the greateſt conveniency, without being under the leaſt apprehenſion of being attacked on the march, or even in any ſhape diſturbed or interrupted by the king. The Field Marſhal had thereby the advantage of the ground conſtantly on his ſide, he found withal poſitions, which ſecured him from any attack, even though the king had been as well acquainted with his plans as he himſelf were, but above all his movements were concealed by the woods and hills from the diſcovery of the eye the moſt practiſed in reconnoitring. The difficulties which are inſeparable from every march over mountains and through hollow ways, were the only hindrances he was expoſed to; on the ſixteenth of June the army broke up from its camp at Gewicz with all poſſible ſecreſy, and marched in five columns to Prodowanow. General Harſch left his camp near Müglitz on the ſame day, and marched to Konitz; on the ſeventeenth the Auſtrian army put itſelf again in motion by break of day, and took up its camp between Ewannowitz and Predlitz, the right flank was poſted at the firſt named place, and was covered by a marſhy rivulet, the left ſtood on the ſteep ſandy hills which lie on the right of Predlitz; this and all the villages lying before the front were occupied by infantry and the corps of general de Ville, here joined the grand army.

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This general had a few days before detached general St. Ignon with the Saxon regiment of dragoons, called Prince Charles's, the two Auſtrian regiments, imperial Würtemberg and Löwenſtein, Deſchofiſches Huſſars, a Pulk of Houlans, and ſome hundred Croats towards Prerau, to obſerve the Pruſſian diſpoſition on that ſide. There St. Ignon heard that the Bayreuth dragoons were quartered at Biſtrowan, and two ſquadrons of Seidlitz's Huſſars at Wiſternitz, which could only be ſuſtained by the grenadier batallion Nimſcheſſky, which was in Drozdin, and Rapin's free batallion poſted at Hollitz, he reſolved therefore to fall on them; with this view he broke up from Prerau on the ſixteenth, and approached the dragoons juſt at the entrance of the night. Field Marſhal Keith had in the mean while received intelligence of this march, and had apprized general Meyer of it, who commanded on that ſide; this general therefore kept his people under arms the whole night through, and drew to his ſupport the batallion of Nimſcheſſky, which was ordered to occupy Wiſternitz. At day break, nor till half paſt five in the morning could any enemy be diſcovered; the patrolles which had been ſent out during the night, were not yet returned: all this time not a ſhot had been heard, but a perfect ſilence reigned all around. This general Meyer, contrary to all the rules of prudence took for a good ſign; he thought that the patrolles having met with no enemy, advanced too far to be back ſo ſoon, and it never once occurred to him that the enemy might have ſurprized and carried them off in ſilence. He held the intelligence therefore as unfounded, and although ſeveral officers thought they had diſcovered cavalry in the woods which lay before their front, ſtill he was ſo poſitive in his opinion, that he thought it unneceſſary to ſend out one ſingle man to aſcertain whether this obſervation were well founded or not; he rather gave orders to the grenadiers to return back to their quarters, and to the dragoons to unſaddle

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and to prepare for foraging, and thus fell into the ſnare with his eyes open. The grenadiers were ſcarcely returned into their quarters, before the enemy fell on the dragoons with his whole force, penetrated into the whole camp, cut to pieces many men, wounded and made priſoners many more, and compelled the remainder to retire to Drozdin to the protection of their infantry. The two ſquadrons of Seidlitz's huſſars had not been ſo precipitate; they remained ſtill ſaddled, and though they were forced indeed to give way before ſuperior numbers, yet they loſt not a man, but on the contrary made ſome priſoners. In the mean while, the batallion of grenadiers got once more under arms, marched with all poſſible expedition againſt the enemy, ſtopped him by ſome cannon ſhot from purſuing any further his advantage, and chaſed him again from the camp of the dragoons quite back to Groſs Teinitz. At the ſame time the free batallion of Rapin quartered in Hollitz, and two other ſquadrons of the Bayreuth dragoons, who were poſted near that village, were attacked. But theſe withdrew themſelves in time over the Dam which leads to the Morava, and the enemy made only one officer and thirty men priſoners, who were poſted in the church yard. General Meyer on this received orders from Marſhal Keith to draw back to Holitz, with his batallion of grenadiers. Theſe formed themſelves into a ſquare, took their baggage in the center, and although they were attacked by the enemy, as well on the ſide of the Heiligen Berg, as by ſome huſſars who ſallied from Olmutz, they made good their way to Holitz without the loſs of one ſingle man; general Meyer on the contrary, who had gone forward with the remaining part of the regiment, was once more attacked by the enemy, and compelled to paſs the Dam near this village on the full gallop. On this the dragoons fell into confuſion and came in pell mell with the enemy, who purſued them very hotly indeed; the loſs would

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here have been very conſiderable, if the free batallion which had poſted itſelf behind the Dams, had not by a heavy well directed fire, ſtopped the enemy's purſuit. The regiment loſt in this unfortunate affair into which they had been drawn by the imprudent ſecurity of their commander, about fifty killed; general Meyer himſelf, four other officers, and one hundred non-commiſſioned and privates wounded, and about three hundred priſoners. Field Marſhal Keith on the very firſt alarm paſſed the Morava without delay, with two batallions and five ſquadrons of Würtemberg's; he came however too late to ward off this blow, for general St. Ignon on his approach retired back to Prerau. Holitz was once more occupied by Nimſchefsky's grenadiers, and the free batallion of Rapin, and thoſe of the Bayreuth dragoons, who were ſtill mounted together with Seidlitz's Huſſars, encamped near the village. As for the Field Marſhal, he returned with his troops back to the camp before Olmütz.

The march of the enemy's army was immediately reported to Prince Maurice and the Markgrave Charles, by their out poſts of Huſſars; they both kept their troops all the night through dreſſed and accoutred, to be ready to turn out in a moment, in caſe of an alarm; but every thing remained quiet. Next morning the Prince detached general Saldern with Schenkendorf's grenadiers, and Möhring's Huſſars, to reconnoitre the enemy. He found the camp on the heights of Müglitz abandoned, and all the accounts he could procure, agreed in this, that the enemy's grand army had turned to the right towards Wiſchau. The Markgrave Charles alſo had now no longer any enemy before him at Neuſtadt; and as the march could be reported to the king, and to the Bayreuth dragoons, at the ſame time, he gave orders to that corps to break up its camp immediately, and go and poſt itſelf on the other ſide of Olmütz, to cut off the communication

munication between Prerau and that town. This was the more neceſſary, as the handful of troops who were poſted there could not prevent the enemy from being from time to time ſupplied with proviſions, ſeveral waggons with powder being ſecretly conveyed into the town; nor the commandant from keeping up conſtant correſpondence with Marſhal Daun's army. General St. Ignon alſo was poſted near Prerau, with no other intention than to ſuſtain the reinforcement which was intended to be thrown into the town. On the ſeventeenth the Markgrave's corps alſo left its camp near Neuſtadt, and went to Bauniowitz. But on the eighteenth, after that the Markgrave and the Prince of Heſſe Caſſel had marched with the king to Proſnitz, it moved into the neighbourhood of Biſtrowan, and was poſted in the following manner by general Retzow, who at this time commanded it. The regiment of Kalkſtein, and one ſquadron of Seidlitz Huſſars were placed at Lodenitz, and were ordered to break up and ruin all the roads which lead to Chometau. The ſecond batallion of Geiſt, and two more ſquadrons of Huſſars were ſent under the command of general Goltz, to Wiſternitz. The firſt batallion of Geiſt, together with the ſecond batallions of grenadiers, Unruh and Manteufel, eight ſquadrons of Bayreuth's dragoons, and two ſquadrons of general Seidlitz's huſſars went to Biſtrowan. Sternberg at the ſame time was abandoned, and the two free batallions, Le Noble and Salenmon, who had been poſted there, went to Holitz; which town was already occupied by Nimſchefsky's grenadiers, the free batallion of Rapin, and two ſquadrons of Bayreuth. Prince Maurice likewiſe changed his diſpoſition, drew himſelf more to the left, and took a new camp on the heights by Choelein, in ſuch a manner, that his right wing came on the hill where his left had ſtood, and the left ſtreched out over this village, in which he placed his head quarters, Littau remained in the rear. But when the king had

reconnoitred the enemy, and found that he had a force greatly ſuperior to himſelf before him; he on the twenty-firſt called in Prince Maurice with ten batallions, fifteen ſquadrons, and the two hundred huſſars who were attached to this corps, and made theſe troops encamp in the ſecond line of his left wing. The grenadier batallions Bohr Wangenheim and Heyden, under the command of general Kreutz, occupied the poſts near Klein Sehnitz, where Möhring's regiment of huſſars was already poſted. This little corps was deſtined in conjunction with that under general Wedel at Namieſt, to keep up our communication with the army of the ſiege, and to hinder general Laudohn, who was ſtill near Konitz, with four regiments of regular infantry, a regiment of dragoons, and ſeveral thouſand Croats and Huſſars from diſturbing the progreſs of the ſiege by his expeditions. The firſt batallion of Münchow, with two hundred men detached from the regiment of Manteufel, remained at Littau, under the command of Major Woberſnow for the protection of the hoſpital, in which about a thouſand ſoldiers dangerouſly ill or wounded were left behind. The military cheſt, the field commiſſariat, the proviant-train, and the leſs ſeriouſly affected ſick and hurt, went to Krenau. The Bakeries however were removed to Horka, and were covered by the free batallion of Rapin, which came from Holitz and encamped in front of that village. On the twenty-third, Littau was ſummoned by a detachment of Auſtrian light troops under colonel Zobel; who having received the uſual anſwer, and learning the approach of general Kreutz, drew off again.

In the mean while Marſhal Daun, who had received poſitive orders from his court to ſuccour the place, ſought to approach more and more to his object; but as he well knew the vigilance and activity of the king, he would not venture to make a ſingle ſtep by which he might run the hazard of coming to action with him.

him. The uſual meaſure of ſtrengthning the garriſon with a reinforcement of freſh troops, appeared to him to be by ſo much ſafer, as the Pruſſian quarters on the left bank of the Morava, were very much diſperſed, and moreover very ſlightly occupied. He entruſted therefore General Bülow with the conduct of this expedition, and detached him on the nineteenth with one thouſand two hundred infantry, and about thirty men of the artillery; this officer arrived without difficulty at Prerau, the next morning General St. Ignon ſent out ſtrong patroles towards Olmutz, whoſe buſineſs was to contain thoſe of the Pruſſians, and to cover the march of General Bülow; the general took a conſiderable *detour* through thickets, wilds and a very covered country, and as he was furniſhed with guides who knew every nook and footpath, and as all neceſſary meaſures were already taken before hand with the commandant, he ſucceeded in getting behind general Retzow notwithſtanding all his vigilance, and on the twenty-ſecond at day break, fortunately entered the fortreſs by the way of Dölein, between Lodenitz, and the Heilige Berge with his whole detachment. But as general St. Ignon was apprehenſive that this enterprize would be attended with more difficulty, and that perhaps general Bülow might not be able to reach the town during the night, but might be compelled to cut his way through by day light; he himſelf advanced with his corps, and ſhewed himſelf at five in the morning on the heights of Groſs Teinitz, to draw upon himſelf the attention of General Retzow, and to ſuſtain the detachment in caſe it were attacked. At the ſame time the light troops which the beſieged ſtill had in Kowalkowitz, moved out, and being reinforced by a part of the garriſon, drew up in order of battle before the village in the rear of the Pruſſian camp at Biſtrowan; Field Marſhal Keith being informed of this, detached inſtantly the regiment of Pannewitz, and the Wurtemberg dragoons to General

Retzow. The enemy however undertook nothing further, but after General St. Ignon had waited till ten o'clock, and from the ſtillneſs which reigned all around, could eaſily judge that the ſtroke muſt have ſucceeded, he began his retreat back again to Prerau.

The king had no ſooner learnt what had happened, than he ordered Lieutenant General Ziethen to advance againſt General St. Ignon, to reconnoitre his poſition and if poſſible drive him from his poſt, before he ſhould have time to receive ſuch reinforcements as might enable him to attack General Retzow with ſuperior numbers, and thus open a communication with the town. Ziethen therefore at one in the afternoon broke up from the camp at Proſnitz, with the grenadier batallions of Carlowitz, Schenkendorf and Rath, under General Putkammer of the infantry, and five ſquadrons of Ryau, five of Schmettau cuiraſſiers, three hundred huſſars of Ziethen, three hundred of Werner, and three hundred of Putkammer under General Krokow the younger; with theſe troops he paſſed the Morava by the bridge which the army of the ſiege had thrown over that river and joined General Retzow: On the twentieth, this corps advanced as far as the heights of Prerau; General St. Ignon had occupied this town with ſome hundred croats, his cavalry was poſted behind it in a camp, whoſe front was covered by the Beczwa, a river with marſhy banks, and by ſeveral ditches. Notwithſtanding the ſtrength of this poſt, he ſent away his baggage to Kropin, drew back with his corps to the heights of Bicknow, and left only a hundred croats in the town; it would not have been difficult for General Ziethen to drive out the croats, and open the road to purſue the enemy, they would probably not have held out a moment, and the affair would have ended with a very trifling loſs of men; but in the mean time came intelligence, that the enemy had occupied the caſtle of Tobitſchau with

with ſome hundred croats, under the command of colonel Vehla. Theſe General Ziethen muſt have left behind him had he advanced any further, and as ſtill more troops of the enemy from Kropin and Kremſir, might fall upon the flanks, he might have met with ſome difficulty in effecting his retreat, he therefore marched back to Olmutz, and General St. Ignon returned to his old poſition. This was not the only deſtination of General Ziethen's detachment, a great convoy was expected out of Sileſia, which had ſet out on the twenty-firſt from Neiſſe and Koſel, under the eſcorte of two batallions of Treſkow, two of young Kreutz, two of Mitſchefahl, one grenadier batallion Bahr, one old Billerbeck, between two and three thouſand recruits and convaleſcents of the infantry divided into four batallions, and one thouſand one hundred men of the cavalry. The convoy conſiſted of between three and four thouſand waggons, of which only eight hundred and eighteen were laden with ammunition, and other neceſſaries for carrying on the ſiege, the reſt contained meal, various other proviſions, and the ſmall mountings for the troops; in proportion as the ſafe arrival of this convoy was of importance to us, in like manner it was of the utmoſt conſequence to the enemy to intercept it. Therefore although the eſcorte was ſufficiently ſtrong to protect it againſt any enemy, not exceſſively ſuperior in force, and the beſt meaſures might be reaſonably looked for from colonel Moſel, who had the command of it (a man of tried reſolution and experience) ſtill circumſtances might happen which would make ſome ſuccour abſolutely neceſſary. General Ziethen therefore received orders to meet the convoy with his corps, and to reinforce himſelf if he thought proper with ſome batallions from that under General Retzow; in the mean time he diſpoſed his troops in and about the villages, on the ſide of the Heilige Berge in ſuch a manner, as that the town was compleatly inveſted; Rath's grenadiers were

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poſted in Drozdin, and three hundred of Werner's huſſars near them; the batallion of Carlowitz occupied Samotiſka, and five ſquadrons of Schmettau's encamped between theſe two villages; Schenkendorf's batallion occupied Towerz, and five ſquadrons of Ryau, with three hundred of Putkammer's huſſars were poſted between that place and Samotiſka, beyond Towerz towards Glaſſowitz, were three hundred of Ziethen's huſſars; by means of the poſition of colonel Lanius in the neighbourhood of Sternberg, and of General St. Ignon in Prerau, who could without danger ſend on their patroles as far as Troppau, and through the readineſs of the country people, to take upon themſelves the employ of a ſpy; the enemy were enabled without difficulty, to learn whatever was going forward on this ſide, while on the contrary the king's intelligence was rare, uncertain, and very often abſolutely contradictory. As ſoon as Marſhal Daun heard of the approach by the convoy, he had no other choice left, he muſt of neceſſity think of contriving the means of either cutting it off or deſtroying it, and theſe he found as well in his great ſuperiority over the king, as in the natural circumſtances of the country, and the inclinations of its inhabitants, by whom he run no riſk of being betrayed. General Laudohn therefore received orders to approach the road to Hof, taking a great circuit round by Müglitz, and ſo over the hills; to join the detachment under Colonel Lanius with his whole corps, and wait the arrival of the convoy. On the other ſide, General Ziskowitz had orders to paſs the Morava, to call in General St. Ignon's corps from Prerau, and then to conceal himſelf in the woody mountains near Alt Liebe, till he found an opportunity of falling upon the convoy.

In the mean time the Auſtrian general ſought by all poſſible means to lead the king into the belief that he intended to give him battle; and theſe demonſtrations appeared the more probable, becauſe the fate

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of the ſiege depended on that circumſtance alone, if the enterprize upon the convoy ſhould fail. It was therefore contrived that the king ſhould receive advice that an attack was intended upon Proſnitz, which would oblige him to direct his attention that way. The light troops made ſome attempts upon Ziethen's huſſars, but without ſucceſs however. Marſhal Daun frequently reconnoitred the Pruſſian camp, and at length on the twenty-ſeventh unexpectedly took up a new poſition with his right wing at Klenowitz, and his left over Dobromielitz, whereby he not only approached nearer to the king, but alſo threatened his majeſty's left flank; at the ſame time general Buccow was detached with a corps of ſome thouſand men to Ptin againſt his right, and the poſts near Tobitſchau were conſiderably reinforced. All theſe movements were made with the following view, partly to conceal the march of general Ziſkowitz, who in the mean while had paſſed the Morava, and was gone away to his deſtination, and partly alſo by the apprehenſion of an attack to prevent the king from detaching any more troops to meet his convoy.

As ſoon as this was aſſembled near Troppau, colonel Moſel, who commanded it, put himſelf in motion on the twenty-ſixth, and arrived with the head of the column on the Heights near Bautſch. The line of march of this great train was very tedious and full of impediments; from the conſtant arrival of convoys to the army the roads were extremely broken up, and now from the rains which had lately fallen were ſo completely ſpoiled, that the carriages were every moment ſtuck faſt, and the line thereby ſtopped and interrupted; ſo that on this day the convoy could make but a very ſmall progreſs indeed on its route. It was prevented alſo the following morning from proceeding at all, for colonel Moſel perceived it was abſolutely neceſſary to halt where he was on the twenty-ſeventh, to draw together the remainder of the convoy, and even then it would not be poſſible for him to carry in more than about two thirds of the whole ſafe into camp. The rear

which

which was by good fortune compoſed only of ſuttlers waggons and ſuch like, which in caſe of neceſſity the army might do without, remained behind in confuſion, diſperſed on the road to Troppau. This circumſtance had a great influence on the fate of the convoy.

In the mean time general Laudohn had reached Sternberg on the ſame day, and occupied various poſts ſo as to hinder the king from receiving the ſmalleſt intelligence of the fate of this great convoy. From hence it aroſe that colonel Werner, who had been detached by general Ziethen on the ſame day to meet colonel Moſel, with a batallion of grenadiers, two hundred dragoons, and three hundred huſſars, was able to proceed no further than Gibau; from this circumſtance the Auſtrian general was convinced that ſuccours muſt be approaching, and that he had no time to loſe, unleſs he would abandon the enterprize entirely. He therefore, without delay, moved forwards, and on the twenty-eighth, in the morning, entered the environs of Gunterſdorf; he immediately occupied all the Heights, from whence he could command the Defilé running between Bautch and Alt Liebe, through which the convoy muſt abſolutely paſs, and threw his croats and Hungarian infantry into the adjoining thickets, while his huſſars and cavalry formed themſelves right in the plain, in order to fall on the line of march on every ſide. Colonel Moſel in the mean while had in like manner put himſelf in motion by day-break, without waiting for the rear of his convoy. It was not long before he diſcovered the enemy with his avantgarde, and directly came to the reſolution of attacking him. The firſt batallion of Young Kreutz marched quickly through the Defilé, formed in front of it, notwithſtanding a very vigorous fire of artillery which the enemy directed upon the *Debouché*, and maintained its poſt till more batallions came up, and colonel Moſel conceived them to be ſufficiently ſtrong to clear the road before them by force. The ſecond batallion of Young Kreutz, the grenadier batallion of Old Billerbeck, and one half of

of the batallions compoſed of the convaleſcents and recruits belonging to prince Ferdinand's regiment, commanded by captain Pirch, were the firſt who paſſed the Defilé, and formed next to the firſt batallion of Young Kreutz, and were followed by the remainder, excepting thoſe who remained behind for the protection of the train of waggons. The enemy had placed a ſtrong battery upon a height which played upon the left flank. The batallion of Billerbeck's grenadiers who covered this flank, and were conſequently moſt expoſed to this fire, did not heſitate a moment, but ruſhed into the wood, drove the croats and Hungarians, and puſhed on pell mell to the battery, where the enemy made ſo obſtinate a defence, that they could only be driven from it by the bayonet; at length however the grenadiers beat them from this poſt, took from them one piece of cannon, and made two hundred priſoners. A moment after the regiment of Kreutz, and the batallion of prince Ferdinand's recruits advanced, and with ſo much vigour and intrepidity attacked the enemy, that after a very warm engagement, and with all the exertions that general Laudohn could make to ſuſtain his poſt, in the end he was beat with the loſs of one piece of cannon taken on the ſpot, and another abandoned in his flight; upon which he retired back as far as Bahrn, with the loſs of above five hundred men killed, wounded, and made priſoners. Colonel Moſel could not let himſelf be drawn into any purſuit, being obliged to employ himſelf in reducing to order the line of march of his convoy, which the foregoing affair had thrown into the greateſt confuſion. The peaſants being panic ſtruck at the very firſt cannon ſhot, fled back, ſcattered themſelves all over the field, and the greater part made the beſt of their way at one ſtretch back to Troppau. This circumſtance was very favourable to the enemy's huſſars and croats, who broke in here and there, and plundered every waggon, till they were chaſed away. When every thing was quiet, and the order of march for the moſt part re-eſtabliſhed, colonel Moſel ſent off immediately adjutant Beville

to the king to Proſnitz, to acquaint him of this affair, and of the progreſs he had made with his convoy, and then making good his way further on, came the ſame day as far as Neudörfel, without the enemy's having been able to take any thing more from him. General Ziethen had on the ſame day, marched from Olmutz with his corps, which had been reinforced in the night between the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, by both the grenadier batallions of Unruh and Manteufel, which had been ſent after him; and after he had reunited to his own corps, the detachment of colonel Werner whom he found at Gibau, he joined colonel Moſel on the ſame evening. Here he found not the half of the waggons, the greater part could not proceed through the badneſs of the relays, others were deſerted by their drivers, and indeed every one of them had turned about to go back. From theſe circumſtances he ſaw himſelf compelled to halt all the following day, till by detached parties from his huſſars, he had collected the greater part together, and reſettled the order of the march; all this greatly favoured the enemy's deſigns, General Ziſkowitz had from hence time to come up, and to poſt his corps in the thickets between Stadt Liebe and Domſtädtl, where they were compleatly concealed. On the thirtieth the convoy reſumed its march by break of day on the road to Domſtädtl; the cavalry of General Ziethen's corps marched on the right of the waggons, and in ſquadrons with great intervals; ſo long as the ground was for the moſt part even, the infantry marched on the left hand. The head of the column reached the defilé near Domſtädtl, without any enemy having ſhewn himſelf, but when ſcarcely about one hundred and twenty waggons had paſſed through the defilé, the enemy appeared upon the heights on the left hand, began immediately a moſt ſevere fire from his artillery on the entrance, ſhot almoſt every horſe dead, and thus brought the line of march abſolutely to a ſtand ſtill; General Ziethen hereupon

hereupon left the waggons, as they arrived by little and little to draw up before the defilé, took both the grenadier batallions, Rath and Carlowitz under General Putkammer, with about two hundred huſſars, and moved againſt the enemy; the attack had at firſt a very proſperous ſucceſs, every batallion of the enemy was broken, every one of his cannon taken; but the Saxon dragoons ruſhing from the thickets where they had been concealed, charged the grenadiers in flank and rear, cut in pieces a great part, took many more and drove the reſt quite to the waggon bourg, where they fled for refuge; on this General Ziſkowitz turned the whole of his force on the center of the convoy, recovered again the artillery he had loſt, and kept up a conſtant unceaſing fire upon the waggon bourg, and the waggons that had already paſt the defilé. In a very ſhort time General Laudohn alſo appeared, coming back again from Bahrn and attacked the convoy on the other ſide; the combat was very obſtinate, and laſted above two hours with various ſucceſs: but the troops compoſing the eſcorte being broken and ſubdivided by the waggons, and the enemy on the other hand keeping their lines always united, they at length broke in, in ſeveral places, overpowered the eſcorte, and diſperſed the whole convoy. Each batallion drew off to the defilé of Domſtädtl, but General Ziethen with his party was cut off from it and obliged to retreat, continually fighting his way back to Troppau; General Krokow who commanded the avantgarde, and who from the ſmoke of the powder waggons, ſet on fire by the enemy, the ſilence which followed the exploſion, and the retreat of the ſcattered fugitives, readily concluded that the enemy muſt have effected their deſign, came to the reſolution of collecting all he could get through the defilé, and ſetting forward on his march ſtrait to Olmutz.

Before he could accompliſh this, he had the mortification to ſee the enemy renew his attack on the waggon bourg, formed

on the other ſide the defilé, cut in pieces a great part, and make priſoners of the remainder of the eſcorte before his face, without having it in his power to afford them any aſſiſtance. He marched off therefore with what remained of the batallions of Manteufel, Unruh, Schenkendorf, Billerbeck, Rath, Carlowitz, the regiment of young Kreutz, five ſquadrons of Ryau, one Schmettau, and about five hundred huſſars; together with near two hundred and fifty waggons, and without making any more halts, arrived in the evening between Biſtrowan and the bridge of boats. Near Heiligen Berg he was again attacked by the huſſars and croats, who plundered *one* waggon; by good luck General Ziethen had placed all the money waggons at the head of the convoy, which from this circumſtance were ſaved. The recruits of Prince Ferdinand's regiment who had never before once ſeen an enemy, diſtinguiſhed themſelves in both theſe actions by the moſt remarkable firmneſs; never did Spartan or Roman veterans, fight for their country with more undaunted valour, than theſe raw lads from ſeventeen to twenty years of age. They determined to defend themſelves to the laſt gaſp, but the greater part of them together with their commander captain Pirch, carried their laurels with them to the grave; out of nine hundred there were ſcarce ſixty-five men taken, ſome who were but ſlightly wounded got back to Troppau, the remainder all lay dead in their ranks. They might have anſwered with a certain Spaniard, after the battle of Rocroi to one who aſked how ſtrong they had been; *as many as you find killed or wounded.* Upon the whole no fault can be imputed either to the Pruſſian troops or their commanders; they did every thing that a man can expect in ſuch circumſtances, from brave men and ſkilful officers. But the enemy was ſo vaſtly ſuperior to them, he had all the advantage of the ground ſo intirely on his ſide, and fortune favoured his whole enterprize in ſuch a manner, that the eſcorte might wholly periſh, but could

could not poſſibly come off victorious. Nothing moreover is eaſier than to diſperſe a convoy, and even to deſtroy it, either in whole or in part, if the aſſailants only know how to profit in any degree by their advantages, even though they ſhould not be commanded by a Laudohn or a Ziſkowitz; a train of three thouſand four wheeled waggons, even if no ſtop or accident happens but all keep cloſe together, takes up at leaſt the ſpace of four German miles, if as commonly happens in a mountainous country, they cannot proceed but in a ſingle file. But ſuppoſe we allow ten thouſand men for the eſcorte, and admit that the commanding officer is able to make the waggons drive four a breaſt, which reduces the line of march to one mile, his troops alſo will be diſpoſed of along this ſpace; I will take it for granted they are divided into three parts, three thouſand for the advanced guard, three thouſand in the center, and three thouſand to cover the rear, the remaining one thouſand ſhall be diſperſed in platoons all along the convoy, by this diſpoſition the three diviſions will ſtill be half a mile diſtant from each other. Suppoſe now the enemy has only ſix thouſand men, he will ſtill be conſiderably ſuperior to each diviſion, and if he only attacks one of them with vigour, he muſt in all probability cut it in pieces before the others can come to its aſſiſtance, (which would take up a full hour) or elſe his troops muſt be good for nothing. Without letting myſelf go here into an enumeration of all the advantages he may draw from the nature of the ground, from making various falſe attacks, from ambuſcades, &c. in ſhort to deſcribe the caſe in one word, he always is the aſſailant, and his oponent muſt confine himſelf to a mere defenſive, and that without daring to hazard himſelf in the leaſt from his convoy, which he muſt always be at hand to ſuccour. While this ſucceſsful enterprize was carrying on, Marſhal Daun was not without apprehenſions

henſions leſt the whole project ſhould miſcarry. For as his reputation and the confidence he had hitherto acquired with his ſovereign, depended upon his relieving Olmutz, he came to the reſolution of drawing as near as poſſible to this town with his army. The better to conceal his views, he ſhewed himſelf about nine o'clock in the morning of the twenty-ninth, with a ſtrong corps on the other ſide Proſnitz, and made as if he would attack that town; during this time General Buccow gave an alarm to Ziethen's huſſars near Koſteletz; the king immediately took Lattorf's regiment and marched that way, leaving orders with ſeveral batallions of the left wing, to hold themſelves in readineſs to follow him in caſe the enemy ſhould penetrate further. Werner's huſſars, who were ſupported by the dragoons, Young Platen and Czettritz as ſoon as they came in ſight of the enemy, ruſhed upon him, broke into his ranks ſword in hand, and made about ſixty priſoners. But the Field Marſhal intending merely to reconnoitre, would not ſuffer himſelf to be drawn into any thing ſerious, and withdrew into his camp. On hearing that a very ſtrong body of the enemy was poſted near Tobitſchau, the king detached lieutenant general Seidlitz with ſome hundred dragoons and huſſars, to acquaint himſelf of the truth of this intelligence. He found, however, nothing but huſſars, of whom he brought back a few priſoners. Towards evening came the flugel adjutant Beville, detached by colonel Moſel to head-quarters, who informed the king that this convoy, after that the eſcorte had repulſed the enemy, had reached the half way between Bautſch and Domſtädtl, and that general Ziethen was on his march, with intention to join colonel Moſel. This intelligence was the more agreeable to the king, as he might now with greater probability hope that the convoy would arrive without any further moleſtation; for the march of general Ziſkowitz was totally unknown to him, ſo perfectly did mere accident by a moſt ſingular caprice

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of fortune, favour the project of the Auſtrian general, and give to all his falſe demonſtrations the appearance of reality. And now Daun being obſerved on the following day wholly employed in ſtrengthening his camp with redoubts, and various other field works; it was conjectured that having without doubt learnt the check general Laudohn had received, he ſought by theſe precautions to put his troops in a ſituation to give the king a warm reception in the expected attack; and indeed this conjecture had ſuch a degree of probability in it, that it would have been difficult to have any otherwiſe accounted for the Marſhal's views. He however had in the mean time cauſed ſeveral bridges to be thrown over the Morava, between Kremſir and Kogetin; and in the night of the thirtieth of June to the firſt of July broke up his camp at Dobromielitz in the moſt profound ſilence, paſſed the river with his army, and accelerated his march to ſuch a degree, that he arrived towards the evening on the heights between Groſs Teinitz and Checkowitz, about half a mile from Olmütz, having made that day a march of more than five miles. Moreover, leſt the king having any intelligence of theſe movements, ſhould take meaſures to interrupt them, the Marſhal had drawn his chain of truſty light troops very cloſe together, ſo that it was impoſſible for any deſerter to penetrate it, and general Buccow, who with a corps of four or five thouſand light troops had been left behind at Ptin to keep up the communication with general Jahnus, who was poſted at Konitz, had orders to fall on Ziethen's huſſars near Koſteletz, at two in the morning on the firſt of July, to draw the king's attention on that ſide; he was however driven back with loſs by ſome infantry, who had occupied a hollow way which he muſt paſs. The out poſts ſent in word that the Auſtrian army had left their camp, and ſoon after the fatal news arrived that the convoy had at laſt, after a bloody engagement, been for the greater part cut off. Marſhal Keith, who heard this ſooner than the king, but ſuppoſed that general Ziethen might ſtill hold

out,

out, detached that ſame morning general Retzow with ſeven batallions and fifteen ſquadrons to Gibau to extricate him, but the blow was already ſtruck; general Retzow could penetrate no farther than Dolein, where he was informed of all the circumſtances of the affair; he marched back therefore without having accompliſhed his object; and as he arrived in his old camp near Biſtrowan, diſcovered the whole of the enemy's army on the heights of Gros Teinitz, on which he paſſed the bridge of boats near Holitz that ſame evening, and joined Marſhal Keith, who had already received the batallions that came back with general Krokow, and the miſerable remnant of the convoy. As ſoon as all had paſſed, the bridge was broken down.

Marſhal Daun not having been able to force the king to change his ſtrong camp, nor effectually to interrupt the progreſs of the ſiege, and deſirous to avoid a battle, determined to paſs the Morava and approach Olmutz, ſo near as to open a communication between it and the army, which of courſe would force the enemy to raiſe the ſiege without running the riſk of a general action; accordingly on the thirtieth of June at night, the army began its march which laſted all that night, and almoſt the whole day following, being forty miles, very near the enemy, and through a difficult country, a river, and ſeveral bridges to paſs, and late on the firſt of July, took its camp near a village called Gros-Teinitz. The Pruſſians were informed of this march ſo late, that they could not prevent, nor even interrupt it. This very extraordinary march, the poſition of the Auſtrians and the ſcarcity of ſtores and proviſions, occaſioned by the loſs of the great convoy, forced the king to raiſe the ſiege immediately, to prevent further misfortunes, which very probably might enſue if his Majeſty perſiſted in his enterprize now rendered impoſſible, as the Marſhal, if he loſt time, would concert ſuch meaſures as would make his retreat very difficult. Accordingly the ſame night the ſiege was raiſed without loſs, excepting a cannon or two, whoſe carriages were broke, the whole army marched off before day break in two diviſions; the main army under the king directed its courſe by Gewitſch to Mariſch Tribau, the corps which beſieged Olmutz under Marſhal Keith went by Littau, and Muglitz to Tribau. People ignorant of the circumſtances in which the king was, wondered he had choſen this route rather than that which leads to Troppau, only forty miles off; he was forced to chooſe the former preferable to the latter, becauſe the Auſtrians under generals Laudohn, Ziſkowitz, Jahnus and St. Ignon, were maſters of this, with about ſixteen thouſand men, who in a country July.

* The author ſpeaks of Engliſh miles ſixty-nine to a degree.

extremely favourable for the operations of corps, and light troops in particular, could effectually interrupt his march, and give Marſhal Daun an opportunity to attack him in his retreat, with every poſſible advantage.

Secondly, the forage on that road, as well as in upper Silefia, was intirely exhauſted, and little or nothing in the camp, whereas by marching through Bohemia towards Königingratz, he avoided the former difficulties, and moreover took ſeveral magazines which the Auſtrians had collected in that country, and left unguarded, not ſuſpecting the king would march that way, though on the leaſt reflection they would have ſeen he could not take any other for the above mentioned reaſons.

A body of Auſtrians marched on the right of Marſhal Keith's column, and took ſome horſes and waggons. The other column under the king, who had marched by Konitz to Tyrnau, and from thence by Krenau and Zwittau to Leitomiſchel, where the Van under prince Maurice arrived the fifth, and the main army the day following; general baron Buccow with a conſiderable corps, marched on the left of the king's column, he took poſt at Oppatowitz, from whence he ſent detachments towards Zwittau, to break up the roads and by that means interrupt, and retard the march of the enemy; which obliged him to deviate a little from the main road, but did not at leaſt prevent him from accompliſhing his march to Zwittau as he had projected.

The Auſtrian generals Buſcow, Laudhon, St. Ignon and Ziſkowitz, with a very conſiderable corps, accompanied the enemy in his march, ſome between the right column and the frontiers of Glatz, ſome on the left to cover Bohemia, others followed; nothing however was done to interrupt it, much leſs to ſtop it effectually.

Marſhal Daun having viſited Olmutz on the fourth, paſſed the Morava and encamped on the hills near Drahanowitz; on the fixth, the

the Van conſiſting of grenadiers and carabiniers under count Lacy then quarter maſter general, advanced to Konitz to mark a camp for the army, which arrived there the day following, and on the next morning continued its march to Gewitſch. General Lacy with his corps always preceded the army a day's march to mark the camp for it, and then proceeded to reconnoitre the country and procure intelligence further on, ſo as to be able to proceed next day to mark a new camp; which method is excellent, it ſecures the march of the army, and gives time for any diſpoſition which circumſtances may require. In this courſe he diſcovered Marſhal Keith's rear, marching from Tribau through Krenau, reſolved to attack it, and drove the Pruſſians out of the village; upon which they halted and formed beyond the village, and brought up ſome cannon; the action (if it deſerve that name) laſted from eleven o'clock, till night, what the loſs on either ſide may have been, is not material. The Pruſſians by ſtopping the enemy the whole day, got time to arrive in ſafety to Zwittau, and thereby accompliſhed the end which they had in view, whereas the Auſtrians acquired no advantage at all.

On the ninth, Marſhal Daun marched in two columns to Politſchka, where the army arrived very late, the road being mountainous, and near fifteen miles. The ſame day the king came towards Hohemauth, but finding ſome paſſes occupied by general Laudohn, he encamped ſhort of that place, ſo let the baggage proceed and followed the next day.

The tenth the Auſtrian main army remained at Politſchka, while the king proceeded to Hollitz, and on the eleventh, arrived at Königſgratz. On this day Marſhal Keith who commanded the rear, left Leitomiſchel, paſſed by Hohemauth and encamped at Hollitz, the Auſtrians advanced the ſame day towards Leitomiſchel, hoping to find Marſhal Keith there, but he was gone, ſo they camped between that place and Politſchka; the groſs of the Pruſſian army which had remained at Hollitz, marched to join the king at Königſgratz.

ORDER of BATTLE of the PRUSSIAN ARMY commanded by the KING in the Camp of Königsgrätz, July 14, 1758.

FIRST LINE.

General Field Marshals	-	Prince Maurice,						Keith.				
Lieutenant Generals	-	Seidlitz		Prince Ferdinand		Retzow		Ziethen				
Major Generals	- -	Bredow	Schöneich	Kahlden	Bulow	P. Francis	Wedel	Geist	Krokow	Schmettau	Lentulus	
		Schmettau	Krokow	Lattorf	Wedel	Grenadier Battalions.	Bredow	Carabiniers	Gardes du Corps			
		Seidlitz	Kyow	Bornstädt	Guards	Diringshofen	Schoneich		Gens d'Armes			
				Old Brunswick	Retzow	Benkendorf						
				G. B. Wedel		Plotkow						
				Heyden		Kremzow						
				Wangenheim		M. B. Markgrave F. Charles						
				Rohr		Geist						
				Unruh		Kannacker						
						Itzenplitz						
Batallions		1	1	2	2	2	2	1	3	5	3	
		5	5	2	2	2	2	1	5		5	
Squadrons		5	5	2	2	1	2					

SECOND LINE.

General of the Infantry	- - -	Markgrave Charles.										
Lieut. Generals	-	Pr. of Würtemberg		Forcade		Wiedt		Hereditary Prince of Hesse Cassell			Pr. of Würtemberg	
Major Generals	-	Meier		Rebentisch		Kannacher		Bornstadt	Saldern	Lattorf	O. Krokow	Czettritz
		Bayreuth	Young Platen, D.	Nimschefsky		Munchow		Kalkstein	Forcade -	P. of Prussia	Young Krokow	Czettritz Drag.
				Biverling		Grenadier Battalions			Affeburg	Manteufel		Normann
				Schenkendorf		Manteufel						
Batallions				1	1	1	1	2	2	2	5	5
Squadrons		10	5								5	5

CORPS of RESERVE.

		Ziethen H.	-
		Le Noble F. C.	-
		Salenmon	-
		Werner H.	-
Batallions		1	1
Squadrons	10	1	10

General Retzow who commanded the rear of this corps, and eſcorted the artillery and proviſions, ſet out about twelve o'clock, was attacked by general Laudohn near a village called Wlezkowitz, and forced to return towards Hollitz, and occupy ſome high ground near that village, and then parked his convoy, having put fire to ſome houſes at Wlezkowitz, probably for a ſignal that he was attacked. When the Auſtrians had collected all the forces they had in the neighbourhood, Count St. Ignon with ſeveral batallions of grenadiers, and a regiment of dragoons, attacked the Pruſſian cavalry which he beat, and followed beyond the enemy's artillery and baggage, by which means it was thrown into diſorder, which might have been fatal, as the Pruſſians were again in order, had not general Laudohn advanced with the infantry and cannon, which gave St. Ignon time to collect his men, and put them in order. The Auſtrians had taken three ſtandards, and ſeveral pieces of artillery, which they were forced to abandon, becauſe Marſhal Keith appeared with the remainder of the rear guard, and the king alſo with a conſiderable body of troops, upon which the Auſtrians retired to their former ſtations, both parties loſt a conſiderable number of men; the Pruſſians reſumed their march without being interrupted, and conſequently now as at the affair of Krenau had the advantage.

The garriſon of Troppau, and what eſcaped of the convoy which was interrupted in going to Olmutz, quitted the former place and went to Neiſs; on which general de Ville, who had been left in Moravia, advanced towards upper Sileſia. The king being arrived on the eleventh, as we have ſaid at Königſgratz, found general Buccow endeavouring to tranſport the magazines which the Auſtrians had there, who withdrew the ſmall garriſon, paſſed the Elbe, and took poſt on the other ſide at Chlumetz, without being able to accompliſh their purpoſe, for a great part of the magazine fell into the hands of the Pruſſians, part of their army ſoon after marched

marched to the frontiers of the county of Glatz, but the principal part of it remained encamped in two lines near Königſgratz, from whence detachments were ſent out on every ſide to collect forage.

On the twelfth, Marſhal Daun quitted his camp at Sebranitz, and marched to Hohemauth, the fifteenth the army advanced to Krockow-Teynetſch between the former place and Pardubitz.

General Jahnus who had made part of general Buccow's corps, was ordered to Konigſhoff on the Elbe, to obſerve the road to Trautenau on the Pruſſians right, whilſt general Laudohn was poſted at Hopotſchna on their left. He was afterwards attacked in that poſt, and forced to abandon it. The king took up his head quarters there, with part of his army, the reſt remained ſtill at Königſgratz, and raiſed ſome works, which ſeemed to indicate an intention of ſtaying there for ſome time.

Marſhal Daun therefore thought it neceſſary to advance nearer the enemy, and on the eighteenth his army paſſed the Elbe at Pardubitz, and took an advantageous camp beyond it, between Libiſchan and Woſſitz, the head quarters at Dobrezenitz in ſight of Königſgratz; general Buccow and his corps joined the army here; ſome days afterwards the army marched on the left, ſo that it came between Urbanitz and Chlom.

The Pruſſians occupied the road which goes to Glatz, with ſmall corps to protect the convoys which went to and from that place to their army, which they did effectually, for general Laudohn never could intercept the ſmalleſt part of them, though he often attempted it; the king returned to Königſgratz, leaving however, two camps at Lewin and Reinertz.

The twenty-fifth, the Pruſſians drew their equipages out of Königſgratz into their camp, and deſtroyed their ovens, which indicated they propoſed quitting the country; accordingly on the twenty-ſixth, they left Königſgratz and marched towards Neuſtadt, all the corps

on

on the right and left, under generals Laudohn, Jahnus, &c. followed, and the Van of the main army under general Lacy, but could make no impreſſion on the enemy. The corps under general Ziſkowitz and St. Ignon, joined the main army, which marched out the thirtieth, and took its camp behind the Elbe, with the right at Rodow and the left at Ertina oppoſite Jaromitz, and the head quarters at Hertzmanitz, the Van at Smirſchitz, with ſome grenadiers beyond the Elbe; on the thirty-firſt the king made a motion as if he intended going by Trautenau into Sileſia, which made Marſhal Daun take ſuch a poſition as would interrupt him, and perhaps prevent it. General Laudohn who was on and behind the enemy's left, was ordered to quit that ſtation, paſs the Elbe, repaſs it above Jaromitz, and poſt himſelf at Welſdorf near the road which leads from Konigſhoff to Trautenau; the ſame day the army made a motion on its left, ſo that the right came to Ertina, and the left on the hills by Kaſchow to the wood near Kukus, the head quarters continued at Hertzmanitz. Auguſt.

On the third of Auguſt the Pruſſians left Neuſtadt, and camped at Klein Skalitz; General Laudohn paſſed the road to Trautenau, and took poſt at Horzitzka, from whence he advanced to attack a Pruſſian poſt on a hill which covered their right, and after much blood ſpilt on both ſides, retired; it being ſo near the enemy, it could not be forced entirely, nor indeed could Laudohn have occupied it long if he had ſucceeded.

On the fourth the Pruſſians marched to Nachod, and the fifth in two columns, the one to Starckſtadt, and the other to Politz, on the road to Braunau.

On the ſeventh, the firſt went by Friedland into Sileſia, and the other camped at Wieſe, and the corps under general Fouquet took poſt at Wünſchelburg. Theſe different motions were performed (though in a very cloſe and mountainous country), without any loſs; notwithſtanding

notwithſtanding ſeveral thouſand light troops attempted to interrupt them. General Laudohn, whoſe corps conſiſted of above ten thouſand men, was ordered to Arnau, and from thence to precede the army, and make the van of it; and on the eighth, advanced to Hohen Elbe. Thus ended this memorable tranſaction, which deſerves to be examined minutely, becauſe it will furniſh an example for ſuch as may be employed on ſimilar occaſions.

A Liſt of the Auſtrian Forces under Marſhal Daun on the ſecond of Auguſt, one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty-eight.

First Line.			Second Line.	
Archduke Joſeph's dragoons	6		Bathyany dragoons	6
Lowenſtein dragoons	6		Archduke Leopold	6
Serbelloni cuiraſſiers	6	ſquad.	Stampach cuiraſſiers	6
Giulai ditto	6		Anhalt Zerbſt	6
	24			24
Emperor	1		Prince Charles of Loraine	1
Saxe Hildburghauſen	2		Waldeck	2
Botta	2		Leopold Daun	2
Königſeck	1		Keuhl	2
Palfy	2		Andlau	1
Clerici	2		Thierheim	2
Old Wolfenbüttel	2		Joſeph Eſterhazi	2
Deutſchmeiſter	2	bat.	Bathyany	2
Brown	2		Forgatſch	2
Bayreuth	2		Puebla	2
Bethlem	1		Mercy	2
Stahrenberg	1			20
Old Coloredo	1			
	21			

Odonell	6	squad.	Anſpach cuiraſſiers	6	
Schmerzing	6		Archduke Ferdinand	6	
Würtemberg dragoons	6		Deuxponts dragoons	6	
Darmſtadt	6				18
	24				

Kollowrath	1	bat.	Geiſruck	2	
Molk	2		Y. Wolfenbüttel	2	
Los Rios	1		Harrach	2	
Archduke Charles	2				6
	6				

Corps of Reſerve.

Henry Daun	2	bat.	Harſch	2	
Ligni and Arbi	2		Baden Baden	2	
Pallavicini	1		Wallis	2	
Luzany	2		Neuperg	2	
Durlach	1	bat.			
Wiedt	2	squad.	Benedict Daun	6	
Mayence	1		Kollowrath	6	
Wurtzburg	1		Birkenfeldt	6	
Aremberg	2		Althan dragoons	6	
			Kollowrath dragoons	6	

Beſides twelve batallions of grenadiers, and the carabineer corps, beſides Croats, huſſars, and other light troops, and beſides the detached corps.

Reflections on the Siege of Olmutz, and the different Operations which were executed on that Occaſion.

IT is evident that no operation, whether military or mechanical, can be performed, unleſs the men employed are provided

with the inſtruments and materials neceſſary for the work intended; have their ſubſiſtence ſecured, and perfect ſafety, that they may proſecute their work without danger or interruption. In treating of a ſiege, we have ſaid in the preceding part of this work, that previous to opening the trenches, a general ſhould have in his camp, if poſſible, the artillery ſtores and proviſions ready prepared, and particularly if his line of operation is of any conſiderable length, and the enemy has an army in the field, otherwiſe bad weather, and the attacks he muſt expect continually from the enemy, will render the arrival of his convoys precarious, ſlow, and uncertain. The greateſt part of his army muſt be employed in eſcortes, patroles, &c. whereas it ſhould be employed either in carrying on the ſiege, or in protecting thoſe who do; ſo that the work may proceed regularly, and as quick as poſſible, for all delays are dangerous, and always turn to the advantage of the enemy of courſe: too many men, and too great a quantity of artillery, can never be employed.

In order to protect as much as poſſible thoſe employed in the ſiege, experience has taught the neceſſity of lines of contravallation and circumvallation, which ought never to be omitted, if the garriſon is ſtrong and moreover the enemy has any army in the field. This enables you to carry on your operation without interruption, and greatly diminiſhes the labour of your troops. I do not mean that you ſhould wait for the enemy within your lines, by no means; the army which covers the ſiege, muſt meet the enemy in the field, always at ſuch a diſtance that in caſe you are beat, you have time to withdraw your troops, and artillery, as the king at Kollin, which could not have been done, had the battle been fought within a league or two of Prague. At the ſiege of Olmutz, the king neglected every precaution; inſomuch, that the place was never properly inveſted, and of courſe the beſieged ſeveral times received ſuccours of various kinds unperceived, which

which beſides its real uſe gives great encouragement to the garriſon, and diminiſhes the hopes and confidence of the beſiegers. When we conſider that the enemy's light troops, very numerous, got immediately between Olmutz and Troppau, from whence every thing came to the army, and Monſieur de Ville was with a ſtrong body of horſe between the firſt place and Brinn, from whence detachments were continually ſent beyond the Morava, which often defeated his majeſty's poſts, and always interrupted the progreſs of the ſiege, while Laudohn and his light troops acted day and night on his line of operation, and attacked his convoys. Thus the two capital points (I mean his ſubſiſtence and the ſafety of thoſe who conducted the ſiege) being totally neglected, he was forced to raiſe it, which would have happened even had Marſhal Daun had no army in the field, for I am convinced that Marſhal Laudohn alone at the head of twenty thouſand light troops, acting upon the king's line near forty miles long, in a country peculiarly adapted to the operations of ſuch troops, would have forced his majeſty to abandon it, and indeed this General and Ziſkowitz, with two detachments of about twelve thouſand men, did perform this work; for Marſhal Daun did not act himſelf, but only placed himſelf ſo, that he might protect and ſupport thoſe who did. Moreover the king had by no means a ſufficient quantity of artillery, ſeventy pieces is nothing againſt a good place and a good garriſon, he ſhould have had three times as much; deſpatch is every thing on ſuch occaſions. The poſt the king occupied at Proſnitz, was of all others the moſt improper, as it left his rear and his line with Troppau, quite naked and defenceleſs, and expoſed to be continually inſulted; whereas if he had camped with his main army at Mahriſch Tribau, with two corps, one at Landſcron and the other at Zittau, Marſhal Daun could not have ſent his light troops on the road towards Troppau, and muſt have changed his poſition, and by a round-about march, to avoid fighting, endeavoured to place himſelf between Olmutz and Brinn;

then the poſt of Proſnitz would have been good, whereas it was of no uſe, while Marſhal Daun was at Leitomiſchel; on the contrary it enabled that General to employ his light troops with every advantage poſſible, and at laſt brought on the loſs of the convoy, which was a deciſive event, and alone would have forced his majeſty to raiſe the ſiege. Poſted as the Pruſſians were, they were ſurrounded by the enemy's parties, who penetrated wherever they pleaſed, and of courſe interrupted the operations of the ſiege; no army however numerous poſted in detachments round a place, can inveſt it effectually; it muſt occupy nine or ten miles of ground, and if it formed a chain, which cannot be done, the enemy by making ſome falſe attacks, will get through it in twenty different places, and even by day force any part in ſpite of you; the circular form of ſuch a chain, makes it every where weak, and no part can be abandoned to ſupport thoſe which are attacked. If therefore the enemy has any force at all in the field, a ſiege cannot be carried on unleſs the place is ſurrounded by good lines, and though this is a truth demonſtrated by experience, and the examples of all great men, we find the king of Pruſſia always neglected this neceſſary precaution; we alſo find that he is not ſucceſsful, for whenever any real attempt was made to raiſe a ſiege formed by him, it ſucceeded, and always will; even lines are often forced, becauſe the communication between the different parts of them, is interſected by the cannon of the place, to a great diſtance, and very often by rivers, and other obſtacles, ſo that the troops which guard them, muſt remain where they are; whereas the enemy's motions are free, ſo that he can bring a greater number to act in different points, than thoſe who are confined within the lines. Hence it is that if they are acceſſible in many parts, and the enemy is provided with faſcines, he will penetrate ſomewhere; you are too near the town to fall back and form again, on ſome advantageous ground, the troops to the right and left are taken in flank, and you muſt fly as you can. For which

reaſons

reaſons no attempt ſhould ever be made to defend lines, if they are at all acceſſible in many or all their parts, yet they are abſolutely neceſſary if you beſiege a place, and the enemy has an army in the field.

I ſuppoſe prince Henry's army was weak, otherwiſe it would ſeem, that if inſtead of going to Franconia, to raiſe contributions he had entered Bohemia, ſuch an enterprize would have facilitated the king's operations before Olmutz; this is only a ſurmiſe, it is poſſible he was afraid of leaving Saxony, leſt the army of the empire ſhould force the paſſes behind him; his army was ſmall no doubt, for we find he could not prevent the army of the empire taking Pirna and Sonnenſtein in his preſence.

The ſituation in which the king was, at the beginning of the campaign, made it neceſſary to take Schweidnitz, to prevent the enemy from entering Sileſia on that ſide, and advance as in the foregoing year to Breſlaw; but the ſiege of Olmutz was a raſh and inconſiderate operation, which if ſucceſsful would have proved diſadvantageous to him, becauſe he could not preſerve it, unleſs he left there an army, and then only till winter, when the Auſtrians would have retaken it; no place iſolated which you cannot preſerve ought to be beſieged unleſs to deſtroy it, becauſe you will loſe your garriſon; moreover the king having many and powerful enemies in the field, and no men to ſpare in garriſon, he ought to have collected all his forces for the field, and wait the moment it was neceſſary to act, and not act till then; more than two thirds of his army were new levies; he ſhould have brought them into the field only when neceſſary, taken time to form them, and not expoſe them raw, as they were, to the hard labours which neceſſarily attends a ſiege; by doing otherwiſe an epidemical diſtemper ſeized them, and deſtroyed a prodigious number, inſomuch, that the corps under Marſhal Keith, which ſhould have ſixteen thouſand men compleat, was reduced to leſs than half that number, which accounts for his very

very ſlow progreſs; he had not a ſufficient number of men, nor half artillery enough; he had but one attack, and that ſo weak, that during the whole ſiege, the fire of the place was ſuperior to his, and after near forty days work, he was as far from taking the place as the firſt day; the nearer he approached it, the more certain his loſs, while the enemy's fire was ſuperior, and in my opinion, he muſt in the end have fallen back, until his fire was ſtronger, and perhaps abandoned the enterpriſe totally. People grow tired in a long ſiege, grow impatient, right or wrong will advance, this brings on heavy calamities, becauſe you cannot advance with ſafety, but ſtep by ſtep, and in proportion as your fire increaſes, and that of the place diminiſhes. This is the reaſon why you muſt raiſe your firſt batteries at a diſtance, though perhaps favoured by the ground, it might be done much nearer, but it muſt not be done, for if the enemy's fire is ſtrong, he will kill you many men, and in an hour deſtroy what you have been forty in doing. The event of this enterpriſe, and the cauſe which produced it, (I mean the taking of the convoy) confirms the doctrine we eſtabliſhed in the preceding volume, which is, that a fortreſs, conſtructed with a view to cover the country, ſhould be placed at a conſiderable diſtance from the frontier, and not cloſe to it, becauſe in the firſt caſe it enables you to act on the enemy's line of operation, which is the only method you have to retard the enemy's progreſs, with ſafety and ſucceſs, for it is by no means adviſeable to riſk a general action. Whereas if it is placed cloſe to the frontier, and of courſe the enemy's line is ſhort and eaſily defended, you cannot act upon it, you muſt fight or let the place be taken in your preſence; we ſhall conclude our obſervation, by ſaying that the king did no one thing, which ſhould have been done. He abandoned his line of operation to the mercy of the enemy; he never inveſted the place, ſo that it received ſuccours of different kinds during the whole ſiege; he had not artillery or ſtores, proviſions, &c. ſufficient; his army was not

not ſtrong enough to carry on the ſiege, and to occupy a hundred different poſts, which was done ineffectually, and harraſſed his men ſo much that they became extremely ſickly, and he loſt many men. He neglected every precaution, as if the enemy had no army in the field, and that the garriſon conſiſted only of a few hundred men, and the place a bicoque; for which reaſon he deſervedly failed in his enterpriſe, which coſt him many men, and much time and treaſure.

When we compare his conduct with that of Marſhal Daun, we ſhall find ſuch rules for the conduct of generals, in ſimilar occaſions, as may ſerve hereafter for guides, certain and infallible.

The reſult of the king's conduct ſhews what is to be done by a general who undertakes a ſiege, for by neglecting it he miſcarried.

That of Marſhal Daun will furniſh no leſs certain rules for a general who dares not riſk a battle, and indeed ought not, but where every other means to ſtop the progreſs of the enemy fail, and is however commanded to do it.

Marſhal Daun's army was almoſt compoſed of recruits; the few veterans diſmayed by the unfortunate concluſion of laſt campaign. It was dangerous to approach the enemy, moreover, he expected conſiderable reinforcements from Flanders, Italy, &c. For which reaſon he wiſhed to be forgot and neglected by the enemy; he was ſo, and therefore he continued a long time at Leitomiſchel. This poſition was ſtrong, and ſo far off, that the king could not leave the neighbourhood of Olmutz, and go after Daun. The poſition of the Auſtrian forces while the king was at Olmutz, was as follows: The main army under Daun at Leitomiſchel, fifty Engliſh miles from Olmutz; General de Ville, with a ſtrong corps, had been left in Moravia; upon the approach of the Pruſſians he retired gradually to Olmutz, and being puſhed threw all his infantry into that place, and retired with his cavalry, ſtep by ſtep, towards Brinn, from whence he ſent detachments over the Morava, which under Count

St.

St. Ignon did much and important ſervices, as we have ſeen. On the left of the main army, and advanced before it, on the ſide of Glatz, was placed general Harſch, with a ſtrong corps, and beyond this all the light troops which advanced occaſionally to the road which leads from Troppau to Olmutz, and conſequently covered the country on that ſide againſt the enemy's parties, and moreover alarmed his poſts continually, and often intercepted and always interrupted his convoys; to which chiefly muſt be attributed the very ſlow progreſs of the ſiege, which was finally raiſed by their taking and deſtroying the great convoy, which muſt have happened though Marſhal Daun had not interfered. This illuſtrious general who left nothing to chance, nor did a wrong thing when permitted to follow his own judgment, reſolved to come nearer the enemy, when his own army was in a condition to meet him, and when his adverſary's forces were greatly diminiſhed, and ſcattered about the country to defend poſts which he could not defend; accordingly he quitted his poſt at Zwittau, and in four days march through a moſt difficult country, arrived the ſeventeenth of June at Evannowitz, within ten miles of the enemy, without his having the leaſt knowledge of it. This fine and vigorous operation, performed with wonderful wiſdom and activity, was in itſelf deciſive; for though the enemy had been provided with ſtores, proviſions, &c. he could not poſſibly have carried on the ſiege with an army in front, a ſtrong place in the rear, and his communication with Sileſia cut off, inſomuch that a cart could not come from thence, unleſs eſcorted by a ſtrong body of troops; and even this precaution was not ſufficient, the place was not inveſted, or rather was abſolutely open on the left of the Morava, ſo that nothing hindered the Marſhal from throwing what ſuccours he pleaſed into it. The proximity of the Marſhal drew the king's attention that way, which enabled the Auſtrians to deſtroy the convoy, as we have ſeen. The Marſhal not content with this deciſive

ſucceſs,

ſucceſs, reſolved to put an end to the buſineſs, and in two more marches performed in the preſence, and within reach of the king, paſſed the Morava, and encamped within cannon ſhot of the town; and if in that very night the king had not raiſed the ſiege and decamped, it is probable the Marſhal would have taken ſuch meaſures as to render the king's retreat difficult, and perhaps impracticable, which I ſuppoſe determined him to go off as ſoon as poſſible.

The column under Marſhal Keith, where the artillery and equipage were, was conducted with uncommon wiſdom, and defended, when attacked, with great vigour. On his coming to Zwittau he was forced to take the ſame road the king had done. It ſeems ſtrange and contrary to all rules that Marſhal Keith's column ſhould march laſt. The king the ſecond day ſhould have taken ſome very ſtrong camp, and ordered Marſhal Keith's diviſion to make the van of the whole, while his majeſty, with the greateſt part of his army, ſhould have made the rear; and as on all ſuch occaſions, diſtributed his troops in echellons, ſo that they might ſupport each other when attacked, and march thus ſeparated, with the more celerity, which is the point to be aimed at in a retreat.

This retreat, like all others we hear of, was executed with ſucceſs, for this ſimple reaſon. It was not interrupted by any ſerious and powerful attack, which is now the common practice. For my part, I ſhould upon ſuch an occaſion purſue the enemy with my whole army, and attack one or other of his columns with my principal force, while the remainder ſhould be employed in haraſſing the others. This nonchalance is the more reprehenſible, as in acting with vigour you riſk nothing. The enemy cannot remain on the ſpot, he muſt retire, he muſt fight if you pleaſe, or abandon his equipage, and part of his army, and run away. Whereas you may bring on a general action, or not, as you like, he cannot force *you*. It will be ſaid that Marſhal Daun ought not to riſk an action, becauſe he knew the enemy muſt

ſoon be obliged to retire, and be called elſewhere. I grant all this, but it is nothing to the purpoſe; for he might have fought him as long as he pleaſed, without being forced to fight a battle, which in ſuch caſes is by no means neceſſary; you may by partial, though vigorous attacks, ruin an enemy, or force him to abandon his artillery, equipage, &c. I beg leave to recommend to the Reader's peruſal, what I have wrote on this ſubject in my preceding volume.

CHAP. II.

Of the Operations of the Ruſſian Army commanded by General Fermor.

IN the preceding volume, we gave an account of the retreat of the Ruſſians into Poland, which gave General Lewald an opportunity to march with his army to Pomerania to oppoſe the Swedes, and having beat them, to aſſiſt the king in Saxony, leaving in Pruſſia only two batallions and fifty huſſars, who retired alſo into Pomerania, on the approach of the Ruſſians, who with about thirty thouſand men in the month of January, took poſſeſſion of all Pruſſia, which the king found it impoſſible to defend at ſo very great a diſtance againſt a powerful enemy almoſt on the frontier of it, and ſo very properly abandoned it. By thus concentring his forces, he could with more eaſe and facility oppoſe the various armies, with which he was ſurrounded, and upon any particular occaſion collect a ſufficient force to ſtop their progreſs, whereas if he perſiſted in defending Pruſſia, a powerful army would be neceſſary, and this he could not ſpare.

March. The Ruſſians remained quiet during the months of January and February. In March a conſiderable corps advanced into Poland and took poſſeſſion of Elbing and Thorn, on the Viſtula, a neceſſary meaſure, in order to ſecure a paſſage over that river, and alſo to form magazines,

magazines, which might eaſily be collected in ſuch a corn country as Poland, and brought there by water carriage, a thing of the utmoſt importance, and particularly where the roads on the falling of a ſhower of rain become impaſſable. In order to accelerate what might be thought neceſſary, the General, Count Fermor took up his head quarters at Marienwerder on the ninth of March; the army remained in quarters till May: about the end of this month the troops approached May. the Viſtula and paſſed the river near Dirſchau; the diviſion commanded by Count Romanzow, encamped near Conitz, who ſent a ſtrong detachment under Major General Demiſcow towards the New March and Pomerania in order to raiſe contributions, which orders he executed without mercy, carrying off what he could, and deſtroying the reſt, if credit may be given to what has been wrote on the ſubject. The tenth of June, the army marched to Conitz, where the whole June. aſſembled and General Demiſcow was again detached with three thouſand huſſars and two thouſand grenadiers on horſeback towards a town called Kazimirſberg in Pomerania, which was taken and plundered as well as the whole country, where the Coſſacks could penetrate and then retired again into Poland. The twenty-eighth of June, the army left Conitz, and on the firſt of July arrived at Poſen on the Wartha, while Count Romanzow marched into Pomerania and the New March. The approach of ſuch a powerful army, whoſe detachments run along the right of the Oder from the frontiers of Sileſia through Brandeburg and Pomerania and ſpread terror and deſolation wherever they came, made it neceſſary to oppoſe an army to curb, and if poſſible ſtop their progreſs; accordingly the king ordered that which the year before had been in Pruſſia under Marſhal Lewald, and was now in Swediſh Pomerania commanded by Count Dohna to march againſt the Ruſſian main army. Lieutenant General Canitz preceded with a ſtrong vanguard, a body of Ruſſians under General Demiſcow made an attempt againſt Drieſen but was repulſed by Colonel Count Huerd. The ſame day (tenth of July) the Ruſſian army advanced to Mied- July.

zyrycz, and immediately ſent a ſtrong corps provided with artillery, &c. to attack Drieſen again, while a detachment was placed at Neübruck to intercept the garriſon in its retreat. The Ruſſians having taken the place followed the garriſon to Friedberg where they attacked them, the greateſt part of the garriſon was compoſed of Auſtrians, who on ſeeing the Ruſſians cried Vivat Maria Thereſa, and joined them; the remainder compoſed of militia defended themſelves extremely well and made good their retreat to Landſberg on the Wartha.

In the mean time Count Romanzow was advanced to Stargard and General Reſanow to Stolpe, with a view to ſecure the communication
Auguſt. with the Oder.

The chief object the Ruſſians had, was the taking of Cuſtrin, which they hoped might be done before the arrival of the king, who they knew was coming from Sileſia with conſiderable ſuccours to join Count Dohna's army which lay encamped near Frankfort. Cuſtrin is ſmall but very ſtrong from its ſituation on the Oder, which joins the Wartha there, this river is very deep, and rapid in its courſe, being narrow; it is ſurrounded by a moraſs, through which is raiſed a wad or a dam by which alone you can approach it on that ſide. It communicates with the country beyond the Oder, by a bridge of timber, at the head of which is a fauxbourg, but no outwork I believe at all, which is a great fault, for had their been a good one, the Ruſſians could not have come near enough to bombard the town, which laid it in aſhes. It had at this time a ſtrong garriſon commanded by a brave man, Colonel Schach de Wittenau.

On the fifteenth of Auguſt a detachment of Ruſſians followed by the whole army approached the town, and immediately without opening the trenches, or raiſing any breaſtwork or regular batteries to cover the cannon, or men that ſerve them, in open field began to throw bombs, which in a few hours laid it in aſhes, but neither did nor could in the leaſt hurt the ramparts, and produced no other effect than the ruin of many thouſand people, and wounded three ſoldiers.

The

The third day only General Fermor thought it neceſſary to ſummons the town to ſurrender, which ſhould have been done before he bombarded it, threatening to take it by ſtorm, if they did not give up the place; this meſſage was in the higheſt degree ridiculous, the Oder was to be got over without a bridge or even a boat. Not one ſingle ſhot had been directed againſt the works, conſequently no breach made, nor one cannon diſmounted. How his Excellency propoſed taking the place by ſtorm, we leave it to his friends to explain.

On the twenty-ſecond of Auguſt, the king with very conſiderable reinforcements from Sileſia, and two regiments of horſe from Saxony, arrived at Count Dohna's army, and on the day following paſſed the Oder below Cuſtrin at Guſtebieſe; this obliged the Ruſſians to raiſe the ſiege and take another poſition. The corps brought from Ruſſia under General Broome, and that which had lain before Cuſtrin joined the army; on the twenty-fourth the king advanced nearer the Ruſſians, and on the twenty-fifth a general action enſued, the moſt bloody of any which happened during this very active war; which goes by the name of the battle of Zorndorff, a village on the field of battle. We ſhall give the different accounts.

Account publiſhed by the Ruſſians.

IN obedience to the king's command I left Cuſtrin, and on the twenty-fourth, found our army encamped at Darmutzel, that of the enemy was formed with the right at Zicker, and the left at Quartſchen, and Zorndorff behind it, between two and three in the morning we advanced over the Mikel a ſmall river, and proceeded through the wood called Maſſin, and the village Batzlow into a plain, where the columns opened and extended as far as Zorndorff, by which means we were exactly behind the enemy. We expected that this manœuvre would have thrown them into confuſion, but we were miſtaken, as the ground on which they ſtood was not ſufficiently extenſive, they formed in four lines, making front every way which was protected by a numerous artillery, and chivaux de frize, their right flank

flank was covered by the village Zicker, behind which was their cavalry poſted in the plain; prince Maurice under the king commanded our firſt line, General Manteufel the left of the infantry, and General Seidlitz the cavalry of the ſame wing; the infantry ſupported by the artillery attacked the villages, theſe were followed by two thouſand two hundred grenadiers; but about eleven o'clock, when we ſaw the enemy preparing to withdraw the artillery, theſe grenadiers from whence much was expected, without any viſible cauſe, run away, at leaſt one thouſand paces before they could be ſtopped. This made a great opening in the line, which left the flanks of both infantry and cavalry quite unprotected, of which the enemy's cavalry tried to avail themſelves, but without ſucceſs; firſt, by doing it too late, and ſecondly, that General Seidlitz, notwithſtanding the ground was cloſe and difficult, advanced at the head of the cavalry, which checked that of the enemy, and gave our infantry time to rally behind it; the king informed of the flight of the grenadiers, ordered three regiments of infantry, two batallions of grenadiers, five ſquadrons of dragoons, five of gens d'armes, and three of garde de corps to advance and aſſiſt them. At twelve o'clock the attack was renewed, and General Seidlitz having thrown the enemy's cavalry into confuſion, took their infantry in flank, and our infantry at the ſame time ſupported by forty pieces of cannon, advanced and drove the enemy out of the village Zorndorff, where they found the baggage and military cheſt, in which was about eighty thouſand rubles, (about one hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds); notwithſtanding the diſorder which prevailed in the enemy's right, they would not abandon their ground, which occaſioned a great ſlaughter among them. While we thought ourſelves ſure of the victory, we obſerved the remainder of their right wing, and their reſerve form again at Quartſchen. We advanced and attacked the enemy again, and after a vigorous onſet, forced him to retire and quit his ground, and at ſun-ſet the battle was finiſhed; his defeat would have been

compleat

compleat and total, had not one of the enemy's Generals (Demiſcow) towards the evening, with a body of choſen men, advanced againſt our right, and though he loſt the greateſt part of his men, he got however time for their infantry to retire towards our left, and during the night to take another poſition, where the whole army was collected and united; we remained under arms during that night. The next morning, the twenty-ſixth, we cannonaded each other; the twenty-ſeventh the enemy ſeemed inclined to fight another battle, but inſtead of advancing they marched towards the road which leads to Landſberg. As it was impoſſible for them to reach that city in our preſence, ſo they turned towards Wietz, and camped between that village and the river Wartha, which was very wrong, as they had no bridge to paſs it, nor could they ſubſiſt long there. Our loſs, conſidering ſo great a victory, is very moderate, and conſiſts of about thirty officers killed, eighty wounded, ſeven hundred and ſixty men killed, one thouſand three hundred and ſeventy-two wounded, and three hundred and fifty miſſing. Whereas the enemy's loſs is about twenty thouſand men; we took above twelve thouſand priſoners, among which are five generals, and ſixty officers of different ranks. The reaſon of our ſmall loſs compared with that of the enemy is, that their artillery was ill ſerved, and the men not expert in the uſe of their arms. The men are however ſtrong and brave, a ſhot through the body does not hinder them from continuing the fight; we have moreover taken one hundred and four cannons, twelve mortars, twenty-ſeven pair of colours, five ſtandards, &c.

From this account nothing more can be collected, than that the Pruſſians left wing attacked the enemy's right, was repulſed, but at length drove it out of the field, after an action which laſted from near ten in the morning till ſix in the evening, and not till ſun-ſet as the Writer ſays. The victory, ſuch as it was, was entirely owing to the cavalry, under whoſe protection the repulſed infantry rallied, and at length

length after the cavalry had driven that of the enemy back, and attacked his infantry in flank, they advanced, renewed the attack, and drove him out of the field.

As I have the greateſt veneration for the king of Pruſſia's abilities, it is with diffidence I preſume to offer my opinion on his conduct; however I muſt aſk, why, after the enemy's right was totally beat as it is ſaid, and forced to abandon the field, he did not ſend ſome troops after them to prevent their rallying, and with the remainder of his army attack their center in flank and rear, while his right attacked their left? This would in all probability have produced their total defeat, or rather deſtruction. Why the day following, when the enemy formed a line in front, he did not attack them? When the twenty-ſeventh they retired, as this account ſays, between Wietz and the Wartha, with their rear to it, he did not place himſelf acroſs their right wing? This would have rendered their retreat to Landſberg impoſſible, and having neither boats to croſs the river, nor ſubſiſtence for many days, they muſt have fought their way through his army, or ſurrendered. Why camp at Tamſel, and ſo leave the road to Landſberg open? and in the ſix days they continued at Groſs Camin, nor in their retreat, ever attempt to attack them? If the Ruſſians after the battle formed on the left, as it is marked in all the plans I have ſeen of this battle, how could they march uninterrupted cloſe before the Pruſſians front, if they were at Tamſel, or behind their army, and between it and Cuſtrin, if it was on the field of battle, to Gros Camin? all this is inconceivable. We therefore think that the action did not paſs as repreſented in the plan; or that the Ruſſians, after the battle, did not form acroſs the enemy's left flank, as in *y y* but on the contrary, acroſs his right flank, from whence they could eaſily retire to Gros Camin, which in the other caſe ſeems impoſſible. It is wonderful that of ſix different accounts of this battle which I have now before me, none tells us preciſely what was the poſition of the

Ruſſians

Ruſſians the twenty-ſixth in the morning; nor when the king marched to Tamſel, though it ſhould ſeem it was on the twenty ſeventh, when the former went to Gros Camin. Upon the whole I think it certain that the Ruſſians marched thither by their left to avoid another action, and not by their right, which would inevitably have engaged them in one, if the king thought proper. The king's army was formed in three lines; two of infantry, and one of cavalry, behind it, whoſe orders were to advance only when the enemy was thrown into confuſion, or to protect the retreat of the infantry, and favour its rallying, in caſe it was repulſed, which happened. To this diſpoſition alone his majeſty owed his victory, as he avowed himſelf. We are happy to find our doctrine on this ſubject (propoſed in the firſt volume) confirmed by ſuch an example, and by ſo great a man as the king of Pruſſia.

The loſs of the Pruſſians was not ſo ſmall as the author of this account makes it. It conſiſts of

In the CAVALRY, Officers and Soldiers

	Killed			Wounded			Miſſing		
	Officers	und. off.	ſol.	Offic.	und. off.	ſol.	Offic.	und. offi.	ſold.
	16	30	496	60	56	584	2	4	80
INFANTRY	45	98	2959	186	262	5015	15	38	1303

There are two more accounts of the battle given by the Pruſſians, but neither gives us any circumſtances which may lead to the knowledge of the ground, or explain the manner in which it paſſed; they ſay nothing more than that their left wing having been repulſed ſeveral times, rallied under the protection of the cavalry, and by the help of this, after a bloody action from ten in the morning till night, drove at length the enemy's right out of the field, as we have ſeen. They do not ſay that their right or center acted at all, at leaſt that they gained any advantage; on the contrary it ſeems clear by their own account, that General Demiſcow's attack reſtrained them, and prevented their proſecuting the advantage gained over the enemy's right.

On the Ruſſian ſide ſeveral accounts were publiſhed, two by the commander in chief, and one by general Panin, neither contains any thing which gives much inſight into the affair. The firſt aſſures the Empreſs he got the battle, and that his army was encamped on the field of action, while the very ſame day he wrote to Count Dohna, the Pruſſian general, to deſire leave to bury the dead, and carry off the wounded; what impudent lies! If he was maſter of the field, why aſk leave to return there to bury the dead? Count Panin was wounded, with a contuſion, very early in the action, the important part of which he was unacquainted with, and he recounts even what he ſaw in a manner, which proves that the ſmoak or other circumſtances prevented him from ſeeing clear, which too often happens; we are therefore obliged to recur to the account given by one Arnfeld, a Swediſh officer, volunteer in the Ruſſian army, as the only one which has ſome likeneſs to truth.

"Count Fermor being informed the king had paſſed the Oder, raiſed the blockade of Cuſtrin, and marched with his whole army into the plain, and formed with the right, conſiſting of the new corps which arrived this day towards Zicker, and the left towards Zorndorff; this poſition enabled him to oppoſe the enemy, whether he advanced by Neüdamm or New Mill; he ſtopped at Neüdamm, and ſeemed diſpoſed to attack our left flank; however, the twenty-fifth in the morning he marched round our right wing, and behind us as far as Zorndorff, which obliged us to change our front, and conſequently our right became the left, and the left the right; this was executed in the preſence of the enemy, without confuſion or loſs of time; we drew back our right from Zorndorff to Quartſchen, that we might have more room to extend our line, to prevent the enemy from attacking us in the flank; Zorndorff was burnt that he might not cover his motions; as the ſmoak was not diſſipated ſoon enough, the enemy advanced, ſupported by a heavy cannonade, and attacked our right, which

which they endeavoured to take in flank. They were however repulſed, and ran off behind their third line compoſed entirely of cavalry, by which they were enabled to form again, and renew the attack. Our cavalry ſupported our infantry, but that of the enemy being much more numerous, it was obliged to give way, otherwiſe the affair in this wing would have been inſtantly determined in our favour. Our infantry obliged to oppoſe that of the enemy, was, after having repulſed it ſeveral times, compelled alſo to give way, while the enemy was continually reinforced by freſh troops. In the mean time our left was attacked, but repulſed the enemy, and with fixed bayonets drove him back in the greateſt confuſion, and even attacked the right of his center and left wing, and threw it into diſorder; our right wing availed itſelf of theſe favourable circumſtances, attacked the enemy, and drove him quite back; but his fine cavalry which had ſaved his left in the beginning of the action, again ſtopped our progreſs, hindered our grenadiers from proſecuting their advantage, and gave his infantry time to rally. Our cavalry on the left, commanded by general Demiſcow, did great ſervice on this occaſion. As ſoon as the enemy's infantry was formed behind the cavalry, which had ſuffered much, they advanced and renewed the attack, which was likewiſe done ſoon after by their left, with more vigour than ever, and at laſt the enemy's corps de reſerve penetrated into our center; and though he did not inſtantly derive any advantage from this circumſtance, however our right and left were totally ſeparated, and the firſt forced to retire, keeping up a continual fire towards the little river, the Mitzel, and the wood; our left remaining on the ſpot. Though general Brown, who commanded it, had been dangerouſly wounded, and colonel Soltikow, were taken priſoners by ſome huſſars who came behind them, and a great number of other officers of all ranks; our good countenance, the diſorder into which we had thrown the enemy's army, and his loſs, and the continual fire from our right,

prevented him from renewing the attack againſt our left, and at laſt compelled him to retire by his right behind Zicker, leaving ſeveral pieces of cannon, and wounded men behind him; our right, in retiring towards the river, left alſo ſeveral pieces behind, which the enemy could not carry off that night. The ſame night our right joined the left, which had always remained on the field of battle; the confuſion which prevailed every where, and the poſition the enemy took behind Zicker, obliged us to change ours, and we camped exactly oppoſite the place on which we ſtood the preceding day, where we remained two days, and then marched unmoleſted to Gros Camin, where our baggage was; we took twenty-ſix cannon, and ſeveral priſoners. The enemy camped between Zicker and Wilkerdorff, and drew a line before his front."

This account of the Ruſſian manœuvres ſeems clear, the right wing joined the left, where it had remained during and after the battle, from whence I conclude, that on the twenty-ſixth the Ruſſians formed ſome where on that ſide; but if, as he ſays, the enemy was poſted between Zicker and Wilkerdorff, and not at Tamſel, how could they march about his left to Gros and Klein Camin? There muſt be ſomething wrong and unintelligible in all theſe accounts*.

The loſs of the Ruſſians killed, wounded, and miſſing, nine hundred and thirty-nine officers; non-commiſſion and private killed and wounded, eighteen thouſand five hundred; ditto taken priſoners, three thouſand. The ſame officer, in another letter to Count Hamilton, a general in the Swediſh ſervice, ſays, that when the firſt line was forced back, and the ſecond advanced to ſupport it, they fired upon them, and killed a great number, which brought the whole into the utmoſt confuſion; the conſequence of which was, they fell upon their own baggage, plundered it, and got ſo drunk with brandy they found there, that they could no longer be brought to obey, or even hear their officers; and had the enemy advanced at that time, they would have been all cut to pieces.

After

* See note C.

After the battle the Ruſſians marched on the heights between Camin and Vietz in a very advantageous poſition; both armies were formed in battle on the twenty-ſixth, however nothing happened, except a heavy cannonade, which being far off, had little or no effect. On the twenty-ſeventh it changed its poſition, and camped further back, beyond theſe two villages, and the Pruſſians followed them about three miles. The king intended attacking ſome redoubts which the Ruſſians had raiſed, in order to cover the road which leads through the wood towards Landſberg, on the Wartha, and advanced without any eſcorte to reconnoitre them within gun-ſhot of them; being obſerved, they fired a great number of ſhot from cannons and howitzers, which endangered his perſon. So he retired in haſte; but as it was neceſſary to obſerve nearly the motions of the enemy, he ordered prince Maurice of Anhalt Deſſau, with an avantgarde of forty ſquadrons of dragoons, two regiments of huſſars, and ſeven batallions, to camp out of the reach of the cannon, while the army remained at Tamſel.

At length on the thirty-firſt of Auguſt the Ruſſians quitted their camp behind Gros Camin, and marched by Blomberg, through the woods and village of Maſſin to Landſberg. The Pruſſians advanced to Blomberg the firſt of September, about four miles off Tamſel. On the ſecond the king with part of his army returned towards Saxony, where the ſituation of prince Henry was critical, on the point of being attacked by the Imperial army under Marſhal Daun, and that of the empire under the prince of Deuxponts. What remained of the Pruſſian army was much weaker than that of the Ruſſians, which had been joined here by Count Romanzow's diviſion, and the corps which general Riſanow had in Pomerania, near Stolpe. Though the Ruſſian army was by theſe reinforcements as ſtrong as ever, yet it undertook nothing at all. The Pruſſians van was camped within four miles of Landſberg, which the Ruſſians attempted to bring to action by ſurpriſe, September.

priſe, but in vain; the Pruſſian general always found means to baffle their attempts. On the twenty-firſt of September the Ruſſians left Landſberg, and marched into Pomerania, leaving a ſtrong garriſon at Landſberg. General Woberſnow was ſent to attack that poſt, which the Ruſſians avoided by leaving the town, and paſſing over the Wartha into Poland. The Pruſſian van under general Manteufel followed the enemy's main army, which encamped by Stargard, the Pruſſians at Pyritz. The Ruſſian general Pulmbach, with a conſiderable corps, was ſent to beſiege Colberg, a ſmall place not ſtrong, and a ſea-port in the Baltic, which would have been of the utmoſt advantage to the Ruſſians could they have taken it; who having a fleet might have formed magazines there, and co-operated with their army on land, and even have been enabled to place a great part of their army in winter quarters in Pomerania, where are many towns ſurrounded with walls in the old faſhion, which by making a good ditch palliſaded, and raiſing a few redoubts before the gates, might be rendered capable of a good defence, at leaſt until their forces could be collected, and brought to ſuccour the place attacked. In ſhort, with very little pains and induſtry ſuch towns, even when they have no walls, may be rendered inattackable to any corps unprovided with cannon. There is no paſſing a good foſſé palliſaded without cannon, if men will defend themſelves. For theſe reaſons this ſiege was determined on; accordingly General Pulmbach approached the place
October. on the third of October, and in a few days raiſed ſeveral batteries, chiefly of mortars and howitzers, which fired continually until the thirty-firſt of the ſame month, when the Ruſſians retired, not having been able to make a breach. Major Heyde, who commanded in the place a ſmall but vigorous garriſon, acquired immortal honour by his very brave and ſkilful conduct in the defence of this place; his loſs killed and wounded did not exceed five or ſix men.

During the ſiege the Ruſſian army remained at Stargard, till the eighteenth, when they marched to Dramburg, where they remained till

till the third of November. The Ruſſians had occupied Greiffen- November.
berg, Count Dohna ordered General Platten, with a detachment of huſſars and a regiment of dragoons to attack it; upon his approach the Ruſſians retired, but the Pruſſians came up with them not far off and intirely defeated them; colonel Cubendorf and captain Lochſtedt, diſtinguiſhed themſelves very much on this occaſion. This event though in itſelf of ſmall conſequence contributed to raiſe the ſiege of Colberg; as it opened a communication with that city. After this action General Fermor recalled General Pulmbach and his corps, and on the third of November returned by Templeberg into Poland; General Ohlitz who commanded the Ruſſians at Drieſen, after he had ruined all the works old and new, abandoned that place, and retired alſo into Poland, where the Ruſſians took up their winter quarters partly on the Viſtula, and partly in the kingdom of Pruſſia. The head quarters, heavy artillery, &c. were fixed at Marienwerden, ſo the Ruſſians with a mighty army concluded this campaign, without executing any one thing worthy to be tranſmitted to poſterity; they wanted neither force nor valour, why then, will it be aſked, did they nothing? the reaſons are obvious, and will ſhew, why, during the war in which they gained ſome very important victories, they never executed any ſolid enterprize.

In the preceding volume we have ſaid, that the final ſucceſs of a war muſt chiefly depend on the length and nature of the line of operation; if this is well choſen and directed to ſome capital object, ſucceſs will in general attend it; but if ill choſen, victory itſelf will lead to nothing.

The line on which the Ruſſians acted has its ſource, and origin like all others at the capital, unleſs the ſovereign commands in perſon; from thence generally ſtores of different kinds are brought, as well as the orders by which the operations of the army are regulated; for ſovereigns, and their miniſters, are too jealous of their power to confide it entirely to the General, however neceſſary; the circum-

ſtances

ſtances in war are tranſitory and almoſt inſtantaneous, a General ſhould therefore be inveſted with every power, that he may avail himſelf of them, but that is not the caſe, and therefore we muſt conſider the court as the firſt point of the line of operations; the ſecond is, that where your depots are lodged; and the third, finally that point or place you intend attacking. It is evident, firſt, that you cannot reckon on any ſubſiſtence, which may be collected between theſe two laſt points, becauſe the enemy will, or ought to employ every means to carry it off, or deſtroy it, which is eaſily done if he can take the field before you, and that your line is long, which of courſe makes your marches ſlow and tardy, and the more ſo, if his places of arms enable him to canton a great number of troops in a ſmall circumference eſpecially, and your cantonments are extenſive; but ſhould the enemy leave the country unmoleſted, the whole reſources you can draw from it, will be only green forage, ſome cattle, &c. until Auguſt, when you may get corn, and moreover horſes to ſupply the wants of the army, tranſport proviſions, &c. but this ſuppoſes the moſt exact diſcipline, and no leſs exact probity, in paying abundantly for whatever the peaſants furniſh, which circumſtance is too much neglected in all armies, and much retards their operations, and very often forces them to quit the field without even attempting any thing. The Ruſſian army ſo far from endeavouring to preſerve a country, on the contrary ſeem to make it their only ſtudy how to deſtroy it, which they do ſo effectually, that wherever they can penetrate, they leave it a perfect deſert, their ſteps are marked with blood and deſolation. Hence it is that they cannot act for any time on a given line, or remain on any one ſpot for a fortnight; when they advance a hundred miles from their depots, the tranſports become ſo difficult, particularly when Autumn is ſet in, and no intermediate depots are formed by what they might collect in the country as they advanced, they are of courſe obliged to return home, and always by a different road, from that by which they advanced.

It

It is a certain rule, from which a General ought never to depart, to ſhorten continually as he advances his line of operation, by forming new depots behind him on *that very line*, and no where elſe, otherwiſe he cannot move at all, for if he do form ſuch depots, if they are not placed on his line, the enemy will deſtroy them, and put an end to his operations. When the line of operation is determined, (and it always is, or may be ſo,) why are depots formed any where elſe? why diſperſed all round the country, as if intended to be given up to the enemy? unleſs to enable the commiſſary and contractors to make up a good account. The Auſtrians always loſt many of their great depots. In every campaign Prince Ferdinand loſt more than he ought to have done, which not only waſted immenſe ſums, but what is more eſſential, retarded the operations of the army, and very often defeated ſome well laid project, or enabled the enemy to execute what otherwiſe he would not have attempted. Time is every thing in war, and nothing makes you loſe it ſo much as delays, in receiving the neceſſary ſupplies; the reader will forgive this digreſſion on account of its very great importance. Secondly, the extreme length of the Ruſſian line, makes it impoſſible for them to carry with them artillery, ſtores, and proviſions for an army deſtined to execute a capital enterpriſe, which reduces all their operations to meer excurſions, and they are ſtopped by the moſt inconſiderable fortreſs: every attempt they made miſcarried in Turkey, excepting Bender, an old inſignificant place, defended without knowledge, and without valour. Chotzim, Ibrahilou, and Georgewa, were attempted, but in vain; the Ruſſians were repulſed with great loſs by the Turks, and afterwards abandoned them for want of heavy artillery, ſtores, and proviſions; they like the Tartars are forced to ſtop, change their route, or recur to violent and deſperate means in attempting places; without any breach or force to make any, they attempt to ſtorm walled towns; to facilitate which they begin with putting them on fire if they can, which ſometimes ſucceeds; when

they meet men void of honour, ignorant, or timorous, but nine times out of ten they fail, which exaſperates them, and renders them more cruel and unmerciful towards thoſe unhappy people who fall into their hands. The Ruſſian army has many of the cuſtoms and manners of the Tartars without their velocity; they are maſſive like the Europeans, but much ſlower, and undoubtedly leſs ſcientific. Though I muſt confeſs that the men are excellent, and among the generals there are many who would do honour to any army in Europe. Marſhal Romanzow is a man of great merit, and among his many good qualities as a general, he ſtudies and knows the genius and character of his enemy. Prince Repnin will acquire honour if ever he commands an army; ſo will Kamenſkoi and Soworow, and many more I could mention, for the reaſons above ſtated.

It is I think impoſſible for a Ruſſian army, or indeed any army, to act effectually on a line of ſuch length. And we ſee in fact that during this whole war every campaign was begun and ended as the preceding one had done. They marched from the Viſtula to Franckfurt on the Oder, and returned from the Oder to the Viſtula, without performing any thing, though in the year fifty-nine they had gained two great battles in a few days.

They and their confederates committed a moſt capital fault in the choice of their line of operations. The king of Pruſſia had wiſely abandoned Pomerania, which he could not defend againſt an enemy who was ſo near that province, and of courſe had ſo much more facility in attacking it, than the king in defending it; this he did with a view to concenter his forces, that he might occaſionally and ſucceſſively employ the ſame troops againſt different enemies, as they approached, and by this means, be in ſome meaſure on a par with them, or at leaſt ſufficiently ſtrong to ſtop their progreſs. The Ruſſians by coming to Franckfurt perfectly anſwered his purpoſe, for he was thereby enabled to employ the very ſame troops, in Moravia, on the Oder, and in Saxony.

Saxony. It is we think owing to this circumſtance principally, aided by his powerful genius and activity, that he did not ſink under the weight of ſuch power as was brought againſt him. Though the event of every campaign proved to a demonſtration the inſufficiency of the plan of operation, yet did the confederates perſevere in it to the laſt, by which the king of Pruſſia extricated himſelf with great glory from the greateſt danger that ever threatened any ſovereign. This perſeverance in a ſyſtem which every campaign ſhewed to be ill formed and falſe, is the more ſurpriſing, when we can make it appear, that they might have choſen another line of operation, not only free from all the difficulties they met with, but on which they would have found every facility poſſible; and moreover, by its direction would have forced the enemy to divide and ſeparate his forces in ſuch a manner, that he muſt have abandoned in a great meaſure the defence of one or other of his provinces. When I conſider the King of Pruſſia's dominions, and obſerve the figure of them, I find that the Oder is the great object he muſt ever have in view. He has many ſtrong places on it, though there is none in the center about Franckfurt, which I think a great fault, becauſe was there a capital fortreſs in that part, his dominions on that ſide would be invulnerable; but even as things now are, no enemy can fix himſelf there, though he gained twenty battles. He cannot ſeparate his army there, and had the Ruſſians taken Cuſtrin, they muſt have abandoned it, or loſt their garriſon, had they left one there, for this reaſon—the king can from Sileſia, Brandenburg, and Pomerania, bring one hundred thouſand men to Franckfurt in a fortnight, even in winter; the proximity of his ſtrong places, and the number of good towns, enable him to quarter many troops in a ſmall extent of country. For theſe reaſons the Ruſſians and Auſtrians in the year ſixty, far from being able to keep Berlin, were extremely happy after two days ſtay, to get away, the one to Poland, and the other to Saxony, though undoubtedly they had together near fifty

thouſand men. This muſt always be the caſe if you attack an enemy in the center of his dominions; whence it follows, that you muſt begin at one or other of the extreme provinces. In the caſe before us every attempt from Luſatia or Sileſia failed, and always will; wherefore the Ruſſians ſhould have advanced from the Viſtula along the ſea coaſt to Colberg, and having taken it, which was a work of fifteen days, made a place of arms of it, and a general depot, which they could ſupply from Poland by land, and from Ruſſia by water. This operation being finiſhed, they ſhould have proceeded to the Oder, and poſſeſſed all the country on the right of that from Landſberg on the Wartha to the ſea, where half their army, and even all, being ſupplied from Poland directly behind, and Colberg, might have taken their winter quarters. The next campaign ſupported by their fleet, in conjunction with the Swedes, or alone, they might have taken Stettin, and the war was at an end, for Pomerania loſt, and Brandenburg open, the king could not pretend to defend Sileſia, with a Ruſſian army immediately at his back, and in poſſeſſion of his capital, which in ſuch a ſuppoſition they might have taken and kept. The Lower Oder, I mean from Franckfurt to the ſea, is the weak part of the Pruſſian dominions; happily for his majeſty ſuch another confederacy may probably never happen again. The Ruſſians alone can never hurt him, and particularly now. The king of Pruſſia is raiſing a conſiderable fortreſs near Graudentz, on the right of the Viſtula, which commands it.

Though we highly approve the abandoning Pruſſia for the reaſons above alleged, yet we can by no means think it was neceſſary to have alſo abandoned all the country between the Viſtula and the Oder. Poland is an open and fruitful country, without any fortreſs at all, excepting Kaminieck in Podolia, about ſix miles from Chotzim on the Dneiſter, and conſequently in all that tract through

through which the Ruſſian line went, they could not form any magazines, excepting behind the Viſtula; conſequently, any body of troops, lightly equipped, might, and always may, ſecure the proviſions between thoſe two rivers and the Wartha, &c. If Count Dohna, with twenty thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe, conſiſting of dragoons and huſſars, had in the end of April, or beginning of May, advanced to the Viſtula, and ſecured every thing behind him, which undoubtedly he might have done, the Ruſſians would have found it difficult to paſs the Viſtula, and much more ſo to advance towards Franckfurt; they could not leave Count Dohna behind them, if he poſted himſelf, when puſhed, in or near the road which leads to Poſen; becauſe, finding the country before them entirely naked, and their line attacked by Count Dohna, they muſt have turned towards him and followed him, which would have been ſo much time loſt for them, and in the end would have anſwered no purpoſe, for the ſame difficulties would have always recurred, and at length forced them to retire to the Viſtula. The direction of the Pruſſian frontier on this, is exactly on the flank of the march from the Viſtula to Poſen, and therefore Count Dohna, by placing himſelf on that frontier, would be continually on their communications, which moſt certainly would have forced them to change the direction of their march, and prevented their approaching the Oder; which proves alſo that the choice was bad, and that no other line here, or any where elſe, can be good, unleſs its direction be in front, and ſo that the enemy has no province, on the left or right, becauſe in ſuch caſe, by deſtroying the provinces before you, and acting on your communications, particularly if long, he will moſt certainly baffle all your attempts. In Poland I am perſuaded that an army of thirty or thirty-five thouſand men, compoſed as we have mentioned, and poſſeſſed of ſuperior velocity, will act ſucceſsfully againſt three

times

times the number, compoſed as the Ruſſian army is. The one will find every thing on the ſpot; a heavy army nothing any where. Velocity is every thing in war, particularly if the country be open and fruitful like Poland. Such an army as we ſuppoſe with two hundred carpenters, and ropes to make rafts, would ruin any European army in a month. The Tartars have overcome and conquered a great part of the world by their velocity alone, whereas our European armies have not in two centuries conquered any one province of conſiderable extent, becauſe they are too heavy.

The laſt thing I have to obſerve is, that the Pruſſians in their operations againſt the Ruſſians, have been too fond of fighting.

When you act offenſively you muſt fight, and force thoſe who oppoſe your march to give way, that you may proceed on your journey; but when on the defenſive never run the hazard of a battle, becauſe if the enemy acts on a long line, you may undoubtedly, by placing yourſelf on his flanks, force him to retire. The Pruſſians got the battle of Zorndorff; in ten days after, the Ruſſians were as ſtrong as ever, and the firſt I am ſure did not exceed twenty thouſand men. Yet could the latter undertake nothing; they even failed before Colberg; Why? becauſe they had no proviſions, and were forced to return to the Viſtula before the bad weather ſet in. The following campaign the Ruſſians gained two great battles on the banks of the Oder, aſſiſted in the laſt by the Auſtrians under general Laudohn, from which neither they nor the Ruſſians reaped any advantage; and having juſt paſſed the Oder, made a tour through Luſatia and Sileſia into Poland, and having ruined the poor people, concluded this campaign; which proves that it was wrong to fight them. Theſe examples confirm our doctrine on the ſubject we have treated in the firſt volume, viz. that when you are on the defenſive you muſt never oppoſe the enemy in front, unleſs (which ſometimes may happen) you can take a capital poſition

acroſs

acroſs his line of operations, which he can neither attack in front, nor by any motions on your flanks, force you to abandon, which was the caſe with the Emperor in the laſt ſhort war in Bohemia.

Of the Operations of the Army of the Empire commanded by the Prince of Deuxponts.

AT the end of the preceding campaign this army took up its winter quarters in the circle of Franconia. The head quarters were at Nurenberg, but in the beginning of April they were transferred April. to Bamberg, and part of the troops encamped near Bayreuth; the cavalry however for the moſt part lay in the neighbouring villages. In the mean time the Pruſſians appeared on the frontiers of Franconia; and colonel Meyer, ſupported by general Grabow, advanced as far as Hoff, which the enemy abandoned; however, the Pruſſians overtook ſome of them, and took ſome priſoners, and a conſiderable magazine, and afterwards retired to Reichenbach. Some time afterwards the ſame officer marched as far as Kahla, to deſtroy ſome arms which were making there for the army of the empire, which he fortunately accompliſhed, and retired without loſs to Reichenbach, protected in his retreat by ſeveral detachments, ſent to occupy different poſts by general Grabow. It is ſurpriſing that any general ſhould diſperſe his magazines in ſuch a manner, that any adventurer may take them away.

During this time the army of the empire remained in its camp between Cronach and Culmback till the fifteenth of May, when it May. marched towards Bohemia, by Weydenberg, Wunſiedl, Artzberg, and Schirnding; and on the nineteenth encamped near Egra in Bohemia; prince Stolberg and general Luſinſki advanced towards Aſch and Adorſt, in order to cover the march of the army. They had

had left a corps consisting of some few batallions and squadrons under general Bosenfeld at Bayreuth, and a good garrison in Culmbach and Cronach, to oppose the incursions of the Prussian light troops, for they expected no other; in which they were deceived: For prince Henry, who had collected the greatest part of his army at Zwickau, resolved to make an expedition into Franconia to destroy the enemy's magazines and raise contributions. For this purpose, being informed that the enemy's main army had entered Bohemia, he left a body of troops in the mountains to cover Dresden and that part of Saxony; and on the twentieth of May advanced from Zwickau, and on the twenty-third encamped at Taltiz, a village near Ælsnitz on the Elster, between Plauen and Hoff. The van of this army consisting of four or five thousand men, and commanded by Lieutenant General Driesen advanced towards Bamberg, where they arrived the thirty-first, and took the place by capitulation; and having raised very considerable contributions, and destroyed several small magazines, this corps retired, and on the fourteenth of June, joined the main army which was advanced as far as Hoff, which they quitted the day following and marched to Ælsnitz, and from thence to Zschoppau.

The Prussians speak of this notable expedition in more lofty terms, than Xenophon of the retreat of the ten thousand, and even published the plans of the different camps occupied by prince Henry, though in fact it was an insignificant enterprize, in an open country totally defenceless, excepting Bamberg, which is surrounded by an old wall, in many places broke down, which however the imperialists defended so well, as to obtain leave to depart where they pleased.

While the Prussians made this incursion into Franconia, the imperial army remained in the camp near Egra, till the twenty-third of May, when it came to Saaz where it was joined by a strong corps of Austrians, consisting of three regiments of horse, one of dragoons,

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a regiment of foot, and a batallion of Wurtzburg, and ſome time after was alſo joined by the Auſtrians, who had been with the French the preceding campaign, and the reſt of the imperial troops left in the circle of Franconia, who aſſembled at Wurtzburg, and from thence were conducted by General Dombaſh to the army. Many ſkirmiſhes as uſual happened on the frontier, between the detachments of the reſpective armies, and as uſual without any real advantage to either; the Pruſſians ſay that a corps of the Imperialiſts entered into Saxony, with a view to ſurpriſe Dreſden and Pirna, which failed. The Auſtrians ſay nothing about it, and as nothing really happened, nor even was there a man killed, the whole ſtory ſeems a mere invention.

At length the imperial army left Saaz the twenty-fifth of July, and marched in four columns to a camp between Brix and Bilin, General Dombaſh with his corps, conſiſting of the Auſtrians who had been with the French laſt campaign, and what remained of the troops of the empire at Wurtzburg, advanced into Saxony, along the frontiers of Bohemia as far as Schleitz. On the twenty-eighth, the imperial army marched to Toplitz. July.

The Pruſſians on theſe motions of the Imperialiſts approached the Elbe, and a conſiderable corps took poſt at Dippoldiſwalda, which made it neceſſary for General Haddich to advance to Schonwald, a village in the mountains on the left of the great road which leads from Auſſig to Dreſden, and General Mitrouſki to Altenberg, who in going to reconnoitre was made priſoner by a party of huſſars. There was a conſiderable ſkirmiſh paſſed at the defilé called Paſberg, which the army were obliged to abandon for a time, but had no other effect; for being reinforced they advanced in their turn, and drove the Pruſſians back with very conſiderable loſs; General Dombaſh made excurſions to Halle in Saxony, and raiſed contributions: he took poſt at Zwickau in the beginning of Auguſt. The twentieth

of this month, Prince Henry quitted the camps he occupied by Dippoldiſwalda and Freiberg, and marched to Gros Seidlitz, by which means the two places above mentioned were abandoned. General Haddich marched by Gieſhubel to the heights of Pirna, and ordered General Dombaſh to take poſſeſſion of Dippoldiſwalda and Freiberg, abandoned by the Pruſſians and with his corps advanced to Frauenſtein, on the twenty-ſeventh of Auguſt the army of the Empire camped alſo by Pirna, the head quarters at Struppen.

Auguſt.

The Pruſſian army marched from the Kohlberg towards Dreſden, and fortified itſelf: the two armies were extremely near, ſo that the Prince of Deuxponts could not well undertake the ſiege of Sonnenſtein, he therefore ordered ſeveral batteries to be raiſed on ſome heights from whence he could fire on the enemy's camp; this and the approach of the Auſtrian army under Marſhal Daun to the Elbe, forced Prince Henry to abandon his camp, which he accordingly did, and on the firſt of September occupied one between Maxen and Gamig, where he propoſed remaining until the arrival of a conſiderable reinforcement, which the king was bringing from the Oder, after the battle of Zorndorff.

This retreat enabled the Imperialiſts to beſiege Sonnenſtein, which capitulated in three days; the attack was conducted by General Macguire, the garriſon commanded by colonel Grape, conſiſting of one thouſand, four hundred and forty-two men were made priſoners of War, twenty-nine braſs and ſome iron cannon were found in the place: as the operations of this army are hereafter connected with that under Marſhal Daun, we muſt reſume our account of the movements of this latter.

After the final retreat of the Pruſſians into Sileſia, Marſhal Daun having provided for the defence of Moravia and Bohemia, on the tenth of Auguſt, broke up his camp at Hertzmanitz and marched by Horſitz, Gitſchin, and Turnau to Reichenberg, where he arrived the fifteenth.

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The court of Vienna had reſolved to drive if poſſible, the enemy out of Saxony, and at the ſame to enter Upper Sileſia and beſiege Neiſs, for which enterpriſe General Harſch was making the neceſſary preparations, and Marſhal Daun was ordered to march through Luſatia towards Dreſden, and in conjunction with the army of the Empire to attack that place.

Accordingly on the ſixteenth, the Auſtrian army decamped from Reichenberg, and marched in ſix columns to Ullenſdorf, in Lower Luſatia; the ſeventeenth to Zittau, the nineteenth to Schöna, and the twentieth to Gorlitz, on the little river Neiſs; the day following General Laudohn with a ſtrong corps, was detached to take Peitz in Upper Luſatia, and extend his contributions as far as he could in the Pruſſian territory; this he effected on the twenty-fifth, when the commander ſurrendered the place, but had leave to retire; a great quantity of ammunition and forage was found in it, the Auſtrians raiſed every where great contributions.

Marſhal Daun remained at Gorlitz, till the twenty-ſeventh of Auguſt, having a few days before detached the Prince of Baden, with a very ſtrong corps to Schönberg, from whence he could obſerve the enemy in that part of Sileſia, and cover Bohemia and Luſatia.

On the twenty-ſixth, the main army decamped from Gorlitz, and marched by Reichenbach, Weiſſenberg, Bautzen, Marien-Stein, Konigſbruck, and on the firſt of September, encamped between Nieder-Eberſbach, and the village of Beerwalde, where the army remained till the fourth, in order to know the reſult of a conference which General Lacy had with the prince of Deux-ponts on the other ſide the Elbe; on his return the army marched the fourth in three columns to Radeberg, and the fifth to Stolpe. General Lacy for fear of being cut off from the army by a ſtrong September.

Pruſſian corps which advanced from Sagan towards Lower Luſatia, recalled his detachment and abandoned Peitz, and marched to Hoyerſwerda. The Prince of Baden Durlach who had been all this time at Schönberg, on the approach of the Pruſſians retired, and marched to Lobau, not far from Hochkirken. This was the poſition of the Auſtrians and Imperialiſts in the beginning of September; the latter were about Pirna, the Marſhal Daun at Stolpe, Laudohn at Hoyerſwerda, and the prince of Baden at Lobau; we have been thus particular, that the reader may ſee how and where, the new ſcene we are going to deſcribe opened; we muſt now return to the king of Pruſſia: This monarch had ordered Markgrave Charles with about ten thouſand men, to march from Sileſia to Saxony, by Priebus, Spremberg and Senfenberg, while he himſelf with a conſiderable part of the army which had fought the Ruſſians, directed his march thither alſo, and both joined on the ninth of September at Groſenhayn, as alſo part of prince Henry's army.

The Auſtrian army in conjuction with that of the Empire, reinforced by ſome more Auſtrians under General Serbelloni, had planned the attacking of Dreſden; the firſt was to paſs the Elbe above that town, ſo as to prevent prince Henry's approaching it, and both armies were to attack on different ſides. This plan was to have been executed on the eleventh, which the arrival of the king prevented, who on the thirteenth encamped at Schönfeld, over againſt the Auſtrians at Stolpe, upon which Marſhal Daun recalled prince Baden's corps, which encamped at Wilten in Luſatia; a few days after he was ordered to Putzl, and General Vehla to Bautzen. The Pruſſians wanted to drive the Auſtrians out of their ſtrong hold, theſe on the contrary took every meaſure to ſtay there, and prepare for a vigorous reſiſtance if they were attacked.

On

On the thirteenth general Retzow, with a ſtrong corps, took poſt at Badenberg, where general Laudohn, with twelve thouſand men, was advantageouſly poſted on the hills, which however on the approach of the enemy he quitted, and occupied ſome other heights near Arnſdorf.

Colonel Rieſe was poſted at Weiſſen Hirſch; attacked by a conſiderable body of Pruſſians, he fell back in good order towards general Emerick Eſterhazi, who with his huſſars covered his retreat to Ditterſbach, near the left of the army. Upon this all the Pruſſian army on the right of the Elbe advanced on the fourteenth to Eſchdorff and Schulwitz, on which Reiſe retired to Porſchendorf, and Laudohn to Arnſdorf. The king reſolved to attack general Laudohn, and either force him back on the army at Stolpe, or rather as it would ſeem from the diſpoſition, to cut him off entirely; accordingly on the fifteenth Major general Prince of Bevern, with a detachment, was to march that night, ſo as to come in the morning on Laudohn's right flank; General Retzow marched to Wolmſdorff, very near general Laudohn; and the king himſelf, with ſeveral batallions and ſquadrons, marched directly towards Fiſchback, a village behind Laudohn, between him and the main army at Stolpe. On ſeeing this diſpoſition Laudohn retired towards Stolpe, ſo that Retzow's van only was engaged, which, according to the Pruſſian account, killed above ſix hundred men, and made three hundred and twenty priſoners. Retzow's corps encamped on the ground Laudohn had quitted. The Auſtrian account does not differ from this. General Laudohn retired towards Dürre Fuchs, and from thence to Biſchoffswerda, being reinforced to ſixteen thouſand men, and Count Colloredo occupied the heights of Dürre Fuchs before the army, with ſeveral batallions.

The king being always determined to drive Laudohn back, and if poſſible bring the Marſhal to a general action, ordered General Retzow

Retzow to advance to Biſchoffswerda, while his majeſty marched to Radeberg. But Laudohn, though attacked by three different corps, made his retreat good to Nieder Putzka, where Marſhal Daun had poſted the Marquis d'Ainſe with a ſtrong corps to ſupport him in caſe he was puſhed; both acted upon this occaſion with much prudence: D'Ainſe advanced, Laudohn inſtantly ſent the greateſt part of his corps to meet him, and ſecured the communications between them, and then followed with the reſt without any loſs. We mention this manœuvre only to ſhew how a man muſt act in ſimilar circumſtances. After this tranſaction the king advanced to Biſchoffswerda, from whence he ſent a conſiderable detachment to Bautzen, which they took poſſeſſion of the thirtieth of September, making there ſome few priſoners. By this means the Auſtrians were cut off from Luſatia and Sileſia.

October. Though the two armies were very near, the king did not think it adviſable to attack Marſhal Daun in his ſtrong poſition. This General recalled five batallions, and Portugal's regiment of horſe, from the Imperial army, the ſecond of October, and ſent Prince Baden Durlach towards Löbau, to ſecure the march he had projected through the mountains to Luſatia, that he might regain what he had loſt, and once more oppoſe in front the enemy's march to Sileſia.

Accordingly the fifth of October, at twelve o'clock, part of the left wing ſtruck their tents and marched; and at night the whole army formed in two columns followed, and marched by the Ottendorf foreſt, Putzka and Neükirken, to Cruſta, where it arrived the ſixth. On the ſeventh the army reſumed its march to Köttlitz. To cover this very difficult march, the rear, conſiſting of Laudohn's corps, Colloredo's, the reſerve, and ſeveral batallions of grenadiers, that is half the army, was conducted by the duke of Aremberg, with great ſkill and prudence, and one ſkirmiſh only happened. Of which the Auſtrians ſay—

That

That the ſixth, in the morning, a Pruſſian detachment, conſiſting of ſeveral batallions and two regiments of dragoons, attempted to trouble the march, but they were inſtantly driven back by Arberg's regiment of foot, commanded by Colonel Count Merode; the huſſars took three cannon, and about one hundred priſoners; a Pruſſian batallion was totally deſtroyed; our loſs in all amounts to three hundred men. The Pruſſians ſay nothing of this affair.

On the eighth the Pruſſian army marched to Bautzen, and on the ninth to Radewitz, and encamped oppoſite the Auſtrians, with the right at Hochkirken, and the left at Guditz or Graditz, and General Retzow took poſt at Weiſſenberg, on the other ſide the ſmall river Löbauer Waſſar. On the eleventh Marſhal Keith, with a convoy from Dreſden, arrived in the camp.

Upon the arrival of the Pruſſians Marſhal Daun made ſome new diſpoſitions in his camp; General Laudohn was ordered to take poſt on the enemy's right flank, the infantry at Wuiſchke, and the cavalry at Rackel; Count Emerick Eſterhazi, with ſome infantry, lay at Noſtitz; General Ziſkowitz, with five batallions of grenadiers on the hill Stromberg, and Colonel Count Browne, with four batallions, at Cloſſen, by which the right of the army was covered, as the left was by Laudohn's corps.

The Pruſſians account of this battle runs thus:

The corps under the king left Blumberg the third of September, and on the ninth of the ſame month joined the army which the Markgrave Charles brought from Sileſia, at Groſſenhayn near Dreſden; the tenth we marched between Moritzberg and Dreſden, and encamped near Schönfeld. The enemy was at Stolpe, and General Laudohn at Fiſchbach, before his front; from whence he was driven by General Retzow, who made about three hundred priſoners. General Retzow camped at Fiſchbach, and our army marched

marched by its left to Ramenau, which motion obliged the Prince of Baden to march towards Bautzen; two days afterwards we drove General Laudohn from Biſchoffswerda, where we encamped. Marſhal Daun found it adviſable to march by his right to Witten; General Retzow had already taken poſſeſſion of Bautzen, where we alſo marched, and General Retzow took poſt at Weiſſenberg. The Prince of Baden ſtood at Arenſdorff, acroſs the road which goes by Reichenbach and Gorlitz into Sileſia, and Marſhal Daun was on the heights near Kettlitz. The king's army advanced to Hochkirken, from whence the Auſtrians were driven, and encamped on the heights, with his right beyond that village, and the left towards Gröditz. In the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth, Marſhal Daun attacked our right wing, and as the night was dark and foggy, the Pandours having drove the light troops poſted at the end of our right flank, got into the village, and ſet it on fire, which obliged the infantry which covered our flank, to quit their poſt, and abandon the village. The Auſtrians attempted ſeveral times to paſs through the village, but were repulſed by our cavalry and infantry; at the ſame time General Retzow was attacked by the Prince of Baden, whom he repulſed, took nine hundred priſoners, and joined the army, whoſe left wing was likewiſe attacked, it was ordered to ſupport the right wing, which was done, and there remained behind only a grenadier batallion (Kleiſt), which having advanced too far was made priſoner. The poſt of Hochkirken was defended from half an hour paſt four in the morning till ten, when the army received orders to retire. General Retzow joined it, and occupied the villages of Beerlitz and Doberſchutz. We have loſt Marſhal Keith and Prince Francis of Brunſwick, whoſe death we greatly lament. Field Marſhal Prince Maurice was wounded and taken priſoner. Generals Geiſt and Krockow were wounded. The

king

king and moſt of the Generals received contuſions, or had their horſes killed under them; our loſs amounts to about three thouſand men; the night prevented our men on the right from taking down their tents, and ſo they were loſt; we have taken five hundred priſoners, among whom is General Vieteleſchi.

The Auſtrians account is as follows.

The king of Pruſſia marched from Bautzen the tenth, and encamped with his right on the heights of Hochkirchen, and his left at Kottiz; he took this poſition to ſecure the corps poſted at Weiſſenberg, conſiſting of eight thouſand men, which we propoſed attacking the eleventh, and cut off from the king, had he remained at Bautzen, and hinder him from going by Gorlitz to Sileſia. This obliged Marſhal Daun to place five batallions on the hill Stromberg, which lies ſome hundred yards before the right wing, and four batallions in the village Cloſſen, by which means, the way to Gorlitz was ſhut, ſo that the king could not march that road, without attacking and beating our army. Theſe meaſures were the more neceſſary, as on the arrival of the king, the corps at Weiſſenberg advanced, with a view to occupy Stromberg, but perceiving we had taken poſt there, it returned to Weiſſenberg. On the eleventh, Marſhal Daun reconnoitred the enemy's poſition, and found, that if he could drive them from Hochkirchen, a certain and compleat victory would follow. As the king had raiſed ſeveral works on the heights of Hochkirchen and placed there a great number of cannon, it was determined to make a corps march through the woods, which ſhould come on the enemy's flank and rear, while another attacked him in front. Though the ſtrong camp occupied by the Marſhal made us eaſy as to the event, if we were attacked in it, he reſolved to attack the enemy, who little expected it; and to add to his ſecurity, abbatis were made, and works raiſed in the wood. The thirteenth was fixed upon for

the attack; as the neceſſary preparations could not be made in time, it was poſtponed to the day following. The diſpoſition to be obſerved in the different attacks, was given to the general officers in writing; the artillery proceeded through the woods, and at four in the morning was within muſquet ſhot of the enemy. A little before day the van of the columns, and the troops under General Laudohn, who came behind the enemy's camp, were maſters of the village of Hochkirchen, and the enemy's works, and at break of day our infantry was formed in his camp.

Immediately after the Duke of Aremberg attacked the enemy's left, and took the redoubts which protected it, and notwithſtanding the enemy made a moſt vigorous reſiſtance on every ſide, he was forced to give way to the ſuperior valour of our infantry. He was driven out of Hochkirchen, and purſued by our vanguard, which, contrary to orders, advanced too far; the enemy had time to rally, and in his turn attacked the van and corps of grenadiers, which he drove back with great ſlaughter, and retook part of the village Hochkirchen, after he had been repulſed three times. As the final ſucceſs depended on having this village, the Marſhal ordered ſeven regiments of infantry, and ſixteen ſquadrons of carabineers and horſe grenadiers to advance and ſupport them, which they did bravely; an Italian regiment ſuffered extremely; Bathianis took three hundred priſoners. During the attack of Hochkirchen the reſt of our left wing was engaged with the right of the enemy, but could not advance with ſafety until we were maſters of Hochkirchen. At length the bravery of our troops, after an obſtinate reſiſtance, forced the enemy to abandon this important poſt, who retired under a continual fire of his artillery. Marſhal Keith and Prince Francis of Brunſwick were killed in this action, the former commanded the right wing, and was buried with all the honours of war.

While

While this paſſed in and about Hochkirchen, the cavalry of the left under Count O'Donnel, was beat back, on which the Marſhal ordered Count Lacy with five companies of horſe grenadiers and carabineers, to attack the enemy's infantry, which advanced againſt our left; this they did effectually, and re-eſtabliſhed the affair, which in fact decided the victory. This is my opinion, and therefore Count Lacy deſerves the greateſt praiſe; it was a critical moment, of which he availed himſelf with ſkill and valour. The Marſhal's chief attention very properly was, to keep the line in good order as it advanced on the right. General Buccow (who commanded the cavalry) and the Duke of Aremberg, notwithſtanding the obſtacles they met with, from the ground and from the obſtinate reſiſtance of the enemy, at length made their way, and obliged him to retire. Prince Lowenſtein, with a ſmall corps, was ordered to attack that of Retzow at Weiſſenberg, to prevent his going to aſſiſt the king. This general, with part of his men, went thither, but was prevented by two regiments of horſe, which attacked the head of his column. The enemy being driven back on all ſides, retired on ſome hills behind him; about nine o'clock the battle was over, and the enemy retired into the plain near Predlitz, followed by Gen. Laudohn with three regiments of dragoons: we have taken above one hundred pieces of cannon, with the camp and baggage of the enemy. The Auſtrians loſt in this battle ſomething more than one thouſand men killed, and four thouſand wounded. The Pruſſians loſt, killed, wounded, taken, and deſerted, about ſeven thouſand men, of this however I am not certain; never having ſeen an exact liſt of their loſs.

Though the Auſtrian army was far ſuperior in numbers to that of the enemy, in the action however they were nearly on a par, for excepting a few batallions ſent to ſupport the Duke of Aremberg, the Prince of Baden's corps did not come into action, nor

any of the troops placed in the center, between the Marſhal's attack and that of the Duke of Aremberg; nor the corps on the left under General O'Donnel, which conſiſted of forty ſquadrons, and all Laudohn's corps then under O'Donnel's orders; Prince Lowenſtein did what he was ordered to do, but he could not hinder Retzow from joining the king's left wing; ſo that in fact Marſhal Daun's, and the Duke of Aremberg's corps or diviſions only, were truly engaged, and the weight of the whole action fell on them alone. As I was preſent at this very important battle, and very often ſince on the ground, I think it will be agreable to the reader to give my account of it and opinion, which will enable him to form a more exact judgment than from what theſe two accounts can afford. All accounts of battles, from malice or ignorance, are generally imperfect, and very often falſe. Moreover, no plan, though ever ſo well executed, can give an adequate idea of a field of battle; to remedy this, engineers will put every thing into them which makes them perfectly unintelligible, by the confuſion and proximity of places and things. The only mode to purſue is, to leave out every thing that is not connected with the operations of the troops, and to give an exact deſcription of the ground; both together will enable the reader to form a competent judgment of the different manœuvres executed in a battle.

The camp occupied by the Auſtrians was ſtrong in all its parts, and moreover, by the oblique direction of the line, ſtill ſtronger, the left being cloſe to the wood occupied by Laudohn's corps, could not be attacked; neither could the right, or center, without preſenting the flank to the left, and to Laudohn's corps; and beſides, the Auſtrians could in a very ſhort time paſs the Löbauer Waſſer, and place themſelves where Durlach's corps was, acroſs the road which leads towards Sileſia, and always arrive before the king at Neiſs, which was then the only object he could have in view.

The

The hills on the left all covered with a very thick wood, fall gradually to a narrow valley, through which runs a rivulet; this, according to the cuſtom of this country, is ſtopped by Damms, in order to form fiſh ponds; on the other ſide, the ground riſes to Hochkirchen, and from thence falls by an eaſy declivity for about three miles into a plain, beyond which runs the Spree, and on the other ſide are ſome heights. On the ridge of the heights by Hochkirchen was poſted the right of the Pruſſian army, where it made an angle with the center, which went in a right line to Radewitz, where the left made an angle, and ran near Kolitz, ſo that the line repreſented the letter Z in this manner _|‾. The ground before and behind the Pruſſians had no woods or trees at all, but many buſhes and ſmall inequalities and ravins, which might check a line of cavalry, but not ſtop it, particularly if it advanced by ſquadrons and ſmall troops, and ſupported as in this caſe by infantry under General Laudohn; by what we have ſaid, and a view of the plan, it appears that the ſtrength of the Pruſſians lay in the poſt of Hochkirchen and the neighbouring heights; this being loſt, all was loſt. It was alſo the only point which the Auſtrians could attack, for the center and left ran away in an oblique direction, and could not be approached without expoſing the flank to the enemy's right, and as he then ſtood, the right wing of the Auſtrians might have been taken in flank and rear by the enemy's corps at Weiſſenberg. If to this we add, that the right was effectually covered by the rivulet and fiſh ponds, that it could not be approached but by paſſing the Damms in columns, within two hundred yards of the camp, and forming the lines under the fire of the infantry, and a great many cannons, which every one knows is impoſſible, the cannon alone would have prevented any one's paſſing the Damm; in which caſe General O'Donnel and Laudohn's corps could not advance, particularly the cavalry; the ſucceſs of this attack (ſuppoſing every body

did

did his duty) depended on the moſt improbable circumſtance in the world; namely, that the Pruſſians who knew it was impoſſible to approach their right, but by paſſing theſe Damms about two hundred yards off; did not in the night, (by day, it was unneceſſary) place a corporal with ten men on each Damm, and a detachment of huſſars, and parties of infantry beyond their right, towards Meſchowitz and Soritz, merely to give notice of the enemy's approach; the cannon directed towards the Damm, would have forced the columns back in an inſtant into the wood, and no battle would have enſued. This obvious precaution however was ſo totally neglected, that the officers who conducted the columns, crept before to diſcover where the centinels of the camp (for there were no out poſts,) were, and brought the columns into the enemy's tents unperceived, nor was there a gun fired, till long after the Auſtrians were in poſſeſſion of that part of the camp. From this fact I would infer one maxim, viz. that whatever is poſſible, a general ſhould think probable, and take his meaſures accordingly, that like old women he may not ſay; who would have thought it? Marſhal Daun reaſoned juſtly; "If "I ſurpriſe the enemy, the diſpoſition I have made will inſure "me a compleat and deciſive victory; if I find him on his guard, "I will not attempt any thing, and the few which may have "paſſed the Damms, and General O'Donnel, may retire before it is "quite day." When you look at the plan, and conſider the poſition of both armies during the whole action, when the Pruſſians to ſupport Hochkirchen formed their line acroſs their camp, one is inclined to aſk why O'Donnel's corps did not turn their right flank and rear? Why all theſe troops placed between the Marſhal's attack, and the duke of Aremberg's, did not attack his left flank? This would have put an end to the battle in five minutes. Why finally, the corps under the duke was not ſupported by all that

under

under the prince of Baden? which would have enabled the former to take the grand battery before the enemy's left in half an hour; why the duke of Aremberg did not advance to Badewitz, after he had taken the battery? which was the more eaſy, as the Pruſſians had very few troops on their left; the whole line having marched to the right, to ſupport Hochkirchen, by this means the enemy would have been intirely ſurrounded, and muſt have periſhed, which ſhews the goodneſs of Marſhal Daun's plan, had it been tollerably executed; but alas, he and the Duke of Aremberg only fought; the corps under O'Donnel, that between the left and the right, and finally that which remained under the Prince of Baden, did not; though they conſiſted of at leaſt half the army; this corps loſt ſixteen killed, and fifty wounded; that under Laudohn ſixty-ſix killed, and about two hundred wounded. The cavalry under O'Donnel loſt nothing that is mentioned; the whole cavalry loſt about one hundred killed, and three hundred wounded, which proves they did not come to action. Thoſe on the right had not an opportunity, thoſe on the left on receiving a few ſcattered ſhots from ſome men hid behind the buſhes, retired, and never advanced afterwards. Laudohn's corps occupied ſome heights behind the enemy, from whence they could fire a few cannon ſhot, but never engaged, as the reader may obſerve by the plan. They who know this general, will not ſuſpect him of being backward in fighting. No man ſees and ſeizes a favourable moment better than he does, or executes with more vigour. He has the eye of an eagle, the heart of a lion, the meekneſs and innocence of a lamb; but great and capital faults were committed undoubtedly, which prevented the total ruin of the Pruſſian army.

If we conſider the ſtate of the Pruſſian army thus ſeparated, and ſurrounded by ſuperior forces, it will appear incredible they could

could make any reſiſtance at all. They did however reſiſt, and in a manner that rendered the victory for five hours doubtful. In my opinion this battle does the king, his generals, and his army more honour than any victory he ever gained. In his retreat he was not purſued, but followed at a diſtance by General Laudohn, who now and then fired a ſhot after him. General Retzow behaved with great prudence on this occaſion. He took poſt near an old Swediſh redoubt, where the king's army aſſembled, and for about an hour was in great confuſion, like a ſwarm of bees about a hive: about eleven o'clock this batallion began to unfold: a line of cavalry was formed on the left fronting the hills, where Laudohn ſtood; another of infantry behind this, and a third of what remained of their equipage and artillery. This being done, they marched off in as good order as if nothing had happened, paſſed the Sprée, and poſted themſelves on the height beyond it. This crowned the Pruſſians with glory; I do not remember to have read, or heard of any thing like it, nor do I ever expect to ſee ſuch another tranſaction. Thus ended this celebrated ſurprize and battle which followed; the wiſdom of Marſhal Daun is no leſs conſpicuous, than the extraordinary vigour and preſence of mind of the king, and his officers; courage was great and equal in both, nothing more could be required or expected from a Roman ſoldier.

The king's army conſiſted of ten or eleven thouſand men he brought with him from Count Dohna's army; as many under the Markgrave Charles from Sileſia, and ten thouſand under prince Francis of Brunſwick, of which he had left ſome batallions and ſquadrons, with his brother in Saxony, ſo that at Hochkirchen it did not amount to thirty thouſand men, whereas that of the Auſtrians, was as leaſt fifty thouſand, but not the half was brought into action, ſo that upon the whole, thoſe who really fought on each ſide, were nearly equal in numbers. One cannot help lamenting the propenſity the king

king has for fighting when by no means neceſſary, as in this caſe; by ſkilful manœuvres he had opened his road to Bautzen and Sileſia, where his preſence was neceſſary to raiſe the ſiege of Neiſs. Why not go thither? or if he choſe to keep the Auſtrians ſome time longer in Luſatia, to hinder their returning to Dreſden, why not march from Bautzen to Weiſſenberg, and ſend Retzow to Reichenbach, on the road to Gorlitz, and camp with his right at Weiſſenberg, and his left on the heights, where the Prince of Baden was poſted? which would have much embarraſſed Marſhal Daun, and might have offered a more favourable opportunity to attack him, which in no caſe was neceſſary. By marching to Hochkirchen he was under the neceſſity of beating the Marſhal, or falling back, to reſume another road to Sileſia. All this was done, becauſe his majeſty loves fighting; he will never comprehend that being on the defenſive a general ſhould never fight, if he can avoid it. Had he beat Marſhal Daun he could derive no other advantage, but raiſe the ſiege of Neiſs, which he could accompliſh without fighting, which appears from this, that though he loſt the battale at Hochkirchen, he went into Sileſia, and forced General Harſch to raiſe the ſiege and retire. A general ſhould ſcarce ever fight when on the defenſive, but to preſerve ſome important place, and hinder the enemy from taking winter quarters in his country, or force him to abandon it, if he is in poſſeſſion, which was the caſe in one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty-ſeven at Liſſa; and even here if the Auſtrians had not loſt their heads, a victory would have availed the king nothing. They had Breſlaw and Schweidnitz, who could drive them from thence in the winter, had they choſe to remain there? Nobody. Let us return to our narration.

After the battle Marſhal Daun having left a brigade on the field to bury the dead, and take care of the wounded, returned with

his army to Kitlitz, where he remained till the ſeventeenth, whence he advanced to Belgern, and camped over againſt the enemy; by this unmeaning and falſe ſtep he left the road to Sileſia open, as the reader may ſee by the plan. Of which the king availed himſelf, for having been reinforced by about ſix thouſand men brought him by Prince Henry from Saxony, and furniſhed with tents and artillery, ſtores, &c. on the twenty-fourth, he broke up his camp, and taking a little to the left to avoid any obſtacles, marched the whole night; and on the twenty-fifth encamped at Ullerſdorf, on the way between Muſcha and Gorlitz, and on the twenty-ſixth arrived at Gorlitz. On the twenty-fifth in the morning, Laudohn's corps, and in the evening the corps de reſerve, were ſent by Reichenbach towards Gorlitz, and the whole army followed the next day. The van of the two armies met unexpectedly, a ſharp ſkirmiſh enſued, in which the Auſtrians had the advantage at firſt, but that of the enemy being ſupported by all their cavalry, they retired, but with ſome loſs, towards the Landſcron, (a high mountain, which riſes like a ſugar loaf, about which the armies often encamped during this war;) and on the twenty-eighth the Pruſſians paſſed the Neiſs, and marched towards Lauban; and on the thirtieth encamped at Litchtenau, on this ſide Lauban. Marſhal Daun, finding it now impoſſible to hinder the enemy's going to Sileſia, ſent General Wied with nine batallions, ten companies of grenadiers, and four regiments of cavalry, through Bohemia, to reinforce the army which was then beſieging Neiſs. This was an idle ſcheme, for undoubtedly they would arrive too late; and ſhould they arrive, it was by no means adviſable for the Auſtrians to wait the coming of the king, whoſe army was ſuperior to theirs; Laudohn's corps perſued the enemy's rear guard, and of courſe attacked it whenever an opportunity offered, in which ſeveral actions, it is ſaid, the king loſt, killed, and wounded, two or three hundred

dred men, which if true, is nothing to the purpoſe, for the Pruſſians proſecuted their march, and on the thirty-firſt came to Lowenberg; the third of November to Schweidnitz, and the ſixth to Noſſen, beyond Munſterberg. Laudohn followed the enemy as far as Javer, and camped at Löhn, not far from Lowenberg; and General O'Kelly, who followed him, took poſt at Lauban. Marſhal Daun reſolved to return to Saxony, and attempt the taking of Dreſden, where we ſhall follow him. In the mean time we will take a view of what paſſed in Bohemia and Moravia, after Marſhal Daun and the king had left that country. November.

General Harſch was ordered to prepare what was neceſſary to beſiege Neiſs, which was then left to its garriſon alone, for General Fouquet poſted at Landſhut, had enough to do to reſtrain the Auſtrians, and prevent them from entering Sileſia on that ſide. Accordingly the Marquis de Ville, with a conſiderable corps advanced towards Neiſs in Auguſt, he endeavoured to block up the place, and raiſed contributions. This General attempted to ſurprize Brieg and Schweidnitz, in which he failed and returned to Neiſs. In October General Harſch, with a conſiderable corps arrived in camp, and took the command of the whole; the greateſt part of October, the Auſtrians were employed in preparing faſcines, and other materials for the ſiege, which however they deferred till they received the news of the victory at Hochkirchen, which they imagined would prevent the king from coming to interrupt their operations; accordingly they camped near the town, and indeed ſo near, that the artillery of the place obliged them to fall back one thouſand paces; on the twenty-ſixth, they raiſed two batteries, and a mortar bed, from which they played againſt the town, and the ſluice to cut off the water, in that however they did not ſucceed. The ſiege was continued in the uſual manner till the fourth of November, when on receiving intelli-

gence of the king's approach, they raiſed the ſiege and retired partly into Moravia, and partly into Bohemia; Koſel which had been blocked up by ſome Croats, for near four months, was alſo on the king's arrival abandoned. Thus ended the ſiege of Neiſs, which no doubt might have been taken, had Marſhal Daun after the king's retreat out of Bohemia, turned his thoughts that way, inſtead of loſing his time idly and unprofitably during the whole months of Auguſt and September, in Luſatia and Saxony; moreover by transferring the ſeat of war into Upper Sileſia, the Auſtrians ſo near their depots at Olmutz, would have been enabled to act with vigour and without danger; the country about Neiſs, Glatz, &c. is extremely ſtrong, an army of forty thouſand men might on every ſpot find a camp, which the king could not by any attack in front, force them from, nor could any diverſion made in Bohemia or Moravia from Glatz, interrupt them a moment, twenty thouſand men placed on that frontier, would have been ſufficient to cover the country effectually; another advantage would from this meaſure have occurred, that the king could not arrive from the Oder to Neiſs in the ſame length of time, as from thence to the Elbe and Dreſden, ſo that the Auſtrians would have had more than ſufficient time to take the place. In all this war, an infatuation to take Dreſden prevailed in the courts of France and Vienna, to which Marſhal Daun in ſpite of his better judgment, was forced to give way, and ſacrifice the intereſts of the ſtate to a groundleſs and chimerical opinion; by endeavouring to reconcile as much as poſſible the intereſt of his ſovereign, with the orders he received to attack Dreſden, he undertook two operations at once, viz. the ſiege of Neiſs, and the delivery of Saxony, and of courſe failed in both, whereas had he carried his whole force againſt one or other point, he would have ſucceeded.

But

But to reſume our narration. Marſhal Daun having left Generals Laudohn and O'Kelly to follow the king, returned to reſume his enterprize againſt Dreſden; on the ſixth of November, he paſſed the Elbe at Pirna with ſixty thouſand men, and ſummoned that town which he expected would ſurrender on his appearance. Prince Henry finding it impoſſible to maintain his communication with Leipſwic, had paſſed the Elbe and left General Schmettau with twelve thouſand men to defend Dreſden, a city of conſiderable extent but ill fortified. The Auſtrian General on the ſeventh (the very day the king had raiſed the ſiege of Neiſs) approached ſo near to Dreſden, as to leave no room to doubt of his intentions of attacking it, he hoped, perhaps to carry it by a coup de main under cover of the ſuburbs; the houſes of which (particularly from the Pirna gate to that of Wildſruf) are ſo high as to overlook the ramparts, and are cloſe to the edge of the ditch; this circumſtance compelled the Governor in common prudence, to provide for the ſafety of the fortreſs, and garriſon intruſted to him, by depriving the enemy of ſo commodious an approach to his walls; this could only be done by burning the ſuburbs, a neceſſary meaſure in his circumſtances, but a moſt diſagreeable and invidious one; he endeavoured therefore by repeated repreſentations, both to the court of Dreſden and the Marſhal, to avoid coming to that extremity; but finding no diſpoſition in Daun to attend to any thing, he or the Saxon miniſter could ſay to him on the ſubject, and that on the contrary his out poſts were driven in, and the redoubts that covered the ſuburbs, attacked and carried by the Auſtrians, whoſe batteries began to annoy the town, and who threatened every hour to carry the ſuburbs, and through them the fortreſs itſelf by aſſault, he at length executed what he had long threatened, and ſet fire to the combuſtibles which had already

already been prepared, and placed in ſeveral of the houſes for that melancholy occaſion; this however was not done till the very laſt extremity, (as by the written certificates of the magiſtrates and other authentic papers ſufficiently appears) nay ſo loth was count Schmettau to employ this dreadful expedient, that he perhaps riſked the event more than in ſtrict prudence he ought to have done, the enemy having penetrated, in the attack of the redoubts (though afterwards obliged to retire) ſo far, as to have left an Auſtrian ſoldier killed on the very draw bridge of the Pirna gate.

It was at three in the morning of the tenth, the ſignal was given for firing the ſuburbs; the ſix batallions who occupied them and the redoubts, retired into the town by the three gates, which were immediately barricaded, and after ſix o'clock not a ſingle Pruſſian appeared in the ſuburbs, notwithſtanding all that has been publiſhed to the contrary.

After the burning of the ſuburbs the Auſtrians remained quiet. Itzenplitz's corps was ſtrongly poſted cloſe to Dreſden, and colonel Wunſch, with ſome batallions, was on the heights of Weiſſenhirſch where O'Donnel ſhould have been, if they propoſed doing any thing on that ſide the Elbe.

In this ſtate things remained till the ſixteenth, when Marſhal Daun broke up his camp, and retired to Pirna, and from thence by Gieſhubel into Bohemia.

Much was wrote on the ſubject of burning the ſuburbs of Dreſden, which did not deſerve a moment's attention; but men, when unſucceſsful in their meaſures, will complain of every thing. Near three hundred houſes were burnt or damaged.

While this was doing in Saxony, the king, whoſe arrival at Noſſen had raiſed the ſiege of Neiſs, and obliged the Auſtrians to retire as we have ſeen; on hearing that Marſhal Daun was before Dreſden, quitted

quitted his camp on the ninth of November, and taking his march towards Saxony, on the fifteenth arrived at Lichtena, near Lauban, and the eighteenth at Bautzen, which obliged Marſhal Daun to quit Saxony, and abandon Pirna and Sonnenſtein, which put an end to the campaign.

Generals Laudohn and O'Kelly who were in Luſatia, on the approach of the king, retired to Zittau, and from thence into Bohemia; on the twenty-firſt of November, the king and his army arrived at Dreſden, and ſoon after put his troops into winter quarters, having finiſhed a very fatiguing but a glorious campaign; his numerous enemies had gained no advantage over him, whereas he had regained the very important fortreſs of Schweidnitz. We muſt return to the Imperial army and follow it to its quarters, and conclude our account of the campaign, with ſome reflexions on the whole.

As the operations of the Swedes were not of any great importance in themſelves, and totally unconnected with thoſe of the Auſtrians and Imperialiſts; we ſhall at the end of this volume, put altogether their operations during the ſeveral campaigns.

After the ſurrender of Pirna, the army of the empire was preparing in conjuction with Marſhal Daun to beſiege Dreſden; as this event was prevented by the king's arrival, this army remained near Pirna, and Prince Henry's, which had been reinforced by ſome troops ſent him by the king, at Gamig near Dohna. The Imperial army which drew its ſubſiſtence from Voigtland, was ſoon ſtreightened, the convoys being intercepted by parties ſent from Gamig, quitted the camp near Pirna, after Marſhal Daun had left Stolpe, and gone from the Elbe, and on the fourteenth of October marched to Gieſhubel, and General Haddick with a conſiderable corps, was poſted at Freiberg and occupied Zwickau and Chemnitz, to ſecure the arrival of the tranſports; September. October.

General

General Haddick was attacked in his poſt by General Hulſen, who marched from Dippoldiſwalda thither with a ſtrong corps, and forced him to retire; this laſt encamped on the heights about the place.

Soon after this affair a conſiderable change was made in both armies, occaſioned by the battle of Hochkirchen; on the eighteenth Prince Henry with ſeveral regiments, left Gamig, and marched by Dreſden, to join the king at Doberſchau, near Bautzen; at the ſame time General Dombaſch, with two regiments of foot, and one of horſe, was recalled from the Imperial army to that of Marſhal Daun. General Itzenplitz took the command of the Pruſſian army after Prince Henry had quitted it. General Hulſen having abandoned Freiberg, the Imperialiſts took poſt there again. Both armies continued in the ſame poſition the remaining part of October; the weakneſs of the Pruſſian army, and the diſtance of the king, brought as we have ſeen Marſhal Daun back to Dreſden
November. in the beginning of November. The army of the empire was ordered to advance farther into Saxony, and if poſſible to take Torgau, Wittenberg, and Leipſwic; accordingly the Imperialiſts quitted Gieſhubel the third of November, and on the ſixth arrived at Freiberg; this movement, and the approach of Marſhal Daun, determined General Itzenplitz to quit Gamig, and march to Keſſelſdorf. The Imperialiſts remained at Freiberg till the twelfth. In the mean time General Haddick was ſent to attack Torgau, where he was met by General Wedel, on which he retired to Eilenburg, where the Pruſſians, under Count Dohna, who was come from Pomerania, followed him, and forced him, with ſome loſs, to retire to Freiberg. On the twelfth the Imperial army had advanced towards Leipſwic; but on Haddick's retreat they retired alſo towards Zwickau, when the diſpoſitions for winter

quarters

quarters were made; and on the twenty-fourth the army ſeparated and marched towards thoſe aſſigned them in Franconia.

Having occaſionally as circumſtances offered, given my opinions on the occurrences of this campaign, it remains for me to conclude my account of it by one reflection only, and this ariſes from obſerving the nature and direction of the line of communication between Sileſia and Saxony; this goes from Dreſden by Bautzen, Gorlitz, and Lauban, into Sileſia, and is of a curvilinear direction. It is evident that the Auſtrians can take no poſition on this line or beyond it, ſo as to prevent effectually the Pruſſians from going from the one into the other; for if they are on the line the Pruſſians may leave them there, and paſs beyond their right or left as they may be poſted: and if to prevent this they advance a conſiderable way beyond it, then the Pruſſians may march along this line behind them, or by acting on their line of operations intercept their convoys, or even enter Bohemia and deſtroy their magazines, and thus force them back. It was owing to this circumſtance that the king was enabled to ſupport both countries during the whole war, by marching from the one to the other as occaſion required, and alſo when neceſſary into Brandenburg; for it is impoſſible to take any poſition in Luſatia, which will entirely prevent him. But Marſhal Daun inſtead of going to Stolpe, ſhould have marched to Hoyerſwerda, this would have obliged the two corps which came from Sileſia to join the king to have marched higher up, as far as Cotbus at leaſt, and they and the king muſt have gone down to Torgau if he wanted to paſs the Elbe; if not, the Marſhal might always have fallen back to Bautzen, and by ſkilful manœuvres gained time enough to have enabled General Harſch to take Neiſs, which was then the only object in view. I know very well the Marſhal could not abſolutely hinder the king from marching into Sileſia; but he might by theſe movements have gained time, which was

every thing; or by forcing him to paſs the Bober at Sagau, or lower down, he might have marched himſelf by the road the king actually took, which is by much the ſhorter; and conſequently the Marſhal would have been at Noſſen before him. A few days proviſions would have been ſufficient.

Upon the whole it appears, that the Auſtrians cannot abſolutely hinder a Pruſſian army from marching from Sileſia into Saxony at all, or from this laſt into the former, unleſs it is on the left ſide of the Elbe; then I think they may, particularly if they are maſters of Dreſden. The great fault of the Auſtrians during the whole war was this, they had not, it ſhould ſeem, any fixed plan of operations; they wandered from one place to another, waiting events, and when theſe turned out even more favourable than could reaſonably have been expected, they were at a loſs how to avail themſelves of them, and in ſuch a ſituation that they reaped no advantage from them; new ſchemes, new projects were made and none executed; ſuch a vague and undetermined mode of making war, renders it everlaſting, and finally it ends in doing nothing at all.

In war all the data are clearly given and known, the reſpective forces are eaſily calculated, from whence a propable opinion may be formed, and ſome certain object fixed and determined on, which muſt be invariably purſued without any the leaſt deviation; in the caſe we have before us, the Auſtrians ſhould have ſaid—The enemy muſt employ a certain number of men in Saxony, and an army againſt the Ruſſians on the lower Oder, theſe whether they gain or loſe a battle, cannot remain long in that country. Our forces are entire and in great numbers, we have a powerful army, what ſhall we undertake? what can we execute? let us do that without loſs of time, for the enemy will be ſoon back. We muſt not, cannot expect any deciſive event from the Ruſſians; they come from far, and cannot execute any ſolid enterprize; they

make

make a powerful but not a durable diverſion in our favor, that is all they can do; let us avail ourſelves of it, be prepared for any event and loſe not a moment in executing what has or ought to have been determined on before the campaign: this the Auſtrians neglected doing, which might have been fatal to them, had not the preſent Empreſs of Ruſſia mounted the throne, and recommended peace.

CAMPAIGN 1759.

THE plan of operations for this campaign, was exactly ſimilar to that of the laſt; the Ruſſians with a powerful army, were to advance towards Franckfurt on the Oder, where they were to be reinforced by a corps of fifteen or twenty thouſand Auſtrians; what they were to do afterwards, I do not know, nor do I believe it was ſettled. They were in all probability to be guided by events; the Auſtrian army was to cover Bohemia and Moravia, and wait till the approach of the Ruſſians drew the enemy's attention that way, and gave by that means, the Auſtrians ſome favourable opportunity to act and execute ſome ſolid enterprize.

The army of the empire was to approach the Elbe, and attack Dreſden.

The Pruſſian forces were poſted chiefly in Sileſia under the king, another army under prince Henry was in Saxony, to oppoſe that of the empire; a third finally in Pomerania, deſtined to act againſt the Ruſſians; all theſe forces put together did not exceed one hundred thouſand men, viz. ſixty thouſand in Sileſia, twenty in Saxony, and as many in Pomerania; whereas thoſe of the Auſtrians alone exceeded that number, thoſe of the Ruſſians, amounted to near eighty thouſand men, and the Imperial army with the Auſtrians who were with it, to at leaſt forty thouſand*.

The king of Pruſſia reſolved to remain on the defenſive, until the approach of the enemy made it neceſſary for him to act.

* See Note D.

As

As the Ruſſians firſt mounted the ſtage, and opened the ſcene of action, the order of things requires we ſhould begin our narration with them; we ſhall therefore relate the march and operations of that army, from the beginning, to the end of the campaign, and add our reflections on the principal events only, and ſuch as really contributed to the good or bad ſucceſs of them, which with the map annexed, will, we truſt, ſuffice to give the reader a pretty clear idea of the conduct of the war.

The Ruſſian army conſiſted of twenty ſquadrons cuiraſſiers, at three hundred men each, ſix thouſand; fifteen ſquadrons horſe grenadiers, at three hundred men each, four thouſand five hundred; eight ſquadrons horſe grenadiers, at one hundred and ninety-ſix men each, one thouſand, five hundred and ſixty-eight; thirty-ſix ſquadrons huſſars, at two hundred and twelve men each, ſeven thouſand, ſix hundred and thirty-two; cavalry nineteen thouſand, ſeven hundred; coſſacks five thouſand: twenty-four thouſand, ſeven hundred;—infantry ſeventy-ſix batallions, at ſeven hundred and five each, fifty-three thouſand, five hundred and eighty; in all, ſeventy-eight thouſand, two hundred and eighty men—with two hundred and thirty-two pieces of artillery: this army was divided as uſual into three diviſions, the firſt was commanded by Froloff Bagrey; the ſecond, by Lieutenant General Ranſanow; the third, by Count Romanzow; all theſe troops had been in quarters behind the Viſtula, and extended throughout the kingdom of Pruſſia; the light troops even during the winter, often advanced to the frontiers of Pomerania, with a view to plunder, and riſe contributions, in which they generally ſucceeded more or leſs, notwithſtanding the vigilance of the Pruſſians cantoned in
February. that country, who were commanded by General Schlabendorff. In the end of February, General Platten took the command, and had his head quarters at Stolpe; it was reſolved by the king of Pruſſia

Pruſſia to ſend a corps into Poland, to deſtroy the enemy's magazines, which lay ſcattered over the country, before the front of the Ruſſians, in ſmall defenceleſs towns and villages, guarded only by parties of twenty or thirty men, contrary to all rules of prudence, which require, that no depot whatever ſhould be placed before the front, or in defenceleſs towns; they muſt always be behind the army, or on the flank, in towns, and well defended; for an army cannot like a traveller, find inns on the road, to refreſh and nouriſh it.

To put this project in execution, Major General Woberſnow was ordered to aſſemble a corps, near Groſs Glogiau n Sileſia, which conſiſted of ſix batallions, and twenty-five ſquadrons, and on the twenty-fourth, he marched towards Poland. In their way the Pruſſians took prince Salkowſki in his palace, and carried him and his guard (about two hundred men) into Sileſia, on pretence that he was connected with the Ruſſians. From Liſſa in Poland the Pruſſians marched to Poſen, where they found a magazine, which they deſtroyed; at the ſame time General Platten ſent a detachment of cavalry under Colonel Platten, along the Wartha towards Meſeritz, where they deſtroyed a conſiderable magazine; after which the Pruſſians who began to want proviſions, on the fourth of March quitted Poland, and having accompliſhed in a great meaſure their object, returned to Sileſia. March.

The Ruſſian account of this tranſaction ſays, that Colonel Dalcke who had been ſent, with a detachment on the road towards Poſen was informed, the Pruſſians had entered Poland in ſeveral columns, one under the king in perſon, another under Count Dohna, &c. and were advancing towards the Viſtula, all which, however falſe, was believed, upon which Colonel Dalcke was reinforced, and ordered to follow and obſerve the enemy in his retreat, but nothing happened worth mentioning. This alarm obliged

obliged the Ruſſians to take precautions, in caſe the enemy did really approach the Viſtula, and the better to obſerve the enemy, a conſiderable corps under Kramachokow who commanded the Coſſacks, was ſent towards New Stettin in Pomerania, where a very ſharp encounter happened, in which captain Hohendorff, who had three hundred men infantry, and ſome cannon, and captain Wuſſow with one hundred dragoons, had the advantage, having forced the Ruſſians to retire with loſs. Wuſſow was killed, and much regretted. The diſpoſition made by theſe two captains, would do honour to any general officers; one does not find many ſuch captains. I mention this affair, in itſelf of no great conſequence, to ſhew there are men of genius in the lower rank of officers, whom a General ſhould know, protect and employ.

Immediately after this ſkirmiſh, the Ruſſian army was ordered
April. to prepare for its march, about the ſixteenth of April. Count Fermor who commanded it, paſſed the viſtula on the twentieth, and took up his quarters at Munſterwalde, where the army aſſem-
May. bled, and on the ſeventh of May encamped by Swetz, and from thence advanced gradually towards Poſen, on which Count Dohna likewiſe aſſembled his army near Landſberg in Brandenburg, and recalled all the detached corps, even that which lay at Stolpe to cover Pomerania; on which the Ruſſian Colonel Tokells took poſſeſſion of Stolpe, and the Ruſſian light troops plundered without mercy every place they could get into, particularly in Pomerania, which was almoſt defenceleſs.

The king reſolved to oppoſe the progreſs of the Ruſſians in Poland, rather than permit them to advance unmoleſted as laſt year to the Oder; for this purpoſe General Hulſen, with a conſiderable corps was ordered from Saxony to go and join Count Dohna at Landſberg, whoſe army conſiſted of twenty-ſix batallions, and ſixty ſquadrons, about twenty-five thouſand men in all; the Ruſſians, according to their account, had at Poſen forty thouſand

thouſand. On the twenty-third of June the Prince left Landſberg, June.
and marched by Schwerin (or Swierſzina,) Birnbaum (or Mienzy-
chod,) &c. to Wroncki, where they camped the twenty-ninth; and
on the firſt of July reſumed their march towards Poznan (or Poſen,) July.
where the enemy lay ſtrongly encamped with this town, and the
Wartha behind them. Being arrived at Rogozno, General Woberſ-
now, with five batallions and three regiments of cavalry, marched
on the ſecond by Lwowek to Poznan, with a view to reconnoitre
the enemy's poſition. General Panin had ordered Lwowek to be
occupied by four regiments of foot, two of cavalry, and two thou-
ſand coſſacks, who on perceiving the Pruſſians, inſtantly retired to
the army, which immediately run to arms, and remained perfectly
quiet without firing a ſhot, and gave General Woberſnow
ſeveral hours to look about him; which having done, he retired to
Muravanna Gotzlina, where the firſt line of the army was arrived.
The enemy's right being thought too ſtrongly poſted to be attacked
with advantage, the Pruſſians paſſed the Wartha by Obernich, and
camped by Objieczrze and Prezlavia, and give the following ac-
count of their ſubſequent movements: "Being informed that the
"Ruſſians were in motion, and were going to camp at Caſimierz.
"On the fifth of July, in the morning, we marched and arrived
"at this place before the enemy, which obliged him to ſtop be-
"tween Tarnowa and Jancovitz*, where we propoſed marching the
"ſame night, and attack him in the morning of the tenth; but
"he had moved off in the night, and marched to Wilczyno with
"a view to ſeize the heights on our right flank, but we antici-
"pated him; and on the eleventh, in the morning, took poſſeſſion
"of them in preſence of the enemy, whoſe front was covered by
"marſhes, ravins, &c. The twelfth the enemy moved on his

* Colonel Tempelhof calls this place Wienkowitza, I imagine it may be Woynowice.

" left, and endeavouring to come on our flank, we made front,
" and wiſhed to bring him to battle, but in vain. On the
" thirteenth we obſerved ſome movements on the enemy's right,
" his front however remained in its full length. Being informed
" that the enemy directed his march towards Pniew, we marched
" in the night towards Neuſtadt, that he might not get a march
" before us. Here proviſions began to fail us, there was nothing
" to be found in the villages, not even a brick to build our ovens.
" On the fourteenth we found the enemy camped between Pinne
" and Conin; we marched that day to Peter, and the fifteenth to
" Meſeritz."

The Ruſſians account of theſe operations ſays, " Brigadier Thraſ-
" nachokow reported that fourteen regiments of Pruſſians were in
" march from Schwerin to Birnbaum; the twenty-fifth a ſtrong corps
" arrived at Franſtadt. On the twenty-ninth the firſt diviſion of our
" army arrived in their camp, and on the ſame day the new com-
" mander in chief Count Soltikow. On the third of July General
" Woberſnow, with nine thouſand men, came to reconnoitre our
" poſition. On the eighth of July the army having the heavy ar-
" tillery and baggage behind, marched in ſix columns to Jankovitz;
" the Pruſſian army was poſted between Morowinow and Babinkow,
" covered by marſhes and fiſh-ponds: the ninth Count Totleben
" paſſed the Damms, and attacked a Pruſſian poſt of two regiments of
" huſſars with ſucceſs, on which the Pruſſians took arms, and not
" thinking themſelves ſecure in this poſt marched by Kazimierz to
" the village Bittin, where they camped. On the eleventh our army
" marched directly towards the enemy's camp, which, on our ap-
" proach, they broke up, and haſtened to occupy another very ſtrong
" one between the villages Perſke and Senkowe; we followed, and
" camped with our left at Bittin, and our right at Molodoſko, four
" miles from Jankovitz. The Pruſſians fired at our out poſts; but

" our

" our howitzers, which threw bombs, made them ceaſe. On the " twelfth we approached the enemy in order of battle, who was for- " med on the heights; and we cannonaded each other. The ſtrong " poſition the enemy occupied, prevented our attacking his line.

" In the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth the enemy " marched to Pniew, where we inſtantly followed him. We obſerved " by all his motions he was afraid of being cut off from Sileſia; " wherefore we marched always on his left flank, by which means " we came behind him. The ſixteenth we marched from Sumerſchka " to Borowki; the ſeventeenth to * Ibonſchino; the nineteenth to " Babimoſt; the twentieth to Kelſchen, and the twenty-ſecond to " Palzig: which brought on a battle the day following, between " Zullichau and the village Kay." During this time Colonel Hordt with a detachment of cavalry, made an expedition towards the Viſtula behind the Ruſſian army, and with great ſucceſs, having deſtroyed ſeveral magazines which contained above ſixty thouſand buſhels of corn, of various ſpecies, and made ſome priſoners, which proves, that a corps of ſome ſtrength might have done ſo much, as would have checked and perhaps ſtopped the Ruſſian army intirely; at leaſt we think that if the Pruſſian General, inſtead of oppoſing them in front, (which at laſt brought on a general Action) had, with his whole army poſted himſelf on their left flank, and from thence ſent a corps behind them, the Ruſſians could not have proceeded and left him there; ſo that by falling back gradually, as they advanced againſt him he could have prevented their approaching the Oder at all. An enemy ſo ſuperior as the Ruſſians were muſt not be oppoſed in front unleſs ſome uncommonly ſtrong camp offers, which he cannot by an attack in front, or manœuvres on your flanks force you to abandon: we have often ſaid this; but when the conduct of the general requires it, we muſt repeat it,

* Colonel Tempelhoff ſays they went that day to Zbaſzyn.

and it cannot be too often repeated. It is the foundation, and principle of a defenſive war.

We have been very particular in our account of the manœuvres of the reſpective armies; becauſe nothing is more entertaining than the motions of two armies in ſight of each other, where the leaſt overſight leads very often to fatal conſequences, and where a few hundred yards gained or loſt decide the final event of the whole. What paſſed on this occaſion bears a ſtrong reſemblance to the operation of the two armies commanded by thoſe great Generals, Turenne and Montecuculi.

The Pruſſians having fallen back to Zullichau, and encamped behind it, on the twenty-ſecond at night Count Dohna received permiſſion to retire being ill, and General Wedel came from the king's army in Sileſia to take upon him the command of the army. The day following, (the twenty-third of July,) was fought the battle which goes by the name of Paltzig, Zullichau, and Kay, which are near the ground on which it was fought. The account which Count Soltikow gives of it, is diſtinct, and appears clear and exact. While he praiſes his own people, he does the enemy that juſtice, which their diſpoſitions and ſingular bravery deſerves. The Count ſays——

"Perceiving by the enemy's manœuvres, and learning by deſerters, which came in to us in great numbers, that far from meaning to cut us off from the Viſtula, his chief view was to hinder us from cutting off his communication with Sileſia, that he might be at liberty to join the king againſt Marſhal Daun, or be ſoon reinforced and enabled to act againſt us. To increaſe his fears on this head, we always marched on his right flank, and at laſt unobſerved, we came before him. On the ſixteenth we marched from the village Sumercha, to the Hill Bokrowka; the ſeventeenth to Ibonſchino; the eighteenth the army halted. On the nineteenth General Merd-

vinow

vinow reported he was arrived with his corps at Folitſche, twenty miles from Poſen; the nineteenth we marched to Babimoſt; the twentieth we marched four miles to Holzen. Here we had accounts from Count Tokeli that our light troops were advanced towards Zullichau. The twenty-firſt we halted to wait for General Merdvinow. The enemy's cavalry attacked our piquets, who were forced to retire. One of their ſquadrons being advanced too far, and ſeparated from the reſt, was cut to pieces. The twenty-ſecond we reconnoitred the enemy's poſition, and our own army leaving the heavy baggage at Holzen, marched to the village Guelrig, or rather Paltzig. The twenty-third (on which your Majeſty's army gained a compleat victory over the enemy) we marched at break of day on our right, in order to come before the enemy on the road, which leads to Croſſen, and Frankfurt on the Oder. In the mean time, it was reported from all parts that the enemy intended to attack our baggage. Though I would advance nothing without ſome foundation, I think however, that theſe reports were propagated by the enemy themſelves, in order to ſtop our march. So I continued my march to the road, without forgetting the baggage, accordingly I ſent a conſiderable corps to guard it, and the main army continued its march; and being arrived at the village Nicken, halted to take ſome reſt. Some ſquadrons of the enemy's cavalry appeared before the firſt diviſion, but were ſoon driven back by our cannon, and diſappeared. We did not imagine we ſhould come to action that day, as the enemy had always avoided it, and on our approach quitted their camps, however ſtrong, and generally in the night. As it was of the greateſt conſequence to him to regain the road to the Oder: ſo he had ſent the cavalry abvove mentioned, ſeemingly to reconnoitre us, but in fact, to cover the march of his army behind them, I therefore ordered mine to reſume the march; and being arrived with my right wing on the road, I ordered it to

extend

extend itſelf quite to the wood, which goes to the Oder, and my left leaned on another wood by Paltzig, which was behind the center of the army; while we were occupied in taking this poſition, our light troops ſkirmiſhed with the enemy; who on his ſide, was advancing in columns. While they were paſſing the defilés and forming the line on our ſide of them, our artillery made a prodigious havock among them; and had they not continually relieved thoſe in front with freſh troops, and the paſs not been of ſuch great importance to them, they muſt have immediately fled. After the cannonade had continued an hour, the enemy approached us, ſuſtaining his troops continually by freſh ones within muſket ſhot, and the fire of the muſketry began; his attack was ſo deſperate that it ſeemed he was determined to gain the victory, or loſe the laſt man in his army. However his deſpair (or rather vigour and bravery as I call it) availed him nothing againſt the great valour and dauntleſs firmneſs of your majeſty's troops; having received reinforcements through the wood, he attacked our right wing with uncommon vigour, three times, and was repulſed with great ſlaughter. When we conſider the loſs he had already ſuſtained, it is ſurpriſing he ſhould have renewed the attack, but without doubt he flattered himſelf thereby to gain the victory. He had ordered four regiments to paſs through the woods to attack our right flank, which was covered by two of our regiments, that of Siberia, and that of Permia, which repulſed the enemy three times, but had ſuffered much ſo that there were great openings in their line, on which the enemy's cavalry leaped among them (this is the expreſſion Soltikow uſes, which ſhews the vigour with which they attacked,) but owing to the help of God, and your majeſty's good fortune, our artillery prevented theſe four regiments from coming well out of the woods, and drove them back; they were purſued by General

Demiſcow,

Demiſcow, with two regiments of horſe, ſo that few eſcaped. In the mean time, three regiments of infantry entered into the lines on the right, and filled the opening; in this manner the enemy's right, was driven out of the field. However he did not give up the affair, he ſent the reſt of his cavalry through the village Nicken to attack our left flank, but General Totleben who was returned from the baggage, put it on fire, ſo that the enemy could advance no farther; he made alſo two attacks on our left, and was repulſed, ſo that he was forced at length to retreat on all ſides, followed by our cavalry and light troops, and the Schuwallows*. We have loſt the brave General Demiſcow, ſeveral officers, and about eight hundred and ſeventy-eight men, of which and the wounded I here ſend the liſt. The enemy's loſs is very conſiderable, General Wobenſnow killed, General Stutterheim, Manteuffel, and Canitz wounded, above four thouſand men killed, and two thouſand priſoners, beſides a great many deſerters. We have taken fourteen pieces of cannon, and many ſtandards, colours, &c. and loſt no trophies.

The enemy made his way through the woods to the Oder, while the infantry paſſed over bridges, and the cavalry through the fords higher up towards Glogau. On the twenty-ſixth, we marched towards Croſſen, where we arrived the twenty-eighth; General Villebois was ſent with a ſtrong corps to Frankfurt, and being informed that the enemy was encamped about eight miles off, prince Gallitzen was ſent to reconnoitre him, but on approaching, they quitted their camp, and retired towards Glogau; a ſmall party I ſent to Marſhal Daun, through Sileſia, met in the way a captain of horſe, with twenty-five men, ſent to me by General

* Theſe are conſtructed like the howitzers, with this difference, that inſtead of being cylindric within, they are eliptic, with the greateſt diameter horizontal, and the leſſer perpendicular, by which their ſhot are ſuppoſed to ſpread more in the enemy's line; I prefer the howitzer, for its ſimplicity.

General Laudohn, who are ſince arrived here. The General ſays, that he, with twenty thouſand men is on the march to join me, and that in four days he will reach the Oder; and I have therefore reſolved after to morrow, to march to Franckfurt, of which I have given General Laudohn notice, that he may direct his march thither, to draw prince Henry another way, and prevent him coming from Saxony and joining the king. Our army is only ſixty miles from Berlin."

The Pruſſian account of this battle, is as follows.

" On the twentieth of July, part of the Ruſſian army came to Zullichau, and the remainder the day following; their object was to come to Croſſen before us, and ſo to cut us off from Franckfurt. The twenty-third in the morning, General Wedel reconnoitred the enemy's camp at Langen Meil, and finding it in motion, the Pruſſian army in order to come before them, marched off in two lines, the one by Kay, and the other by Moſe, upon which the Ruſſians occupied all the heights beyond Kay, as well as the ravins, &c. Scarce were the Pruſſian columns come out of the hollow way by Kay, when they fell in with the enemy's light troops, which they diſperſed, but theſe were continually reinforced, and the action became more general. The Ruſſians had placed a great quantity of artillery on the heights oppoſite to the ground we advanced upon. It was neceſſary to attack theſe batteries; accordingly General Manteuffel with ſix batallions, attacked them, and took forty pieces of cannon, but was wounded, and carried out of the field. The Ruſſians made preparation for a retreat, in which they were protected by the remaining artillery, on the heights behind thoſe we had taken; whereas ours not being able to advance through the marſhy ground, we were obliged to do every thing with the muſket alone, which it was hardly poſſible could be ſucceſsful; moreover, this ground did not permit us to advance regularly and form a line, ſo that our attacks were inſu-

lated,

lated, and with the batallions ſeparated, and not ſufficiently ſupported; General Wedel here ordered four regiments of cavalry to advance through the woods, and attack the enemy's right flank; and though theſe drove all before them at firſt and made their way through the woods, yet partly by the ſuperior force of the Ruſſians, and our troops wanting timely ſupport from the ſecond column, and partly from the ground not permitting us to form a greater line; we were obliged to give way and retire: the attack began a little before four in the evening, and finiſhed at ſeven; ſo that the action did not laſt above three hours; our left was poſted on the heights by Kay, where it began, and then extended to Paltzig. The enemy occupied all the heights before us, where he remained. General Woberſnow was killed in the attack of the cavalry, and much lamented for his good qualities, as a gentleman, and a ſoldier; we have loſt ſome cannon. The enemy during the action burnt five villages without any neceſſity."

The loſs of the Ruſſians, officers and men, was near nine hundred killed, and above four thouſand wounded. That of the Pruſſians, above twenty thouſand killed, above forty thouſand wounded, and twenty thouſand miſſing, by the infantry; and by the cavalry, four hundred killed, as many wounded, ſixty miſſing, and one thouſand three hundred horſes killed and wounded—in the whole above nine thouſand, that is more than a third of their army, which proves, that they fought with vigour and firmneſs.

Reflections on theſe Tranſactions.

In general it is highly neceſſary to oppoſe an enemy beyond your frontier, and advance as far as poſſible to meet him, becauſe many advantages ariſe from this method. For in the firſt place, you gain

time, which is every thing in a defenſive war: ſecondly, by conſuming all ſubſiſtence behind you, the progreſs of the enemy is retarded ſo much, that when finally you are driven back by ſuperior forces; if you can find ſome ſtrong camp on your frontier, from whence you cover it, he will find it difficult, or perhaps impoſſible to collect proviſions, ſufficient to undertake a ſiege, or execute any capital enterpriſe, which of courſe will force him to retire, (and this is particularly true, with regard to the Ruſſians, for the reaſons alledged already.) However this rule has its exceptions, and the caſe before us is one. The Pruſſians knew that the enemy was to be reinforced by a conſiderable corps of Auſtrians, that the junction could be made only above Franckfurt, and that it muſt be executed almoſt inſtantaneouſly, becauſe the Auſtrians could not pretend to remain above one day in that country: as the king from Sileſia might come behind them, and cut them off from Bohemia, and Saxony. From whence it follows that the Pruſſian army, ſhould never have loſt ſight of Franckfurt, which would have prevented the projected junction, and probably the calamities which aroſe from it: any poſition about Guben behind the Oder, would have effected this object; whereas by loſing the communication with Franckfurt, they ſuffered Laudohn to arrive there unmoleſted at the very moment it was neceſſary. Having once loſt his communication with that place, the Pruſſian general inſtead of giving battle ſhould inſtantly have retired, and endeavoured by forced marches to have regained it, which he might ſtill have done; for Laudohn arrived on the eighth or ninth day after the battle: this was a capital fault, to have ſuffered himſelf to be puſhed, I may ſay, out of the road to Franckfurt, and ſtill a greater, not to have regained it, as he might have done, and prevented the junction till the king arrived, which would have forced Laudohn into Saxony;

Saxony; and the Ruſſians of courſe, to avoid another uſeleſs battle, would on their part alſo, have retired without loſs of time.

The Pruſſians having loſt the road to Franckfurt and Croſſen, were obliged to fight on improper ground, where they could not form a line, or make their cavalry act, which was remarkably good. They were brought on bad ground, and deſtroyed by the artillery alone, which no cavalry can reſiſt for a moment. It muſt not therefore be expoſed to it, nor ever appear on any ground where it cannot advance full gallop. The partial attacks which the Pruſſian account blamed, are however in my opinion the beſt; whenever the enemy cannot avail himſelf of the intervals between them, which was the caſe here, and is ſo generally againſt the Ruſſians, who manœuvre ſlowly, and ſtand on the ground which they occupy, and ſeldom or ever break their line to advance againſt any particular point, however advantageous it might be; partial attacks are more vigorous, and if properly ſupported, generally ſucceed: you can bring the main part of your line to act againſt particular points: whereas the other parts of the enemy's line muſt remain inactive, if the ground permits you to hide your diſpoſition, and make ſeveral falſe attacks to prevent him from breaking his line to ſupport the points really attacked. When the ground is open, and you cannot cover your motions, of courſe all your attacks muſt be linked together, and no openings left between them, for if the enemy is able, and his troops manœuvre well, inſtead of bringing his forces entirely to oppoſe your attacks, and breaking his line for that purpoſe, he will inſtantly order his ſecond line, and his reſerve (which ſhould always be divided into three parts, behind the right, the center and the left) to ſupport the points attacked; and with his beſt troops attack thoſe places between your attacks, which ſeem the weakeſt, his ſecond line always advancing to ſupport theſe detachments, ſo that you cannot

come on the flanks of ſuch corps as advance before the front to attack you. Whether this ſucceeds entirely or not, you cannot puſh on your attacks, though ſucceſsful. Whereas if your enemy remain on the ground (as the Ruſſians always, and indeed moſt other troops too generally do) without attempting by ſuch detachments, as I have deſcribed, to create a diverſion on that part of your army unemployed in your attacks, he will probably be forced in one point or other, becauſe his motions neceſſarily depending on yours; if his attention is drawn to more points than one at the ſame moment, he will not dare to reinforce any part of his line, till one of your attacks ſhall have become deciſively ſerious, and then it is often too late to do it with effect; his line is pierced, his reinforcements arriving ſucceſſively, are ſucceſſively beaten, and his army being broken, brigade after brigade, the day concludes with a compleat and bloody route, in which he probably loſes moſt of his artillery, and perhaps his camp and baggage, and thus becomes unable to reſiſt whatever operation you may be diſpoſed to undertake in conſequence of your victory. The Ruſſians hold this conduct, becauſe they do not, as I ſaid, move with celerity, and confide much in their artillery; others perhaps truſting too entirely in the ſtrength of their poſition; but beſides, few generals and few armies are equal to the ſyſtem of defence I propoſe. Few generals have genius to diſcern what points may, or may not be attacked, or defended with advantage, or catch the moment it is to be done. Few armies are ſo conſtituted that they can, if I may ſo ſay, execute the general's orders with the ſame rapidity he has conceived the propriety of them. The prodigious quantity of artillery which they drag after them (in which, like the Ruſſians, moſt troops place too much confidence) chains them to the ground on which they ſtand, or renders their motions too ſlow. They cannot

follow

follow their general; he muſt follow them, and his talents when moſt required (in battle) are loſt.

The Ruſſians during this part of the campaign conducted themſelves with great wiſdom, and in the action behaved with a firmneſs peculiar to themſelves. The object was Franckfurt, becauſe it was there alone they could be joined by Laudohn, and therefore from their firſt march from Poſen they moved uniformly on their right, and cloſe to the enemy's left flank, which wiſe manœuvre, united to his fears of loſing the communication with Sileſia, at laſt brought them on the road which leads to Franckfurt, forced the enemy to engage in an unequal combat, where he was defeated, and accompliſhed their end with great glory.

After the battle of Paltzig, the Ruſſians marched on the twenty-ſixth to Croſſen, and there remained till the thirty-firſt; and on the third of Auguſt arrived at Franckfurt, in whoſe neighbourhood General Laudohn, with above eighteen thouſand men, and forty-eight pieces of artillery, beſides thoſe belonging to the regiments, arrived the ſame day; the bridge over the Oder was re-eſtabliſhed, and another of Pontoons thrown over that river higher up, to maintain the communication between the Auſtrians and Ruſſians.

In the mean while General Wedel paſſed the Oder after the battle, and camped within a few miles of Croſſen, between that place and Glogau. The king ordered Prince Henry, who commanded in Saxony, to march with the greater part of his army into Sileſia, which accordingly arrived at Sagan on the Bober the twenty-eighth of July, where it was joined by another under the Prince Frederick of Wurtemberg, who with ſix batallions, and fifteen ſquadrons, had been ſent to obſerve General Haddick, but finding himſelf too weak, had by the king's orders returned to Sagan.

The king leaving his army in Sileſia under Prince Henry's command, on the twenty-eighth of July came to Sagan, and put himſelf

ſelf at the head of the corps aſſembled there. When Marſhal Daun detached General Laudohn to join the Ruſſians, he ordered General Haddick, with a conſiderable body, to advance towards Pribus in Luſatia to reinforce him, and cover his march towards Fanckfurt, which having done, Haddick himſelf with about twelve or fourteen thouſand men remained at Guben. The king who had directed his march from Sagan to Somerfield, where he arrived
Auguſt. the firſt of Auguſt with one of his columns, was informed of his poſition, and fearing he might make another expedition to Berlin, reſolved to attack him, which he did on the ſecond, and drove him back with the loſs of the greateſt part of his baggage; he ſeems to have been ſurprized, otherwiſe ſuch an event could not have happened. On the third the king reſumed his march to Muhlroſe, where he was joined by Wedel's army the fourth. Soon after happened the battle of Kunnerſdorff near Franckfurt: the accounts publiſhed by both parties of this important action, relate alſo all the manœuvres which preceded, and led to it, we ſhall therefore give them as they are, that the reader may judge for himſelf. The two firſt are given by the Pruſſians, and the laſt by the Ruſſians.

"The king having united his forces at Muhlroſe the fourth, he marched on the fifth to Wulkow on the Oder, the ninth the van camped at Lebus, and the army at ſome diſtance behind; both armies, were now ſeparated by the Oder, and fronted each other; here General Finck arrived from Saxony, with a ſtrong corps of twenty-four batallions and ten ſquadrons, upon which the king ordered bridges to be thrown over the Oder, which was done lower down near Ritwein, between Lebus and Cuſtrin the ground before the army where it then ſtood being improper, and moreover too near the enemy. On the tenth the army received orders to march, and on the eleventh we paſſed the Oder, the infantry over the bridges, and the cavalry through the fords, and advanced about four miles further

further on, but the troops were ſo fatigued with the heat and duſt, that it was thought prudent to poſtpone the attack till the next day; that night we remained in the open field, without tents; the van was at Biſchoffsee, about two miles from the enemy, who remained very quiet in his camp well fortified. The twelfth at three o'clock we marched towards Reppin, and formed ourſelves in order of battle in the wood, and then advanced againſt the enemy's right, (it ſhould be the left.) This was likewiſe done by the corps under General Finck. The fire from the batteries, began ſoon after ten, and produced good effect; having continued near an hour, eight batallions of the van advanced againſt the enemy's entrenchments, and nowithſtanding they were on high ground entered them, without any loſs, and took forty-two pieces of artillery: upon which General Finch, with the reſt of the van, marched againſt the great entrenchment by Kunnerſdorff. At firſt this did not ſucceed, becauſe it was not ſupported by any artillery; but when we had brought ſome heavy cannon on the hill we had taken, which was the higheſt, General Finck, protected and ſupported by them, attacked once more the entrenchments, and ſucceeded; we had few men killed, but many wounded; which done, the General advanced through the village Kunnerſdorff: behind which lay an entire line of redoubts, the greateſt part of which were taken, and the enemy driven back on all ſides. They defended themſelves however, with great bravery, and many of them threw themſelves on the ground, as if they had been dead; and when we had paſſed them, got up, took their arms, and fired at our backs: our cavalry was kept back by the prodigious fire of the enemy's artillery loaded with grape ſhot, (particularly the howitzers) and could not advance to ſupport the infantry as well as it could be wiſhed. The Ruſſians however retired all together towards the laſt hill, and ſeemed reſolved to defend it. At the ſame time they

ſeemed

ſeemed to deſpair, for they began to plunder the baggage. We had taken above one hundred pieces of cannon; and the Ruſſians continually flying, till ſix o'clock, we could flatter ourſelves with hopes of a glorious victory: the Ruſſians had thrown themſelves behind an abbatis by the Judenberg, where they defended themſelves, protected by fifty pieces of cannon; and in this moment the Pruſſians fortune failed them, and turned her back upon them, to which many circumſtances contributed. The exceſſive heat of the day, had very much fatigued the troops, and not a drop of water being to be found was one, but not the only cauſe of our bad fortune. After the taking of the third line of entrenchments, the Pruſſians did not as before, advance in good order, but in broken troops, the diſadvantage of which, any one may imagine. General Laudohn ſaw this diſorder, and with ſome regiments of grenadiers, which as yet had not been engaged, knew how to avail himſelf of it; while we were making our laſt attack in great confuſion, he advanced, and hindred the Pruſſians from taking the laſt entrenchment. The cavalry is always victorious when the ground permits it to act freely againſt tired infantry. The death of General Putkammer, and the wounds of General Seidlitz were alſo the cauſe that our cavalry was brought into diſorder. It attempted to enter the entrenchments, but did not ſucceed. The king did all that was poſſible to bring his troops into order and expoſed himſelf ſo much, that he had two horſes killed under him, but they were ſo tired, that they fell on the ground unable to ſtand: ſo that nothing remained to be done, but retire as well as they could. Had the Pruſſians remained in good order on the third height they had taken, and poſtponed the laſt attack till next morning; when it might have been made with more advantage; it is probable the flying enemy would have abandoned his poſts in the night—but when an event has happened, it is eaſy to judge how one might have

"have done better. It is ſaid that General Finck propoſed this to "the king who did not approve of it: we can however ſay for cer- "tain, that after we had taken Kunnerſdorff, if inſtead of advancing "by our right, as we did, we had advanced by our left, we ſhould in "great meaſure have avoided the fire of the enemy's great battery, "and with much more eaſe have taken the laſt hill. During the bat- "tle, about twelve o'clock, General Wunſch had taken Franckfurt, "which circumſtance likewiſe obliged the enemy to exert themſelves. "It is eaſy to imagine, our retreat could not be made in good order; "the Ruſſians however purſued us only a little way. The loſs of "the Pruſſians conſiſts of about three thouſand killed, two thouſand "taken, and eleven thouſand wounded, above one hundred cannon, "and near three thouſand horſes. The fourth our army repaſſed the "Oder, and camped near Retwein." Every body ſays, and the Pruſſians believe, that nothing remained to be done but take the Judenberg: a perſon who was on the ground ſince the battle however aſſures, that before the Judenberg and cloſe to it, was a whole line of batteries, which appeared evidently long after the battle, which the Pruſſians muſt have taken, before they reached the Judenberg. Moreover this line was naturally ſo ſtrong that it could not be forced, which muſt have been done, after taking the abbatis on the ſide; where, into the bargain, the height is ſo ſteep and craggy that it is as inacceſſible as if it was palliſaded. This circumſtance in the heat of the battle, was overlooked by the Pruſſians, at leaſt, it does not appear in any place; which ſhews how imperfectly men ſee and judge of ground.

The ſecond account runs as follows.

"Though the king's army was not half ſo numerous as that of the "enemy, and they occupied a very ſtrong camp, fortified and co- "vered with cannon, circumſtances did not permit his majeſty to "defer the attack any longer.

"On the eleventh the army paſſed the Oder, four miles above "Cuſtrin; the twelfth, at eleven o'clock, the attack was made with "ſuch ſucceſs that we took three batteries, in which were above "eighty pieces of artillery. The greateſt part of the Ruſſian army "fled, and for ſix hours, the victory was ours, which the enemy be-"lieved; but as part of their troops collected in a great battery, "which lay on the Judenberg, ſtood their ground; ſo at the ſame "time, the Auſtrian cavalry attacked ours, and beat it; Seidlitz "who commanded ours, was wounded and carried out of the field. "The enemy's cavalry then attacked the infantry and brought it "into diſorder. The king did all that was poſſible to re-eſtabliſh "the affair, and brought on the troops three times again, and ex-"poſed himſelf to the greateſt danger; but in vain; the men were "ſo fatigued, they could not advance, which obliged his majeſty "to order the retreat, and abandon the advantages he had obtained "at firſt."

Count Soltikow's account is as follows——

"IN my laſt I had the honour to inform your Imperial Majeſty, "that the twelfth your army had gained a complete victory over the "enemy, commanded by the king in perſon. I now beg leave to add "the particulars: on the eleventh we were informed the enemy had "paſſed the Oder. I did not think it neceſſary to change any thing "in the poſition we had taken, but to remain on the height we oc-"cupied near Franckfurt. Our right came almoſt to the banks of "the Oder, our left went to Kunnerſdorff as far as the woods. It "would ſeem from hence that our army had its back towards the "enemy, but the nature of the ground, required we ſhould form as "we did; when the enemy advanced to Geritz, it was plain he "would march about us, our right compoſed of the firſt diviſion, was "commanded by Count Fermor, the van by General Villebois; the "ſecond diviſion under Count Romanzow, made the center; and the

„ new

" new corps under Prince Gallitzin, made our left: for want of
" room the Auſtrians could not enter into the line, and were there-
" fore poſted behind the right. I endeavoured to place the cavalry
" ſo as not to expoſe it to the enemy's artillery; from the nature of
" the ground, the affair muſt be decided chiefly by the infantry.

" On the enemy's approach our light troops, commanded by Count
" Totleben retired and took poſt before the front of our right;
" though from the diſpoſition of the enemy, it appeared he intend-
" ed to ſurround ourleft. I made no alteration in mine afterwards.
" On his nearer approach he ſeemed to intend attacking alſo our
" right, probably to cover his real intentions which was to attack
" our left: having erected two batteries on that ſide againſt our
" flank; and at the ſame time ordered ſome infantry and cavalry to
" advance through a valley, about ten he extended his left; having
" raiſed ſome batteries againſt our right which was covered by a
" marſh, over which is a bridge: this Count Totleben put on fire,
" ſo that the enemy could not approach our right; though by this
" I brought the enemy's whole fire againſt my left. I reaped how-
" ever this advantage, that I could make my diſpoſitions as circum-
" ſtances required; accordingly the enemy attacked our left, exactly
" againſt the flank; where a regiment of grenadiers of the new corps
" was poſted; and after a vigorous reſiſtance was obliged to retire,
" the enemy having brought the greateſt part of his fires againſt
" this point: on which prince Gallitzin, who commanded there,
" ordered two regiments from the firſt and ſecond line to advance,
" and form a line, theſe were ſupported by two other regiments
" from the new corps, ſo that they made front acroſs the camp,
" where the flank was. During this manœuvre, the enemy who
" were advanced to the ground left by the regiment of grenadiers
" which retired, had an opportunity to take our heights, and open
" his columns: ſo that theſe regiments were likewiſe driven back,

" and the enemy took two of our batteries, formed his army in one " column, which took all the ground about our new line; and " though he had ſuffered much in theſe attacks, his line extended " towards our right, againſt which he had likewiſe brought a great " quantity of artillery. To oppoſe theſe great forces, I ordered " General Panin to advance and ſupport thoſe regiments which re- " tired; and as the narrowneſs of the ground did not permit any " more than two regiments to form the line in flank, he did ſo " with a regiment of grenadiers, while Count Campitelli brought " on the German grenadiers; behind theſe he (General Panin) " formed another line of two regiments, and ſoon afterwards " another of two more, and General Laudohn ordered two Ger- " man regiments to advance and ſupport his grenadiers, ſo that " upon the whole there were ſix or ſeven lines, one behind the " other, the ground on which they ſtood, allowing no more than " two regiments in each line; of courſe the enemy was ſtopped " by this maſs of infantry, and it was doubtful which ſide ſhould " prevail. The enemy ordered his cavalry to advance, though the " ground did not permit them to act with vigour and advantage, " on which Count Romanzow at the head of ours, and General " Laudohn with the Auſtrians attacked the enemy, and forced him " to give way; at the ſame time prince Lubomirſky with three " regiments of infantry, and prince Wolkonſki with two more " taken out of the other lines wheeled about and brought the ene- " my's infantry into confuſion: however he did not give it up, for " he formed a new column, with which he endeavoured to come " behind our ſecond line, to put us between two fires, and prevent " our right from marching to ſupport the left, but General Berg " with two regiments taken out of the ſecond line of the right, ad- " vanced to meet him, and being ſupported by our cannon and " howitzers drove him back, to which the Auſtrian artillery con-

" tributed

" tributed very much; we then concluded the battle was over, for " though the enemy endeavoured to bring his troops into order, " he was forced to retire. About five o'clock two regiments ad- " vanced from the van, while General Berg with two more attacked " the enemy in flank, and forced him to run away; he was retiring " before; General Laudohn at the head of all the cavalry purſued " him on the left, and the light troops on the right, ſo ended this " famous action, having laſted from eleven in the morning to ſix in " the evening." The Ruſſians had killed, wounded and miſſing, about fourteen thouſand men; the Auſtrians about two thouſand; and the Pruſſians loſt eighteen thouſand, near three thouſand horſes, and one hundred and ſeventy two pieces of cannon, they loſt alſo General Putkammer who was killed, and eleven other generals wounded. The plan which we give of the battle, and the different accounts of the ſame, read with attention will enable the reader to form a proper judgment of it.

REFLECTIONS.

IN the conduct of this action we muſt obſerve, that the Ruſſians as uſual fought well, and manœuvred ill; when finally they ſaw that the enemy brought his principal forces againſt their left wing and that flank, they ſhould inſtantly have done then what they afterwards did, when it was almoſt too late. They ſhould have brought up their van, their reſerve, and the greateſt part of their ſecond line, together with the Auſtrians, and formed another left flank, eight or ten lines deep, which they might have done, as the ground was narrow, and did not exceed ſeven hundred yards. Theſe lines would have extended their left towards the Oder, more or leſs as the ground opened and permitted it. This they might have done with the more confidence, as the front of their camp,

particularly

particularly on their right, was very ſtrong, being covered intirely with impenetrable marſhes: and ſecondly, becauſe they in fact ſaw that all the enemy's forces were directed againſt their left. Having neglected this precaution for above five hours, they were on the point of loſing the battle, and their army. For the Pruſſian General Wunſch had during the action taken Franckfurt, and their baggage in it, ſo that they had no retreat, but over a bridge a little above that town, which broke down, and had it not, an army totally routed, ſo near the river, and the enemy cloſe to their heels, or rather upon them with their bayonets in their backs, muſt have been drowned, cut to pieces, or ſurrendered at diſcretion. Happily for the Ruſſians, General Laudohn advanced with his Auſtrians, and ſtopped the enemy until a diſpoſition could be made, and ſupported ſucceſſively by many regiments of Ruſſians and Auſtrians, who formed ſeveral lines acroſs the camp, which great maſs the Pruſſians could not move, and immediately gave way on all ſides. The attack made by the enemy's cavalry was repulſed, and he attacked in his turn, and beat; the battle was then won.

As to the king and his troops, they behaved with wonderful vigour and activity, and deſerved to win the battle: why did they not? in the firſt place, becauſe the enemy was much ſtronger, having at leaſt ſeventy thouſand men, and a prodigious quantity of artillery, particularly howitzers of different ſpecies, which are of great uſe in the field, in a cloſe country, and againſt cavalry; ſecondly, the ground was extremely ſtrong by nature, and moreover well covered by entrenchments; ſo that the Pruſſians, particularly their formidable cavalry, could not move, and act with their accuſtomed vigour and celerity, which gave the enemy time to make the laſt diſpoſition on his flank, and this was deciſive as we have ſeen. The Pruſſians, greatly diminiſhed by their various attacks, and much fatigued with the uncommon heat, and moreover, as it always

ways happens after a long and obſtinate engagement, being thrown into diſorder, and of courſe unable to reſiſt the ſhock and weight of ſo great a maſs as was formed againſt them, were obliged to give way, at firſt gradually, being ſuſtained by the cavalry, but this being beat, they fled precipitately, and abandoned every thing, their own artillery, and that taken from the enemy: whether they ought or could form on the ground they had taken already, and were in poſſeſſion of before the laſt attack they made againſt the Judenberg, with their left on the heights, and their right towards Franckfurt, of which they were maſters, I do not know; though I think they might, in which caſe the enemy muſt have retired in the night over the Oder, and the battle was completely won. It was the laſt attack which was fatal to the Pruſſians; had they avoided it, I am ſtrongly inclined to believe the enemy could never have driven them from the ground they occupied, and the leſs ſo, as the king might have ſent a ſtrong detachment towards Franckfurt to join that under Wunſch, which muſt have come on the Ruſſians left flank and rear, had they advanced to drive him out of his ground. To ſupport the laſt attack the king ſent a ſtrong column along the high road to come even behind the flank of the enemy's ſecond line, as it is marked in the plan. Now I aſk, why at firſt ſetting out he did not ſend a ſtrong, or rather his chief column that way, from whence he would have reaped every advantage poſſible, particularly had he ordered a great part of his artillery to be placed againſt the enemy's front towards the right, and made ſome falſe attacks there, which would have hindered them from drawing troops from thence to ſupport their left. We think that neither the Ruſſians, nor any army upon earth, however ſtrongly poſted, if one or other wing is ſurrounded, and vigorouſly attacked, while another ſtrong corps ſupported by cavalry, acts upon and behind the flank, can reſiſt a moment; and I am convinced, that if the king had firmly adhered to this diſpoſition, advancing

vancing coolly and deliberately with his infantry (for cavalry alone muſt act with rapidity, infantry is inſtantly thrown into confuſion if you pretend to hurry it), he would have driven the whole Ruſſian army into the Oder, or obliged them to diſperſe and fly in the night up that river on the right of it. The ground permitted him to do this at the laſt attack, and conſequently it might have been done at firſt; would have ſaved a great number of men, and, we think, inſured a complete victory. The contrary happened, merely from having neglected it.

* We muſt here again lament the king's violent inclination for battles; which as we have often obſerved, are ſeldom neceſſary, and in a defenſive war muſt always be avoided. In theſe two battles the king loſt thirty thouſand men, and two hundred pieces of artillery, though neither was neceſſary.

Had Wedel's army been reinforced to thirty-five thouſand men, and retired ſucceſſively before the Ruſſians, paſſed the Oder, and taken poſt behind the Neiſs between Guben and Franckfurt, with a ſtrong detachment there and at Croſſen; General Laudohn could never have joined the Ruſſians, and theſe would moſt certainly not have paſſed the Oder; though they never decline fighting, they never engage freely in action. They would have gone over the Wartha towards Landſberg, and from thence through Pomerania home, as they did the preceding year, or perhaps gone up the right of the Oder a little way, plundered the country, and gone by Poſen to the Viſtula. The king in the mean time might have poſted himſelf with an army behind the Bober to obſerve the Auſtrians, and Prince Henry in Saxony to oppoſe the army of the empire; by ſuch a diſpoſition his majeſty would have ſpared his men, and moſt effectually protected his country, and ſaved Dreſden into the bargain. The poſitions we mention are ſo deciſive, that I am convinced the king with one hundred and thirty thou-

* See note F.

thouſand men, will be able to protect his country againſt double the number.

Fifty thouſand on the frontiers of Bohemia, with their center at Glatz, move to the right or left, as the motions of the Auſtrians require, and if theſe penetrated into Upper Luſatia, thoſe move up the Queiſs and Bober towards Naumbourg, Sagan, and Chriſtianſtadt; forty thouſand near Frankfurt, which will protect Pomerania, and all beyond the Oder; and forty thouſand men in Saxony, which nobody can drive out. If the king had poſted himſelf with forty thouſand men only, on the heights behind Frankfurt, and left eight or ten thouſand more in Saxony to protect Dreſden for the preſent, and his brother at Sagan, to obſerve Marſhal Daun who was advanced to Pribus, I ſay the Ruſſians would never have paſſed the Oder, and expoſed themſelves to the hazard of an action, with that river behind them; and if they did, the king might have had many opportunities to fight them with advantage, or by occupying a ſtrong camp, with Berlin behind him, and Cuſtrin on his left flank, ſtop them ſhort, and force them to retire. The idea which then prevailed, of joining Marſhal Daun, which his motions ſeemed to confirm, was ridiculous in the higheſt degree. Theſe two armies amounted to, I ſuppoſe, near one hundred and forty thouſand men; neither had a ſtrong place or any depots, they could not conſequently keep together twenty-four hours, nor even ſubſiſt ſeparately a week. If ſuch a project ever was made, they would have been both ruined, the king on one ſide, and Prince Henry between the Auſtrians and Bohemia. There was no opening for them but to fly into Saxony, and from thence probably for the ſame want of ſubſiſtence into Bohemia. The truth is, the Ruſſians felt they had nothing to do beyond the Oder; that in paſſing it, they greatly expoſed themſelves, and finally that they could not ſtay any where beyond it. Theſe be-

ing the circumſtances and poſition of the reſpective armies, they could not remain ten days where they were, and of courſe muſt have left Laudohn to ſeek his way through Poland, and retired through Pomerania home, or march on the left up the Oder, bring him part of his way home, and having plundered the country in their way, return to Poſen, on the Wartha. For my own part, I am throughly convinced of this reaſoning, but the reader will take the map in his hand, and judge. Why then, O King, fight? Indeed this reaſoning is ſo well founded, that the Ruſſians, though they had got two great victories, were checked by the king, who had not above twenty-five thouſand men, and obliged after they had paſſed the Oder, to ſkim (if I may ſo ſay) Luſatia, and part of Sileſia, repaſs the Oder, and having eſcorted Laudohn on his way home, be content to return to Poſen, which proves there was no neceſſity for fighting, and that they muſt have done this, without ever being able to paſs the Oder at all.

The king continued at Retwein for ſome days; but on the approach of General Haddick, who was coming with a conſiderable corps to join the Ruſſians, his Majeſty thought it prudent to take ſome advantageous camp, to hinder their advancing into Brandenburg towards Berlin; accordingly on the fifteenth he marched by Lebus to Madlitz, between Frankfurt and Furſtenwalde, and on the eighteenth to this laſt place, that he might with greater convenience receive the artillery and ſtores he expected from Berlin.

The Ruſſian army having been joined by General Haddick on the fourteenth, paſſed the Oder the ſixteenth, and encamped near the village Loſſow. On the twenty-ſecond Count Soltikow had an interview with Marſhal Daun at Guben, whoſe army camped at Tribel in Luſatia, and conſequently the two armies might have joined had they choſen, which the Ruſſians undoubtedly

edly refuſed, for the reaſons above mentioned; they had nothing, and were only ſupplied by the Auſtrians for ſome little time, while the communication was open between them, as I was informed. On the twenty-eighth of Auguſt, the Ruſſians occupied a camp at Hohenwalde, and jointly with the Auſtrians blew up the ſluices of the canal by Muhlroſe, which joins the Spree and the Oder, a cruel and unneceſſary work, worthy Goths and Vandals. On the twenty-ninth they encamped at Grahnau in Lower Luſatia; upon which Frankfurt after it had paid fifty thouſand dollars, (about eight thouſand pounds) was evacuated. The thirtieth the Ruſſians camped at Liberoſe, Haddick covered the march on the right and Laudohn the rear; here they remained till the fifteenth of September. The king kept very cloſe, and September. almoſt in ſight of them during the whole march. On the thirtieth of Auguſt he camped at Waldau oppoſite the Ruſſians; on the firſt of September, and the day following at Lubben, ſeparated from them by a ſmall moraſs, where he remained till the Ruſſians reſumed their march, which they did on the fifteenth of September, not being able to continue there any longer for want of proviſions; when they went to Guben, from thence on the eighteenth to Starnzeddel, and on the nineteenth to Sommerfield; Laudohn advanced to Chriſtianſtadt, where he was reinforced with eight or ten thouſand men, under Count Campitelli. The king followed cloſe to the enemy, on his right; he had already ſent a corps under General Finck to Saxony, and being arrived at Cotbus ſent four batallions more there. The Ruſſians ſeemed inclined to take Glogau, that they might have a place of arms in Silefia, but as they were not in a condition to beſiege it in form, and it had a good gariſon, and the king cloſe to them, they wiſely abandoned

this project, (if ever they had ſeriouſly formed it)*. The twentieth they came to Chriſtianſtadt, paſſed the Bober the twenty-firſt; the twenty-ſecond they camped at Langen-Hermſdorff; the twenty-third at Freyſtadt; the twenty-fourth at Benthen; the twenty-ninth paſſed the Oder below Benthen, having the king always cloſe to them on their right; he advanced with ſome batallions in hopes of coming up with their rear in paſſing the Oder, but found them all on the other ſide, upon which his Majeſty marched to Glogau, and ordered a ſtrong detachment to take poſt at Rutzen, where they fortified themſelves. On the fourth of
October. October the Ruſſians marched to Schwaſen, Laudohn made the rear guard. The Ruſſians made ſeveral batteries againſt the Pruſſian corps above mentioned, but could not drive them away. On the ſeventh they marched to Groſs Oſten, by which it appeared they propoſed going towards Breſlaw, and arrive there before the king. This obliged his Majeſty to return over the Oder the ſeventh, and march alſo towards Breſlaw, he therefore ordered a ſtrong corps to advance to Ratſchutz: a bridge was thrown over the Oder, where this detachment paſſed, and had a ſmart encounter with the enemy's light troops, the whole army paſſed in the night and camped by Sophienthal. The Ruſſians by this poſition were prevented from going to Breſlaw, and ſo remained at Gros Oſten till the twenty-eighth, when they marched to Hernſtadt on the Bartſch river, which was the direct road to Breſlaw, but the king had occupied this paſs, which was of great conſequence, as the enemy could no longer go to Breſlaw, without a long and difficult march through moraſſes, &c. The king on ſeeing the enemy advance

* They never had it in their power to make the attempt, the king by the poſition he took at Milkau barred their road to that place, and by his well placed detachments rendered it impoſſible for them to come near enough even to bombard it.

to

to Hernſtadt, marched thither alſo to ſupport that important paſs: both armies were near each other; General Laudohn burnt the town with his artillery. The reaſons he gives are by no means ſufficient to juſtify ſuch unneceſſary barbarities. He was led by paſſion, on ſeeing himſelf and the Ruſſians diſappointed in their views againſt Breſlaw, by taking which place it was hoped, the Ruſſian army, or at leaſt a great part of it, might be prevailed upon to ſtay with the Auſtrian. This was the laſt exploit of the Ruſſians. On the twenty-fourth they began their retreat towards Poland. The king continued in his camp ſome days after the retreat of the enemy, to make ſome diſpoſitions. General Hulſen with the greateſt part of the army was ordered into Saxony; General Schmettau remained in Sileſia, with a corps. The king being ill with the gout went to Glogau, but finding himſelf better, on the ſeventh of November he ſet out for Saxony. General Laudohn took his march through Poland towards Upper Sileſia, and on the twenty-fourth of November arrived with his cavalry at Cracaw, and on the firſt of December marched to Teſchen. General Fouquet had left Landſhut, and croſſed the Oder at Breſlaw, from whence he advanced to the frontiers to obſerve Laudohn, and keep him from making incurſions in his way, into Sileſia, and kept cloſe to him, which brought on ſeveral ſkirmiſhes but of no conſequence. Both parties being quite fatigued with ſuch operations at that ſeaſon of the year, and having great need of reſt agreed to a ſort of truce, on condition that neither ſhould undertake any thing, during the winter, and ſo went into quarters; I wiſh this was always done. For expeditions undertaken during the winter can be of no great ſervice, and ruin the troops who want reſt. November.

I ſhall conclude my obſervation on the Ruſſian campaign, by ſaying it proved, that an army whoſe line of operation is conſiderably too long can execute no ſolid enterprize, though it be ever ſo

ſo powerful: and that a handful of men well conducted (as the Pruſſians were, who certainly did not amount to a third of the Ruſſian army) will infallibly ſtop their progreſs, and finally force them to retire, without doing any thing; theſe two campaigns and the following prove theſe truths to a demonſtration.

CHAP. III.

Of the Operations of the Auſtrian Army, commanded by Marſhal Daun in 1759.

THIS army took up its quarters during the winter in Bohemia; the weather being very ſevere in the ſpring it did not aſſemble till the end of April. In the months of March and April ſeveral ſkirmiſhes happened on the frontier, from Moravia to Landſhut, but as uſual of no real importance. General Beck took and diſperſed a poſt of about four hundred men the Pruſſians had at Greiffenberg. This blow however was not left unrevenged at Commottau, in the circle of Saatz, and on the borders of Bohemia towards Saxony. The Auſtrians under General Gemmingen had a corps of near three thouſand men, which were intended to cover that country, and particularly ſome magazines diſperſed about in the uſual careleſs manner; theſe Prince Henry reſolved to attack and deſtroy: accordingly the fourteenth of April he left Dreſden, and on his way divided his troops into two columns, the one he led himſelf, and the other was commanded by General Hulſen. The former entered Bohemia by Peterſwald to Linnay, not far from Howoſitz, where Prince Henry remained while his light troops advanced further into the country to raiſe contributions, and deſtroy the magazines, which they did with great ſucceſs; and having joined the main

April.

main body at Linnay, retired on the twentieth to Saxony. The other column met with greater resistance on the Passberg, where they found the Austrians entrenched with two regiments of infantry and some cavalry, whom after a long action they dispersed, took fifty-one officers, and near two thousand prisoners (among whom General Rheinhard,) three pair of colours, two standards, and three cannons. In this expedition the Prince ruined all the magazines as far as Berlin on Egda River, in the circle of Leutmeritz, &c. to a very great amount. In the middle of May the Prussian army assembled and camped near Landshut. The Austrian army had occupied a strong camp behind the Elbe, between Jaromitz and Königshoff; the head quarters were at Schurtz. Here Marshal Daun resolved (according to the plan established) to wait until the approach of the Russians, or of the Imperialists, obliged the king to abandon his position. The Austrians made several attacks on the enemy's posts during the time the two armies remained in their respective camps, but without any considerable success. The Prussians had drawn a great part of their forces out of Saxony to oppose the Russians who were advancing towards the Oder, so that the Imperial army was at liberty to act almost unmolested on the Lower Elbe, about Dresden, which was the object. The motions of this and the Russian army made it necessary for the Austrians under Marshal Daun to march into Lusatia, in order to support the operations of the one and the other; accordingly on the twenty-eighth of June they quitted the camp of Schurtz, and marched in two columns to Neudorff; another corps composed chiefly of the troops which General Harsch had commanded, made the third column, and the same day arrived at Horzize, under the Duke of Aremberg, so that the whole army was, for the conveniency of the march through that mountainous country, divided into three corps. On the twenty-ninth the first marched in two columns, the one

May.

June.

arrived

arrived at Gitschin, and the other at Lömnitz. The corps under General Laudohn marched on the right between these columns and
July. the enemy. The first of July the two columns marched, the one to Turnau, the other to Bredl, followed by that under the Duke of Aremberg, who came that day to Gitschin; the second the army arrived at Riechenberg, where the Duke of Aremberg also arrived, and the whole army was brought together. General Laudohn advanced at the head of two thousand horse to reconnoitre the fron-
May. tiers of Silesia about Marckliffa. On the fifth the country beginning to open, the army marched in five columns to Friedland; and the sixth, in four columns to Marckliffa, the head quarters at Gorlitzheim, where it remained till the twenty-ninth of July.

ORDER of BATTLE of the AUSTRIAN ARMY, under the ORDERS of his EXCELLENCY FIELD MARECHAL LEOPOLD COMTE DE DAUN, on the 7th of July, 1759.

FIRST LINE.

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The king being informed of the Auſtrians march towards Luſatia, ſent General Seidlitz with a conſiderable corps to Lahn, part of which had an encounter with a detachment of Laudohn's under Count Caromeli; in which this laſt had ſome loſs. On the fifth of July the king, with his whole army, marched to Lahn, and afterwards to Löwenberg. About the middle of July he ſent a corps under the Prince of Würtemberg to Sprottau, to obſerve the Duke of Aremberg, who had been ſent with the reſerve to occupy Lauban.

Marſhal Daun's object was to ſend General Laudohn with a ſtrong corps to join the Ruſſians at Frankfurt. To which end he made the following diſpoſition: he recalled General Haddick, who was on the frontiers of Saxony, and ordered him to march through Bohemia, into Luſatia, where he arrived the twenty-ſecond of July, and General Laudohn joined him, and both marched together to Pfoerten, where they came the thirty-firſt of July, and Laudohn proceeded on his way to Frankfurt, where he arrived happily the fourth of Auguſt, and joined the Ruſſians ſome days after, as we have already related. Another corps under General Macguire was ſent towards Saxony, which took poſt the twenty-ſeventh at Biſchoffswerda, to obſerve the motions of General Finck, who had left Dreſden, and was marching towards Torgau. This was the poſition of the reſpective armies till the end of July, when Marſhal Daun, on receiving the news of the battle of Paltzig, where the Pruſſians were beat, thought it neceſſary to proceed further into Luſatia, and come nearer the Ruſſians, which it was thought would facilitate the operations of both armies. General Beck, who was in the neighbourhood of Lauban, marched to Naumberg on the Bober. The left wing of the army went to Lauban, and the right remained at Marckliſſa.

The loſs of the battle of Paltzig made it neceſſary for the king to reinforce Wedel's army in ſuch a manner, as would ſtop the progreſs of the enemy on that ſide; accordingly the king reſolved to march thither in perſon, and Prince Henry was ordered with the greateſt part of the army in Saxony to march to Sagan, on the Bober, where he arrived the twenty-ninth of Auguſt. The day following the king began his march to the Oder, and Prince Henry was left to command the army in Sileſia.

Auguſt. On the eleventh of Auguſt Marſhal Daun having left a conſiderable corps under General Boccow at Marckliſſa, to cover Bohemia, and obſerve the enemy on that ſide, the Marquis d'Ainſe at Lauban, and General Macguire at Görlitz; marched to Pentzig, the twelfth to Rothenburg, and the thirteenth to Pribus. General Beck occupied Serau, and ſent detachments to Chriſtianſtadt and Croſſen. The Pruſſians had a poſt at Grunberg, which General Beck attacked and made priſoners.

On the nineteenth the army marched to Triebel, where it remained till the thirtieth. From which Marſhal Daun made ſeveral conſiderable detachments; General Macguire, with about twelve thouſand men, was ordered into Saxony to join the Imperialiſts under the Prince of Deuxponts; General Haddick was ordered to take Peitz, which he did. Various other corps were left on the Queis and Bober, to keep up the communication with Bohemia.

During this time Prince Henry continued in his camp near Löwenberg, not knowing well what the object of the Auſtrians was, and having no communication with the king, he could receive no orders from him; he detached General Ziethen along the Bober towards Sprottau, from whom he received information that the Auſtrian army was at Triebel, upon which he ordered General Fouquet to join him at Lowenberg, where he left him, and with the main army advanced to Sagan, at which place he arrived the twenty-

twenty-ninth of Auguſt, and General Ziethen paſſed the Bober, and took poſt on the hills behind Sorau, with a great wood behind him, which goes quite to Sagan. On the thirtieth the Auſtrian army marched to Muſka; on the thirty-firſt to Forſt, and the day following back to Triebel. The ſecond of September the van- September.
guard went to Sorau with an intention to attack General Ziethen, who on the approach of the Auſtrians retired unmoleſted through the wood to Sagan, paſſed the bridge and joined Prince Henry, who was encamped on the other ſide of the town. On the third however the whole Auſtrian army went to Sorau, with what intention it is impoſſible to judge, for he could not think of bringing Prince Henry to battle, or of entering Sileſia on that ſide; I therefore think it was to prevent Prince Henry joining the king, or going into Poland behind them, which the Ruſſians were afraid of, and ſo this motion was made merely to make them eaſy on that ſubject. Their fears were ill grounded, for as the armies then ſtood ſuch a junction was impoſſible, and the other movement not to be performed.


Prince Henry obſerving that the Auſtrian army was ſixty miles from the frontiers of Bohemia, from whence they drew their ſubſiſtence, very naturally thought by marching back towards Lauban, Marſhal Daun would be obliged to return inſtantly towards Bohemia, and take ſome poſt on the line of communication between Sileſia and Saxony, and by that means maintain his communication with that country and his magazines in Bohemia: on the fifth of September accordingly this Prince left Sagan, and marched behind the Bober to Lauban, and on the ninth arrived at Neuſtadt not far from Lauban, on which General de Ville, who had been left at Marckliſſa to cover Bohemia, left that place, and the fifth came to Lauban, which gave the Pruſſians an opening to ſend General Stutterheim over Marckliſſa, to ruin the Auſtrians

depots at Friedland and Gabel, which he compleatly executed. On the approach of Prince Henry, de Ville left Lauban, and retired to Görlitz, and the Pruſſians took poſſeſſion of Lauban. On the ninth de Ville's corps had been conſiderably reinforced: however as Prince Henry made a motion towards his left flank, de Ville quitted his camp near Görlitz, and retired to Bautzen. The Pruſſians advanced and camped on the Landſcron beyond that town.

This manœuvre of Prince Henry of courſe obliged Marſhal Daun to leave Luſatia, and run back towards Bohemia; accordingly on the ninth of September he left Sorau, and marched through a very cloſe and difficult country by Spremberg to Bautzen, where he arrived the thirtieth. The rear of one of the columns was attacked by the Pruſſians under General Krokow, who with one thouſand horſe had been ſent to obſerve their march; he took in this affair, about two hundred priſoners and a great number of waggons. Both armies continued for ſome time in their camps, the Pruſſians about Görlitz, and the Auſtrians at Bautzen; Marſhal Daun had reſolved to advance againſt Prince Henry, with what view I dont know, or can even conjecture. Accordingly the army marched the twenty-third to Riechenbach, and the day following the attack was to have been made, but Prince Henry avoided it by retiring. At this time the few Pruſſians which were in Saxony under General Finck, were hardly preſſed by the Imperialiſts, who had taken Dreſden; wherefore Prince Henry reſolved to march into Saxony; to accompliſh this deſign and avoid fighting, on the twenty-third at night he left Görlitz, and marched the whole night; in the morning he came to Rothenberg, and having halted a few hours proceded to Klitten*, where he arrived at midnight on the twenty-fourth; the next morning he proceeded to Hoyerſwerda, where General Vehla with about two thouſand

* A village on the Tahmer, between the Gros and Kleine Heyde.

men



ORDER of BATTLE of the RUSSIAN ARMY at Zornſdorf, on the 25th of Auguſt, 1756.

Generals — — — — Braun. Fermor.

Lt. Generals — — Tſchernitſchef. Dolgorucky. Pr. Gallitzin. Soltikow.

Major General — — Faſt. Olitz. Panin. Dietz. Manteufel. Pr. Lubomirſky.

Brigadiers — — — — — Leontiew. Sievers. Kokoſin. Uwarrow.

4 Grend. Legion
5 1 Muſq. Legion
6 1 Grenadier Regiment
7 St. Peterſburg
8 Novogorod
9 Woron
10 Reſan
11 Murom
12 Smolenſko
13 4th Grend. Regiment
14 2d Grend. Regiment
15 Neus
16 Caſan
17 Troitſkoy
18 Schluſſelburg
19 Czernikow
20 Raſow
21 3d Grenadiers

M. G. Tieſenhauſen. Palmbach.

3 Caſan C. — 2 Kiow C. — 1 Novotroitſkoy C. — M. G. Demikow

24 5 Muſq. Legion
25 Wiet
26 Nifegroch
27 Wiburg
28 2d Moſkow

M. G. Martuinow

Imperial Cuir 22
3d Cuir 23

Lieut. Gen. Martuinow.

Major Generals — Wolguſky. Leontiow. Plimenikow.

Brigadiers — — Gaugraven. Graſnatſchokow. Berg. Dolgorucky. Stojanow. Jarapkin.

29 3d Muſq. Legion
30 4 Muſq. Legion
31 Reſal H. Gren.
32 Tobal Drag.
33 Ripa H. Gren.
34 Tſchojujew Coſſacks
35 Ladoga
36 Kexholm
37 Plaſkow
38 Suldal
39 Wologda
40 Niſen
41 Obſcheroa
42 Battery
43 Serbien Huſſ.
44 3 Cargapol. Ditto
45 6 Squadrons H. Gren. of St. Peterſburg

Commanded by H.I. Majeſty at Zornſdorf, Auguſt the 25th, 1758.

Field Marſhal Prince Mat...

...Majesty's Command by His Majesty at London, August the 25th, 1758.

Field Marshal Prince Maurice

Van Guard

Lieut. Gen. Manteufel

Major Generals Kurſel. Kahlden.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
1 Bat. of do.	Kanitz Muſq.	Burgſdorf -	Neſſe -	Billerbeck do.	Peterſdorf do.	Kleiſt ditto	Kamzow's Gr.	Battalions
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	

FIRST LINE.

Lieut. Generals — Schorlemmer. Canitz. Dohna. Seidlitz.

Major Generals — Plathen. Ziethen. Raucher. Dierecke. Bülow. P. Francis of Brunſ. Bredow. Letulus.

9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37
Plathen D.	Plettenberg D.	P. Frederick	P. Royal	Rohr G.	Loſſow G.	Rauther	Below		Dohna		Bevern		Lewald		Aſſeburg		Kalkſtein		P. Royal		Forcade		Wedel G.	Carabineers	Seidlitz	Gens d'armes	Garde du Corps	Czettritz H.
5	5	5	5	1	1	1	2		2		2		2		2		2		2		2		1	5	5	5	3	5

Batallions

Squadrons

SECOND LINE.

Lieut. Generals — — — Marſhal. Forcade.

Major Generals — Malakouſky. Froideville. Fleming. Gablentz.

38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52
Ziethen	Malakouſky	Schorlemmer	Maurice		Kurſel		Bulow		Seers		Kreytzen		Norman	Ruſch H.
10	8	10	2		2		2		2		2		5	7


Batallions

Squadrons

53	54
At the Bridge 2 F. B. Hord.	

In Cuſtrin 2 Batallions Wied.

In Stettin 1 Batallion Rauther.



men was encamped, never dreaming the enemy could come there, he was ſurrounded, ſurprized in his camp, and taken with all his men, four or five hundred only with one or two cannon however, I dont know how, eſcaped and came to Bautzen; there Prince Henry remained to let his troops recover themſelves, till the twenty-eighth, when he marched by Elſterwerda to Torgau, where he arrived the ſecond of October, and on the fourth joined General Finck at Strehlin. October.

Prince Henry in quitting Görlitz had begun his march towards Hulbau, but ſoon turned off to the left. However Marſhal Daun was deceived by this, believing he was gone to Sileſia, and ſo the Marſhal continued his march to Görlitz, where he was informed of the real route Prince Henry had taken, upon which he returned the twenty-fifth of September towards Dreſden, and encamped at Keſſelſdorff, beyond that city. From this time to the end of the campaign, the operations of the Auſtrian army were connected with thoſe of the Imperialiſts. We muſt therefore relate the tranſactions of this laſt until the arrival of the Auſtrian army in Saxony, at the end of September, and then conclude with their joint operations, till the end of this campaign. But before we proceed to that part, we beg leave to make ſome obſervations on what we have ſeen done by the reſpective armies in Luſatia.

REFLECTIONS.

Of all the follies that ever entered the head of any Miniſter or General, that of bringing one hundred and forty thouſand men, with at leaſt forty thouſand horſe of different ſpecies, into a country where ten thouſand could not ſubſiſt a fortnight, and where there

was

was nothing to do, is the greateſt. This was now the caſe, and had neither Prince Henry nor the king interfered, theſe immenſe armies could not have remained in Luſatia a week longer. The Ruſſians muſt have taken their march one way or other towards Poland; and the Auſtrians muſt have returned towards Saxony and Bohemia, becauſe they could not ſubſiſt where they were, nor had they any thing to do there at all; there was nothing to be done, I repeat it. In juſtice to the memory of Marſhal Daun, I muſt explain the motives of this very abſurd meaſure. The Court of Vienna during the whole war, wanted to engage the Ruſſians to paſs the Oder, and leave a part at leaſt of their army with them; becauſe they ſaw the Ruſſians came late into the field, and for want of ſubſiſtence retired very ſoon, to take their quarters behind the Viſtula. The Ruſſians for very obvious reaſons would and indeed could not, come into this project. However having gained two great victories they conſented to paſs the Oder, and advance a day or two's march into Luſatia, on condition, firſt that Marſhal Daun ſhould ſend them another conſiderable reinforcement, (which was done, for general Haddick joined them,) ſecondly, that the Marſhal ſhould advance with his whole army to hinder Prince Henry joining the king. This was the motive which brought Marſhal Daun into that country. We have ſeen the effects of ſuch prepoſterous meaſures.

Prince Henry has gained great reputation by his conduct on this occaſion, which is the only foundation, that is known to the world of that glory which he enjoys. He has acquired the name of a conſummate general. Many people place him above the king. Why I cannot conceive; for, in the firſt place, the meaſure he purſued in marching back to Lauban, and placing himſelf on Marſhal Daun's line of communication, was ſo very obvious; that had he not done it, he muſt have paſſed for ever for a block-

head;

head; the operation itſelf could meet with no obſtacles, for there was nobody in his way: de Ville had a corps, Prince Henry had an army. As to his going afterwards to Saxony, I have already ſhewn, that the Auſtrians can take no poſition in Luſatia, which will prevent the Pruſſians from going out of Sileſia into Saxony, and vice verſa. The king when he ſaw the Ruſſians direct their march over Guben towards Sileſia, might have ſpared himſelf, and his troops, much unneceſſary trouble, if inſtead of following them himſelf, he had left it to the care of Prince Henery (then behind the Bober;) and marched to Bautzen, which would have brought Marſhal Daun thither, and moreover hindered him from going into Saxony, which perhaps would have enabled his Majeſty to ſave or retake Dreſden.

What happened on this occaſion confirms the doctrine we laid down in our firſt volume, concerning the line of operation, and a defenſive war. If the enemy's line is conſiderably long, inſtead of oppoſing his progreſs in front, and running the hazard of a battle, you muſt act on his line, which will force him to fall back.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Operations of the Imperial Army.

THE Imperial army had lain in Franconia during the winter, and were making diſpoſitions for opening the campaign as ſoon as poſſible, collecting magazines on every ſide; and had occupied Erfurth, which they propoſed making their place of arms, the enſuing campaign. This Prince Henry reſolved to hinder, and concerted

concerted his meaſures with Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, who on his ſide agreed to ſend a ſmall corps towards Fulda and Herſchfeld, on the enemy's left flank, while the Pruſſians advanced in
February. front. The project was accordingly executed in the end of February and the beginning of March. The poſts of the Imperial army were every where drove back; ſo that the Imperialiſts loſt what
March. magazines they had collected. On the twentieth of March the prince returned to Saxony, and the corps of the allies to their quarters.

April. In April Prince Henry made an incurſion into Bohemia, as we
May. have ſeen, and retired into Saxony. In May he marched again againſt the Imperialiſts, and drove them back beyond Nuremberg; and having ruined a great number of their depots, retired again into Saxony.

Upon this the Imperial army aſſembled, and about the middle
July. of July advanced towards Leipzig, which was given up to them,
Auguſt. without a ſiege, the fifth of Auguſt; from hence they proceeded to Wittenberg, which they took in the ſame manner; from hence they went to Dreſden, already blocked up by General Brentano,
September. and took it the fourth of September without any oppoſition, by capitulation. While they were occupied at Dreſden, General Wunſch with nine batallions and as many ſquadrons, from the gariſon of Leipzig, Wittenberg, and Torgau, advanced to Wittenberg, which the Commandant gave up, without firing a ſhot; upon which he advanced to Torgau, where he arrived the thirtieth. In the night he ſtormed the place, and General Kleefeld beat a parly at eleven o'clock, and capitulated. Immediately after, he marched towards Dreſden, which he found had ſurrendered; upon this he retired to Torgau. During his abſence General St. André who had been left at Leipzig, came to Torgau, with a view of taking it; Wunſch attacked him, beat him, and took his camp.

This

This action did General Wunſch much credit; his corps conſiſted of eight batallions and ſix ſquadrons, whereas that of the enemy, was at leaſt three times the number. The Imperialiſts retired towards Dreſden; General Wunſch marched to Leipzig, and took it; the garriſon was made priſoners of war. By all this one ſees, that a brave man, with few troops, who have confidence in him, can do great things; and that numbers are nothing in the hands of an ignorant General. Wunſch had not above three thouſand men; the Imperialiſts had thirty thouſand at leaſt. We have thought it needleſs to trace particularly the marches and encampments of the Imperial army, becauſe they had no enemy before them to make any diſpoſition neceſſary. They could, and did advance unmoleſted and unobſerved; for even Wunſch did not arrive in Saxony until they had overrun the country, and were before Dreſden, which as we have juſt ſeen, they took alſo without any oppoſition. The Commandant, General Schmettau, who had about three thouſand men in that town, might have defended it ſome days, which probably would have ſaved it.

This conqueſt ſeemed to lead to that of all Saxony, but from bad conduct, or from the real difficulty of things, the Auſtrians during the whole war could get no further; for though occaſionally they advanced towards Torgau, Leipzig, &c. yet at the end of every campaign they were finally forced to fall back to Dreſden. The only advantage they reaped from the poſſeſſion of this place was, that they could canton a part of their army in Saxony about Dreſden, and in the Ertzgebürg during the winter, cover Bohemia on that ſide, and take the field ſooner than uſual; they could alſo aſſemble their army in Saxony without difficulty, being maſters of the paſſes which lead out of Bohemia into that country.

General Wunſch with his ſmall corps was alone in Saxony, as we have ſeen, till the middle of September, when General Finck

with twelve batallions, and eighteen ſquadrons, arrived there, and poſted himſelf by Eulenburg, where he was joined by General Wunſch. The Imperial army had recalled all its detachments, and was encamped about Dreſden. The Pruſſians advanced to Rothſchönberg, and camped behind a great and deep ravin, and the Imperialiſts camped on the other ſide. The Pruſſians retired to Meiſſen, and were followed by the Imperialiſts, who harraſſed their rear with advantage; and on the twenty-firſt of September attacked them, of which action we have the following account by the Imperialiſts.

"The Pruſſian corps under General Finck, conſiſting of about "eighteen thouſand men, had their left near Meiſſen; their right on "the heights of Korbitz; their front was covered by ſome villages "and a deep ravin. The Prince of Deux-Ponts reſolved to attack "them. The rain rendered the march ſo difficult, that General "Haddick, who was to have attacked the enemy's right flank, "thought it neceſſary to halt, and let the troops reſt, and clean "and load their muſquets, which had been rendered unfit for ſer-"vice; the reſt of the army did the ſame. On the heights about "Neuſtadt the enemy perceiving our diſpoſition, ſent a conſiderable "corps to ſupport the villages before his front; General Macguire "however attacked theſe villages, and after a vigorous reſiſtance "took them. In the mean time General Haddick advanced; "Finck oppoſed him, with the greateſt part of his corps, and at "firſt had ſome advantage; but Prince Lobkovitz advancing with "his cavalry, drove that of the enemy back, and penetrated into their "infantry, and after an obſtinate engagement forced them to fly on "all ſides, leaving their cannon behind them. The night pre-"vented our purſuing them. We remained on the field of battle "this night, and part of the following day. Haddick's corps re-"tired to Taubenheim, that he might join the army. We have

"taken

"taken ſeveral pieces of artillery, and three hundred priſoners. "Our loſs amounts in killed, wounded, and miſſing, to about "ſixteen hundred men." The Pruſſians on the contrary ſay, that they kept the field, which ſeems true: for the Imperialiſts retired to their former camp after the battle. The idea of ſending General Haddick with a ſtrong corps againſt the enemy's right flank, was juſt, and had it been well executed, would have been deciſive, which induced General Finck to bring the greateſt part of his force againſt it, well knowing that if in this he ſucceeded, he had his retreat ſecured, and little to fear. Upon the whole it appears, that the Pruſſians, though greatly inferior in numbers, behaved on this occaſion with much firmneſs, wiſdom, and bravery.

The Imperial army remained in its camp at Wilſdruff, where it retreated after the battle till the twenty-ſeventh, when on receiving advice that the Pruſſians under Prince Henry were advancing, and preparing to paſs the Elbe at Meiſſen, it was thought adviſable to retire to Dreſden, and cover that city.

Upon Prince Henry's marching into Saxony Marſhal Daun did the ſame, and on the twenty-fourth of September took his camp at Keſſelſdorff. As General Finck remained at Meiſſen, Marſhal Daun made the neceſſary diſpoſition to attack him on the ſecond of October, which did not take place, becauſe this general very wiſely retired towards Torgau, and joined Prince Henry at Strehla; the Auſtrian army however advanced, and on the ſixth arrived at Oſchatz, about three miles from the enemy; who had placed General Rebentiſch with a corps on the heights of Eulenberg, to keep up the communication with Leipzig. October.

ORDER of BATTLE of the AUSTRIAN ARMY, commanded by H. E. Field Marshal LEOPOLD COUNT DE DAUN, on the 4th of October 1759, at Heyda in Saxony.

FIRST LINE.

| | | |

FIRST LINE.

Lieut. Generals — Major Generals — Battalions

Count Wied Stutterheim
- Forcade - - 2
- Duke of Brunswick - - 2
- Grenad. Batal. 1
- Rathenow 1

Forcade

Saldern
- Lattorff - - 2
- Guards - - 2
- Retzow - - 1
- Wedel - - 2

Lattorf
- Itzenplitz - 2
- The Kings - 2

Braun
- Grenadiers —
- Billerbeck - 1
- Haake - - 1
- Anhalt - - 1
- Nimſchefſky - 1

SECOND LINE.

Lieut. General Finck.

Major Generals — Squadrons — Batallions

Rebentiſch
- Salmuth - - 2
- Caſſel - - 2
- Behr. G. - 1
- Benkendorf - 1
- Bieverling - 1

Sydow
- Markg. Charles 1
- Zaſtrow - - 1
- Grabow - - 1
- Lehwald - - 1

Park of Artillery

Model
- P. Ferdinand - 2
- Rebentiſch - 2

THIRD LINE.

Lieut. General Ziethen.

Major Generals — Squadrons — Batallions

Aſcherſleben
- Horn - - - 5
- Mark. Frederick 5

Brodow
- Vaſſolt - - 5
- Seidlitz - - 5

Vaſſolt
- Bredow - - 5

Bandemer
- Carabineers - 5
- Schmettau - 5

Lentulus
- Gardes de Corps 3
- Gens d'Armes 5

Crokow
- Norman - - 5

Czettritz
- Czettritz D. - 5
- Würtemberg - 5

RESERVE.

Major Generals — Squadrons — Batallions

Schenkendorf
- Grenad. Bat. — — 1
- Lubath - - — — 1
- Krekwitz - — — 1
- Swolinſky - — — 1
- Bäyer - - - — — 1
- Neſſe - - - — — 1
- Willinay - - — — 1
- Burgſdorf - — — 1
- Free Corps
- Wunſch - - — — 2
- Quintus - - — — 1
- Salenmon - — — 1
- 2 Comp. Jägers —

Meinicke
- Crackow - - 5 —
- Plettſbeeg - 5 — —
- Platen - - - 5 — —
- Ziethen - - 10 — —
- Mohring - - 5 — —

Squadrons
Batallions

The Pruſſians could not well be attacked in front, and therefore the Marſhal ordered a corps towards Dahlen beyond their right, which if they waited in their preſent poſition, would come on their flank, while the army attacked them in front; Prince Henry ſent General Wunſch to obſerve the corps above mentioned, and met him at Dahlen, upon which he retired towards Eulenberg to ſupport Rebentiſch, if neceſſary. Both retired. The Auſtrian corps advanced beyond Schilda; all theſe manœuvres of courſe obliged Prince Henry to retire to Torgau, from whence General Finck was ſent to take poſſeſſion of Eulenberg. The twenty-ſecond of October the Auſtrian general advanced to Schilda, he ſent a ſtrong corps to Strehla under the duke of Aremberg to prevent the enemy receiving any thing down the Elbe*; another corps under General Gemingen to Eulenberg, which the Pruſſians abandoned. Marſhal Daun was very intent on driving Prince Henry from Torgau before he received the reinforcements, which were on their march from Sileſia, for which purpoſe the duke of Aremberg was ordered to take poſt on the Elbe, behind the Pruſſian army, which he accordingly did on the twenty-fifth, when his corps arrived undiſcovered at Domitſen. Upon which Prince Henry marched with Finck's corps that way, and met General Brentano at the village Vogelgeſang, where they had a ſkirmiſh till night, but of no conſequence: to keep up the communication, between this corps and his, Marſhal Daun ſent a very conſiderable one, under General O'Donel towards Eulenberg, Prince Henry was alarmed at theſe diſpoſitions which ſeemed to portend a battle; which he could not ſuſtain if attacked in front, flank, and rear at the ſame time. Having obſerved that the duke of Aremberg's corps was quite inſulated and could not be ſupported if immediately attacked, before he or the other Auſtrian corps took other poſitions; he reſolved to ſend that very night General Wunſch with his corps

* Two batallions and two cannon, were enough, and too much, becauſe the country behind was in the hands of the Auſtrians, and conſequently nothing could go that way to the Pruſſians at Torgau. The Author.

over

over the Elbe, with orders to march down that river, repaſs it at Wittenberg, join the corps under Rebentiſch who was not far from thence; and together attack the duke, while Prince Henry himſelf with part of his army did the ſame on his ſide, by which means the duke being attacked in front, flank, and rear, and having the Elbe behind him, muſt have laid down his arms. On the twenty-ninth the two firſt met the duke at Pretzch, (happily he had left Domitſch) attacked, beat him, and drove him back to Düben on the Mulda, with loſs of ſome cannon, many killed and wounded, and about one thouſand men priſoners, among whom was General Gemingen. Of this ſtrange tranſaction the Auſtrians give the following account.

"It was reſolved by Marſhal Daun that the duke of Aremberg "ſhould leave the Elbe, and march to Kemberg, and General "O'Donel to Düben, and having conſulted together, proceed "where they ſhould think moſt uſeful to the ſervice. O'Donel "took his poſt accordingly at Düben, on the twenty-eighth; and "the day following, the duke began his march to the place aſ-"ſigned him; General Brentano conducted the rear, and came to "Pretzch, where they were met by Wunſch's corps and General "Finck behind them, here a ſharp action enſued; the duke con-"tinued his march; but on coming to the heights by the village "Schnellin, he was met by Rebentiſch's corps, whoſe cavalry ad-"vanced immediately, but was kept back by ſome infantry till the "duke could get with his corps on a height by Sackwitz, where he "formed in order of battle, and determined to attack the enemy "before him; but obſerving that General Brentano to avoid being "hemmed in between Wunſch and Finck's corps, was returning "to Güben, and that the three Pruſſian corps were cloſing upon "him on all ſides, he thought it beſt to retire alſo to Güben. "General O'Donel advanced with his corps towards Kemberg, to "aid the duke, but having, as he ſaid, heard late of the affair, "did

" did not come in time, or even near enough to ſee the enemy;
" and though the duke of Aremberg did all that could be done
" to ſecure his retreat, with as little loſs as poſſible; he could not
" prevent the enemy taking ſome baggage and a cannon or two,
" and making many priſoners: when we conſider the proximity
" and poſition of the enemy, it is wonderful the whole corps did
" not periſh. The woods which cover the country helped to
" make a tolerable retreat.

The Pruſſians account is as follows:

" The enemy wanted to cut off our communications on the Elbe
" behind us; for which purpoſe on the twenty-eighth of October
" Marſhal Daun ſent the Duke of Aremberg with ſixteen thouſand
" men to Domitſch, which is on the Elbe, upon which Prince
" Henry at the head of Finck's corps, marched that way. Our
" column was to paſs through Vogelgeſang, which the enemy en-
" deavoured to ſet on fire, but in vain, our cannon drove them off;
" night coming on, we could not purſue them. The next day the
" prince reconnoitered the enemy, whom he found encamped very
" advantageouſly, and ſo it was not thought proper to attack him
" in this poſt; upon which General Wunſch was detached the ſame
" night to Wittenberg, and joined General Rebentiſch, who was
" at Bitterfeld; theſe two corps were to come by the road of Pretſch
" to attack the enemy in the rear, Finck's corps in front, and Ge-
" neral Wedel with another was to go through the woods, and cut
" off his retreat to Düben, all which was to have been executed
" the twenty-ninth. But the enemy having marched that morn-
" ing at break of day towards Pretſch, where he was going to en-
" camp, met Wunſch and Rebentiſch who were coming that way.
" Prince Henry advanced to Pretſch, but could do nothing.
" When the enemy ſaw himſelf between two corps, he retreated to-
" wards Düben, one column went by Schoniedberg unpurſued, the

" other

"other was followed with a continual cannonade by Rebentiſch, "by the route of Graffenhayn. General Gemmingen who com- "manded the rear, was attacked near Sackwitz by General Platen, "with his own regiment of dragoons and Gendorff's huſſars, and "beat. He himſelf and above a thouſand men were taken priſon- "ers, and one cannon; we found much baggage in the woods.

"After this action the Auſtrians under O'Donel retired to Eulen- "berg, and the Duke of Aremberg to Kulen, on the left of the "army, with his advanced poſts at Thalnitz*."

REFLECTIONS.

THE abſurdity of ſending a conſiderable corps behind an enemy, where a patrole of twenty men cannot go without danger, is ſo very obvious, that one wonders it ever happened; yet this and a thouſand other ridiculous manœuvres are daily made. No corps can be poſted behind an enemy, within a good march at leaſt, unleſs it is ſupported by the whole army, becauſe it cannot remain there an hour without danger; and unleſs you propoſe attacking the enemy inſtantly on one of his flanks, ſo that your right or left communicates with that corps; and moreover, you alſo manœuvre againſt his front, or part of it at leaſt. Whether Marſhal Daun intended attacking the enemy or not, he ſhould have brought his left to Eulenberg, and poſted General O'Donel's detachment between it and the Duke of Aremberg, which would have ſaved him and his corps. There was no danger in this, becauſe Prince Henry could not leave his camp and paſs between the Marſhal's right and the Elbe. What the Marſhal did was the more dangerous, as he

* Or perhaps Delitzſch.

knew the Pruſſians had a corps behind the Duke of Aremberg, not a day's march off, and that Prince Henry covered with the woods, might bring any part of his forces unmoleſted, (which really happened,) to attack him in front, while the other came behind him. General O'Donel, inſtead of going fair and ſoftly towards Kemberg, ſhould have inſtantly marched where the action was, which he knew very well from the firing, which was loud enough, but he took quite another road. Beſides the danger of the plan purſued, it was fooliſh and uſeleſs; for Prince Henry had his communication open on the right of the Elbe as far as Berlin, and great depots at Torgau itſelf. So that no manœuvre on the left of the river where both armies ſtood, could oblige him to quit his poſition, unleſs you fought him and drove him by force out of it.

The ſeaſon being far advanced, and the weather very cold and ſevere, Marſhal Daun after this tranſaction determined to march
November. back to Dreſden; accordingly on the fourth of November the army left Schilda, and returned by the ſame road it came to Dreſden, where it arrived the ſeventeenth of November, followed cloſe at the heels by the Pruſſians, who had ſent a conſiderable corps beyond the Mulda, which acted conſtantly on the Marſhal's flank, and ſome of the parties ſent by this corps were got to the neighbourhood of Dreſden before him; this made him haſten his march, which was ſo well conducted that he did not ſuffer any loſs worth mentioning, though many ſkirmiſhes happened, which naturally are more advantageous to the purſuers, than to the purſued.

During this retreat the king came to the army, which advanced to the heights of Keſſelſdorff, ſeparated from the Auſtrians by a brook, or rather a torrent, when it rains, called the Weiſtritz, which falls into the Elbe below Dreſden.

The

The king thought it dangerous to attack the Auſtrians in this ſtrong poſition, but determined to force them to quit Dreſden, by cutting off their communication with Bohemia. For which purpoſe, he ſent General Finck with a great corps by Freyberg to Dippoldiſwalda, and from thence to Maxen, exactly behind the Auſtrian army, from whence he could ſend detachments into Bohemia, and had this general been ſuffered to ſtay there, the Auſtrians muſt have abandoned Dreſden, paſſed the Elbe, and marched by the paſſes of Rumburg and Gabel, into Bohemia. But Marſhal Daun and thoſe about him in whom he confided, were not men to be frightened out of the country. So far from it, that it was reſolved inſtantly to attack this corps, and in ſuch a manner, as to leave it no iſſue whereby to eſcape, and ſo open the communication with Bohemia. They were reſolved to repair the fault committed at Pretſch, and do the buſineſs more effectually than the Pruſſians did theirs. As the country about Dreſden, has been the ſcene of many military tranſactions, I think it will be uſeful to thoſe who may be brought to act hereafter in it, if I give a deſcription of it; which I am the more inclined to do, becauſe I found on the preſent occaſion, that the Auſtrians and Pruſſians were equally unacquainted with it.

Dreſden lies on the Elbe in a vale; on the left of the river the ground riſes gradually for about three miles, till you come to the village of Rainchen, which ſtands on the higheſt ſpot. Immediately at the foot of it runs a narrow vale, from the left towards the right as you ſtand with your back towards Dreſden; in this vale is the village of Poſſendorff, through which the high road from Dreſden to Dippoldiſwalda, and Freyberg goes; the vale runs to the right into a hollow ground, where is the village of Potzſchappel, from whence you go up a ſteep hill to Keſſelſdorff, where the Pruſſians van was encamped and their army directly be-

hind it. To Potzſchappel come many ſprings, which form the Weiſtritz; this runs through a very narrow vale to Plauen, and cannot be paſſed any where but at Plauen, and lower down under the cannon of Dreſden, for which reaſon the camps of Plauen and Keſſelſdorff were thought extremely ſtrong. Beyond Poſſendorff on the other ſide of the vale we firſt mentioned, the ground is alſo very high, on which ſtand Rabenau, Carſdorff, and other villages; about half a mile further on to the right of the road, which goes to Dippoldiſwalda, begins a great foreſt called the Tharandiſcherwalde, which goes for many miles towards Freyberg, and beyond it. This foreſt is impenetrable for troops; which obliged the king to order General Finck to go a great way about by Freyberg, to Dippoldiſwalda, and ſo on to Maxen.

The quarter maſter general Count Lacy, to whom the Author was then attached by duty, as he is now by gratitude; having traced the camp at Plauen went to follow ſome Pruſſian huſſars, in hopes of taking ſome of them, and get intelligence of Finck's corps; coming on the heights near Poſſendorff, he obſerves, that the enemy might march down Keſſelſdorff, to Potzſchappel, and on either ſide to the heights on which he then ſtood, or the other oppoſite by Rabenau; both which poſts would enable him to cut us off from Bohemia, and the more, ſo as the diſtance from Keſſelſdorff to the heights, is not half an hour's march. On coming to head quarters he informed the Marſhal of theſe circumſtances, and the Marſhal immediately ordered General Sincere, with a very great corps of infantry and cavalry, to take poſt on the heights this ſide the vale of Poſſendorff; this was done on the nineteenth*. The Marſhal being informed that General Finck was at Dippoldiſwalda, determined to attack him there; accordingly having

* Tielke ſays General Sincere was detached on the eighteenth. See note H.

ordered

ordered General Sincere's corps, to be reinforced by ſome cavalry, on the nineteenth it marched to Dippoldiſwalda; it ſnowed very much. On coming there, we found Finck was gone that very morning to Maxen; his baggage, eſcorted by a batallion of light infantry, was then marching through a village called Rheinhartſgrimme, and getting with all haſte into a little wood beyond it, through which goes the road to Maxen. This of courſe required a new diſpoſition, which was as follows.

A corps was to be left at Dippoldiſwalda, to keep our rear ſecure; that under Sincere was to march next morning to ſeek the enemy; General Brentano was to advance from the neighbourhood of Dreſden, and come behind the enemy; and finally the Imperial army was to proceed on the right of the ravine of Dohna, and come on the enemy's left flank, ſo that having the Elbe behind, all hopes of eſcaping were cut off. The Marſhal at the ſame time gave all the neceſſary orders to the army, in caſe that of the enemy made any motions.

On the twentieth at break of day the troops got under arms, and formed, expecting the order to march. At length the Marſhal accompanied by many generals and officers, came to the line, but no orders for marching were given, becauſe theſe gentlemen, who pretended to know the country, raiſed many difficulties to diſſuade the Marſhal from marching. They ſaid the roads were impracticable; happily, Major Fabri (now a lieutenant general in the Emperor's ſervice, a zealous and an excellent officer,) had been reconnoitring that way; he arrived and reported to the Marſhal that the roads were good, and that in leſs than two hours, the troops might be formed on the hill behind the wood; upon which the Marſhal ordered him to conduct them, and they marched accordingly. The country between Dippoldiſwalda, and Maxen, is as follows. A little beyond the former place, is a village, Rheinhartſgrimme,

hartſgrimme, and beyond that a wood about half a mile in extent, (repreſented as impaſſable, though the enemy had paſſed the preceding day,) upon coming out of it; to the right is a hill, which commands the wood and the road, within one hundred yards, the road goes along the ſide of it, cloſe to a ravine on the left; from the top of the hill runs a narrow plain, for about a mile, which is bounded by another hill, much higher, which commands it. On this the Pruſſians were placed with Maxen behind them; within one hundred yards of this hill, which is ſteep, the plain which leads to it is broke by two ſmall ravines to the right and left, which leaves a paſſage only of about forty yards, through which the Auſtrians muſt advance, within one hundred yards of the enemy's line, covered by many batteries. The Auſtrians paſſed the wood unmoleſted, the grenadiers took poſſeſſion of the hill before it, and halted there till the artillery was brought upon it, and the reſt of the troops arrived; then proceeded to the enemy, with a very narrow front, a batallion or two. On the right the artillery moved, and did the enemy much damage: on coming to the narrow paſs above mentioned, the front was ſtill more contracted, by which a moment's time was loſt, however in a few minutes they got over it, and with extraordinary rapidity entered the enemy's redoubts; here they halted, till the whole came up and formed on the ground, where the enemy had ſtood, and which runs in a ſlope quite to the Elbe about Pirna. While this was doing on the ſide of the Auſtrians, the Pruſſians retired to Maxen, and formed a new line on ſome heights behind it; the Auſtrian grenadiers advanced, drove them out of Maxen; the reſt followed, keeping to the left to avoid breaking the line, and to come on the enemy's right flank; and after a faint reſiſtance forced him to retire; the Auſtrians purſued him, from hill to hill, till night put an end to the affair for the preſent. In the night the Marſhal was

informed

informed that the enemy approached Dippoldiſwalda, upon which he ordered a body of troops to occupy the poſt at Rüppchen, where Sincere's corps had been, before it marched to Dippoldiſwalda, with orders to advance if neceſſary, to ſupport the troops which had been placed there, and to prevent the king from ſending any ſuccours to Maxen, through the valley, which was found to run from Keſſelſdorff by Poſſendorff, to the laſt place; and another on the heights of Maxen, likewiſe to ſupport Dippoldiſwalda, in caſe the enemy advanced that way; theſe diſpoſitions being made, the Marſhal was prevailed upon to go into a houſe at Maxen to reſt; in the morning before day break he came to the troops, and ordered ſome cannon to advance, and fire towards the place where the enemy was ſuppoſed to be; in a little time a trumpet was heard to ſound, the fire ceaſed, but nobody appearing, it began again. A trumpet ſounded a ſecond time, and the fire ceaſed. The day was breaking, and ſoon after came General Rebentiſch, and ſurrendered the troops priſoners of war. They were ſo entangled, that it was near twelve o'clock before they could be brought out of the hole, where they had lain pell mell the whole night. They were carried to the great Garden, near Dreſden. The corps conſiſted of nine generals and about twelve thouſand men, ſeventy pieces of cannon, &c. Thus ended this extraordinary affair, with little loſs on either ſide during the battle. I was preſent, and therefore the reader may rely on the veracity of this account. I have omitted ſeveral particulars, as names of the regiments, &c. becauſe I thought them no ways neceſſary to explain the action itſelf; ground and diſpoſition are the only things to be conſidered, unleſs, as it ſometimes happens, a particular manœuvre, on either ſide contributes to the deciſion of the buſineſs, which was not here the caſe.

The

The Pruſſians did not upon the whole behave on this occaſion as they generally do, which is eaſily explained, if we conſider the human heart. From the firſt moment the Auſtrians appeared, General Finck muſt perceive he was loſt; he had before him a ſtrong corps of which he could not know the numbers, behind his right, at no great diſtance, the Auſtrian army; and a corps under General Brentano approaching him on that ſide; behind him was the Elbe, on his left the ravine of Dohna, on the other ſide of which within muſquet ſhot, was a great part of the Imperial army, which fired on his flank during almoſt the whole action, and annoyed him not a little. In ſuch a ſituation it is no wonder if he deſpaired; neither he nor any general on earth, could have eſcaped the cataſtrophe which befell him. If the reader will recollect we ſaid, that cloſe to the wood through which the Auſtrians paſſed there was a hill, very high and ſteep; and rendered uncommonly difficult to mount, by the great quantity of ſnow which fell the nineteenth and twentieth, ſucceeded by a ſevere froſt; he will think as I do, that if General Finck had poſted four batallions and ſome cannon on this hill, with parties in the wood, the Auſtrians would have found it difficult, or perhaps impoſſible to advance that way, which would have protracted the affair, and given time for the king to ſend reinforcements to diſengage him, or for him to march in the night on his right, through the woods towards Rabenau, between Dippoldiſwalda, and Dreſden. The ſituation of Marſhal Daun could he have been ſtopped here, was very critical, inſomuch that any motion either Finck or the king, made on that ſide, would have forced him to abandon the enterprize, and ſeek his own ſafety; but this not having been done, no obſtacles could poſſibly have prevented his ſucceſs. Had the king known the country; firſt, he would not have ſent General Finck to Maxen, without occupying the heights at Rabenau, not a mile from his camp,

camp, and not much more from Maxen, by which neither one or other could be attacked, but in front. Had he known the country, he would have ſent a corps through the valley on the twentieth towards Maxen, which would have greatly embarraſſed Marſhal Daun, and cut off the troops he had left at Dippoldiſwalda. It was not known then by the Auſtrians, that the valley ſo often mentioned, runs from Keſſelſdorff to Maxen; and when it was known, General Lacy trembled at the danger which might have happened, and inſtantly ordered ſome works to be raiſed on the heights of Rabenau, which commanded the vale towards Potzſchappel and Keſſelſdorff, which the author of this work executed the two following days; ſo that theſe works and the corps placed at Dippoldiſwalda, made it impoſſible for the enemy to make the leaſt motion on that ſide, which enabled the Marſhal to extend his quarters in Saxony behind theſe poſts, as far as the mountains which ſeparate that Electorate from Bohemia. I have been very particular in the deſcription of the ground, becauſe in a mountainous country, if it is not perfectly known, every ſtep an army takes may be attended with the moſt fatal conſequences, of which we have before our eyes, a very ſtriking example.

In all this tranſaction, and thoſe which lead to it from Torgau to Maxen, two things are remarkable, and ſerve to confirm our principles; firſt, that no army however ſtrong, can keep its ground if you advance againſt it in front, and at the ſame time ſend a powerful corps to act on its flank and rear.

Secondly, that if you do not keep up the communication, between the army and ſuch corps, they will be loſt, if the enemy is at all an able officer. This laſt axiom having been neglected, the Auſtrians narrowly eſcaped the fate of General Finck at Pretſch, under the Duke of Aremberg; and the Pruſſian corps was entirely deſtroyed. We cannot therefore but wonder that ſo great a cap-

tain as the King of Pruſſia, having the example of Pretſch before his eyes, ſhould within a fortnight have repeated the fault: it is poſſible in war, as in moſt other ſituations, to over-do a thing, and drive the nail further than it can go. The King of Pruſſia has been guilty of this fault more than once. He had won the battle at Franckfurt, had he known when to ſtop; he did not, and the victory was torn out of his hands. Let us reſume our narration.

December. The king ſent a ſmall corps under General Dierke, up the right of the Elbe towards Meiſſen, which Marſhal Daun ordered General Beck to attack, who executed his commiſſion compleatly. On the third of December, this general directed his march ſo that he came on the Pruſſians left flank, attacked, and drove them to the Elbe, where having no bridge, they were all taken with their general: another proof that no corps or army ſhould camp with a wing on a river, moraſs, or precipice, becauſe if they are attacked on the flank, and beat, they are loſt.

After the affair of Maxen, the king had applied to Prince Ferdinand for a reinforcement, which accordingly arrived under the Prince of Brunſwick at the end of December, and was poſted on the right. The king advanced to reconnoitre the Auſtrians, on the ſide of Freyberg, and finding them well fortified made no attempt; and in the month of February the Pruſſians returned to Meiſſen.

The Imperial army having left the greateſt part of the Auſtrians, who had joined them, with Marſhal Daun, quitted the field the ſeventh of December, and marched through Bohemia, and Voightland, into winter quarters in Franconia; the head quarters were at Bamberg. So the campaign ended on this ſide.

In the ſummer, General Harſch, with a very powerful corps, or rather army, entered Sileſia, twice, on the ſide of Landſhut, where the

the Pruſſian General Fouquet, with very conſiderable forces, was encamped, who repulſed the former both times, and the laſt with ſome loſs, the Auſtrian General having embroiled himſelf among the mountains, which he did not ſufficiently know.

Having made my obſervations on the plan of operations, and on the ſeveral tranſactions, which occurred during this campaign, I hope the Reader will comprehend, why the Auſtrians and their allies, with near two hundred thouſand men, did not gain any conſiderable advantage over the Pruſſians, who never had above half the number, and why the victories of Paltzig, Franckfurt, and Meiſſen, were not followed by any ſolid ſucceſs; it was certainly owing to the bad plan, which the Auſtrians had formed for this campaign. Had the governor of Dreſden done his duty, he might have held out a few days at leaſt, and this would have been ſufficient, to have ſaved that important place. And ſo the campaign would have ended exactly where it began.

Note A.

COLONEL Tempelhoff (an officer of diſtinction in the Pruſſian ſervice, and from that circumſtance perhaps a better authority than General Lloyd, for the detail of the Pruſſian operations,) gives a very different, and I think a more intelligible, and accurate account of theſe movements; according to him, General Fouquet did not join the king's army at Gibau, but at Krenau, which happened not on the twelfth of May, but on the ſixteenth and the three following days; conſequently this junction was ſubſequent, to the ſecond expedition the king made againſt General De Ville's corps, not previous to it: his majeſty had advanced from Littau to a camp near Proſnitz, (not Czetkowitz) ſituated between Studenitz and Stareckowitz, his head quarters at Schmirſitz, where he arrived on the eleventh with nineteen batallions, and forty-eight ſquadrons, here he joined the Prince of Würtemberg, whom he had left with two batallions of foot, ten ſquadrons of dragoons, and as many of Werner's huſſars, and having detached General Seidlitz on the evening of the twelfth, with two regiments of dragoons, and three hundred huſſars to Tobitſchaw, to collect forage and proviſion, which General Lentulus was to bring to the army; for which purpoſe he followed Seidlitz, with a batallion of grenadiers, and three hundred cuiraſſiers, eſcorting a number of bread waggons and pack horſes; his majeſty the better to ſecure the object of this detachment, determined to drive back De Ville's corps, and on the thirteenth marched himſelf, with three batallions of foot, twenty-three

ſquadrons

ſquadrons of cuiraſſiers and dragoons, and fifteen of huſſars directly to Prödlitz; General De Ville being apprized of the king's approach, broke up his camp, and ſent away his baggage to Rauſnitz, which he had time to do before the enemy's columns could get at him, through the Defilés, which lay before his front; he himſelf (though at firſt he made a ſhew of maintaining his poſt, probably the better to ſecure his tents and baggage,) retired on the king's approach in good order, firſt to Wiſchau, and then to Rauſnitz, with the loſs only of ſixteen killed, and forty-one priſoners. The king's cavalry advanced as far as Wiſchau, the infantry occupied Prödlitz, the king himſelf returned to Schmirſitz, leaving the detachment to the Prince of Würtemberg, who, having ſeized a magazine of meal and forage, which the enemy had left in Wiſchau, and ſent it under the eſcorte of his infantry to the camp by Schmirſitz, retired himſelf, and went back to his old poſt near Proſnitz.

Note B.

A CLOSE attention to dates, and an accurate detail of the *ſeries* of events are ſo abſolutely neceſſary, to enable a reader to comprehend clearly, and reaſon juſtly upon military operations, (but moſt eſpecially when as in the preſent inſtance, every poſition occupied, every movement executed, was good or bad, according to the relative ſituation of the enemy,) that I truſt, I ſhall be excuſed if I add another long note, containing a few more details, borrowed likewiſe from Colonel Tempelhoff's work.

On the king's firſt arrival in Moravia, the infantry of his own corps was cantonned in Littau, and the villages lying beyond the Mora on the ſide of Olmutz; that belonging to Marſhal Keith's diviſion was partly encamped near Starnau, partly in cantonments in the villages between Neuſtadt, Littau, and Starnau, the whole cavalry encamped; Marſhal Keith's ovens were in Sternberg, covered by the free batallions of Le Noble, and Salenmon; thoſe belonging to the king were in Littau. On the fifth, the king drew ten batallions from Keith's corps to his own; it was with a part of this reinforcement, and ſix regiments of cavalry and dragoons, that his majeſty marched to ſupport Werner's detachment, in the firſt expedition made againſt De Ville. The ſixth on learning the approach of Laudohn, the king drew twenty-three batallions, and thirteen ſquadrons into the camp of Aſchmeritz, near Littau, while the Prince of Würtemberg's corps poſted at Proſnitz, kept De Ville in check.

On

On the eighth of May, this was the diſpoſition of the Pruſſian forces. In the camp of Aſchmeritz, twenty-five batallions, thirty-three ſquadrons under the command of the king himſelf.—In that near Newſtadt under Lieutenant General Forcade, eight batallions, twenty-four ſquadrons—In the camp near Starnau, under the Markgrave Charles nine batallions, ſixteen ſquadrons—In Sternberg, two free batallions.—In the camp of Prösnitz under the Prince of Würtemberg, two grenadier batallions, and thirty ſquadrons. On the nearer approach of the Auſtrians, the king called in Lieutenant General Forcade, with ſix batallions, and five ſquadrons, and the Markgrave Charles replaced him with ſeven batallions from Starnau; on the eleventh the king marched as we have already ſeen, with nineteen batallions, and forty-eight ſquadrons to Proſnitz, leaving Marſhal Keith with fifteen batallions, and as many ſquadrons, in the camp of Aſchmeritz; theſe alterations were made in conſequence of intelligence received, that Marſhal Daun was directing his march by Brinn.

The above diſpoſition laſted with very little variation, till General Fouquet arrived with the artillery, &c. when the ſiege began.

Note C.

IF our author had had an opportunity of referring to a moſt excellent account of this battle, publiſhed by Captain Tielke, an officer in the Saxon ſervice, who was preſent at it, and had been aſſiſted by the inſpection of the accurate and very detailed plans with which his work is illuſtrated, he would, I think, have found himſelf at no loſs to conceive and to convey to his readers a very perfect idea of all the movements ſubſequent to the action, as well as the circumſtances of the action itſelf; he would have found that the king's firſt attack on the enemy's right not having ſucceeded, he with his uſual quickneſs and ability immediately changed his plan, and leaving General Seidlitz with the cavalry under his command, to protect the retreat of the broken grenadiers, and favour their rallying, advanced with his right wing to renew the attack on the other extremity of the Ruſſians ſquare, where he was more ſucceſsful; for though he met with a vigorous reſiſtance, he finally drove the enemy quite beyond Zorndorff and the marſhy rivulet, towards the ſheepfold, where they formed again in a ſquare, as marked in the plan No. III. ſo that the two armies changed places, that of the Pruſſians making a ſort of wheel to the left, upon their own center. The ill ſucceſs of the king's firſt attack was owing (as at Collin the year before) to his orders not having been obeyed with ſufficient punctuality by the general who commanded the firſt line of infantry, who by not ſufficiently inclining to his left as he advanced, loſt (as the king himſelf obſerves in his memoirs) the protection of the marſhy rivulet which ran towards the enemy's right flank; and what was worſe, found himſelf dreſſed

with the eight batallions of grenadiers, behind whom he ought to have been formed to ſuſtain their attack.

The circumſtance which moſt puzzles our author, viz. the movement of the Ruſſians on the twenty-ſeventh to Groſs and Klein Cammin, by which they marched along the greateſt part of the Pruſſians front, and turned their left wing, he would have found accounted for by the nature of the ground, and a thick fog which concealed their march. With reſpect to his majeſty's conduct ſubſequent to the action, perhaps the general's criticiſms may be better founded: in the firſt place, if inſtead of throwing back his left wing towards Zicher, when he encamped in the afternoon of the twenty-ſixth, he had extended it to the heights between Wilkerſdorf and Tamſell, and employed his numerous and victorious cavalry in ſcowering the plain between that and the Drewitz wood, encamping as in s s, he would have cut off General Fermor from his heavy baggage, parked near Groſs Cammin, and the four thouſand grenadiers which guarded it, muſt have fallen; or if the king thought ſuch a poſition would have too much extended his line, his majeſty had ſtill another effectual way of cutting off the final retreat of the enemy, even after he had retired under cover of the fog to Groſs Cammin; for it appears evident, that by marching from his left through the intervals of that chain of ponds, which run from Wilkerſdorff towards the Maſſin wood, and ſo ſtriking into the road by which his firſt and ſecond columns marched to the field of battle on the twenty-fifth; the Pruſſian army might have taken up a very ſtrong poſition as in x x behind Batzlow and Blumenberg, the front covered by thoſe two villages, and the left upon the Wartha, in which ſituation the Ruſſians would have found them encamped acroſs the only roads by which it was poſſible to retreat to Landſperg.

But a general's operations are not always to be tried merely by ſtrict principles of tactics; other reaſons of war, and powerful ones too, totally independent of thoſe, will often operate irreſiſtably; and this ſeems to have been particularly the caſe with his Pruſſian Majeſty,

Majeſty, in the preſent inſtance; the loſs he had ſuſtained in this terrible action, was very conſiderable, and though much inferior in numbers to that of the Ruſſians, was (conſidering his circumſtances,) much more ſeverely felt by him, than by them; the moſt complete victory over them, even though it ſhould amount to a total deſtruction of their army, was to him but a partial advantage, a temporary deliverance from an enemy, that threatened to penetrate into his country on one frontier, but he had already done enough, on the twenty-fifth to check that; Marſhal Daun on another ſide threatened, by wreſting Saxony out of his hands, to cut off at once all the ſinews of the war; to oppoſe him with ſucceſs called for the exertion of all the ſtrength his majeſty could muſter: another action therefore with the Ruſſians, however it might terminate, would have been highly detrimental to the general ſtate of his affairs, if attended with any thing like the loſs he ſuffered in the firſt, and that was much to be apprehended if he had driven them to deſpair; beſides every man the king loſt was a ſoldier formed, a loſs but ill ſupplied by the beſt recruit, and yet even ſo to replace them was to him an object of difficulty. The Ruſſians on the other hand were little better than a vaſt band of peaſants, brave but ill diſciplined, who if they had been deſtroyed to a man, would by the opening of next campaign have been eaſily replaced, and till the next campaign he knew he had at any rate nothing to fear from them. Cuſtrin was ſuccoured, they could not ſubſiſt any longer upon the banks of the Oder, ſtill leſs could they attempt to paſs it, they muſt therefore retire homewards; and his majeſty well knew they were not in a capacity to undertake any ſolid operation in their retreat, with the ſmalleſt proſpect of ſucceſs, particularly as they would have a Pruſſian corps to follow them continually, and wait upon all their motions; for theſe reaſons probably he did not puſh matters ſo far as he might, and perhaps would have done, had he had no other enemy to contend with.

Note D.

COLONEL Tempelhoff's account differs from this both with reſpect to the groſs amount of the Pruſſian forces and the proportion in which they were diſtributed; and as theſe are points on which the Pruſſian officer, was more likely to obtain accurate information than our author, and as the following diſtribution is very circumſtantial, our readers, I hope, will not be ſorry to find it inſerted in a note.

The army in Sileſia under the king himſelf, conſiſted of the following regiments.

INFANTRY.

Grenadier Batallions.

1 Diringſhofen
1 Billerbeck
1 Haack
1 Kleiſt
1 Rathenow
1 Nimſheſki
1 Buſch
1 Bähr
1 Benkendorf
1 Carlowitz
1 Manteufel
1 Unruh
1 Heyden
1 Bieverling

Muſquetteer Batallions.

2 Itzenplitz
2 Prince of Pruſſia
3 Guards
2 Lattorf
1 Retzow
2 Wedel
2 Forcade
2 Stutterheim
2 Markgrave Charles
2 Linſtädt
2 Münchow
2 Prince Henry
2 Prince Ferdinand
2 Bonſtadt
2 Manteufel
2 Kalkſtein
2 Rebentiſch
2 Old Brunſwick

Free Corps.

1 Leckolbe
1 Angenelly
1 Salenmon
1 Du Verger

Grenadiers Batallions		14
Muſquetteers	-	36
Free corps	-	4
Total	— —	54

CAVALRY.

Cuiraſſiers.

3 Gardes du corps
5 Gens d'Armes
5 Carabineers
5 Schmettau
5 Bredow
5 Schoneich
5 Seidlitz

Dragoons.

5 Normann
5 Czettritz
5 Y. Plathen
5 Wirtemberg
5 Krockow

Huſſars.

10 Ziethen
10 Möhring
10 Seidlitz

Total 88 Squadrons.

A corps

A corps under the command of General Fouquet in Upper Silesia, consisted of the following regiments.

INFANTRY.

Grenadier Batallions.		*Musquetteer Batallions.*	
Naumeister	1	Mosel	2
Buddenbrock	1	Queiss	2
Rath	1	Young Brunswick	2
Arnim	1	Markgrave Henry	2
		Fouquet	2
		Young Kreutz	2
		Latterf Garr. B.	1

CAVALRY.

10 squadrons Bareuth dragoons | 10 squadrons Werner hussars.

Total { Batallions 17 / Squadrons 20

The army in Saxony, under Prince Henry, was composed as follows.

INFANTRY.

Grenadier Batallions.			
Lubath	1	Bornstadt	1
Oesterreich	1	Schwartz	1
		Old Billerbeck	1

Musquetteer

Muſquetteer Batallions.

Bemburg	3
Goltz	2
Brandeis	2
Leſtwitz	2
Bredow	2
Hülſen	2
Knoblock	2
Grabow	2
Finck	2
Salmuth	2
Putkammer	2
Hoffmann	2
Newwied	2
Kurſel	2
Bulow	2
Kaſſel	2
Hauſen	2
F. C. Monjow	1
F. C. Wunſch	1
F. C. Colignon	1

CAVALRY.

Cuiraſſiers.

Life regiment	5 ſquadrons
Prince of Pruſſia	5
Prince Frederick	5
Horn	5
Krokow	5
Kyau	5

Dragoons.

Meinicke	5 ſquadrons

Huſſars.

Kleiſt	10
Belling	5
Putkammer	10

Total { Batallions 43 / Squadrons 60

The

The following regiments were under General Count Dohna in Pommerania.

INFANTRY.

Grenadier Batallions.

Neſſe	1
Loſſow	1
Peterſdorf	1
Kleiſt	1
Burgſdorf	1
Kremzow	1

Muſquetteer Batallions.

Bevern	2
Prince Maurice	2
Lehwald	2
Dohna	2
Kleiſt	2
Kanitz	2
Dierke	2
Old Kreutz	2
Treſkow	2

Free Batallions.

Hordt	2

CAVALRY.

Dragoons.

Schorlemmer	10 ſquadrons
Old Plathen	5
Plettenberg	5

Huſſars.

Rueſch	7 ſquadrons
Malakowſky	8

Total { Batallions 26 / Squadrons 35

Reca-

RECAPITULATION.

Colonel Tempelhoff reckons ſeven hundred men to each Pruſſian batallion, in this campaign; and one hundred and forty to each ſquadron, ſo that the reſpective ſtrength of the three armies would be as follows.

The king's (including General Fouquet's corps.)

Batallions 72 ——	50,400
Squadrons 108 ——	15,120
Total	65,520

Prince Henry's army in Saxony.

Batallions 43 ——	30,100
Squadrons 60 ——	8,400
Total	38,500

The army under Count Dohna, in Pommerania.

Batallions 26 ——	18,200
Squadrons 35 ——	4,900
Total	23,100

Total of the Pruſſian forces, employed as above mentioned.

Batallions 141 ——	98,700
Squadrons 203 ——	28,420
Total	**127,120**

Note E.

AS there is much fineſſe, and much matter of inſtruction, as well as curioſity in the king's diſpoſitions, for this important battle, our readers we truſt will not be ſorry to ſee them conveyed in his majeſty's own words, a literal tranſlation of which is here ſubjoined.

" If the enemy remains in his preſent poſition, the army will " march early to-morrow morning, in columns of lines by its " left flank; but the generals, Finck and Schorlemmer, will re- " main with the troops under their command at their poſts. " At break of day, General Finck will make all the drums of " his corps beat the reveillé, and moreover cauſe much noiſe to " be made in his camp; as ſoon as the day-light appears, all the " general officers belonging to Finck's corps with a great ſwarm " of attendants, led horſes and huſſars, muſt reconnoitre the " heights upon which the enemy's left wing is poſted; they muſt " carry ſpying glaſſes and aſſemble frequently together in a circle. " This may laſt a full hour, and is intended to draw the whole " attention of the enemy to this part of his poſition; Lieutenant " General Finck muſt therefore occupy likewiſe the heights " before Treffen, both with infantry and cavalry, taking care " however not to expoſe the troops to a heavy fire of artillery. " At ſix o'clock, Lieutenant General Finck will advance with his " corps, and occupy the heights before the Biſchoffſee, (where " at preſent the grand guards of Kleiſt are poſted,) with a battery " of heavy cannon, and alſo a corps of infantry to ſupport it.

" But General Finck muſt not begin his attack before the king " ſhall have engaged the enemy, and he hears the fire of the ſmall " arms; then if the enemy ſhould change his front, or attempt " any other movements, he muſt take advantage of them. " General Schorlemmer will ſupport this infantry with his cavalry, " and repulſe the enemy, ſhould he attempt to paſs the Defilé of " Croſſen and Beckermill.

" The army itſelf will march in two columns by its left; " the grenadier batallion Oeſterreich, will be at the head of " the firſt column, or firſt line, and General Seidlitz will have " the head of the ſecond column, or ſecond line. The duke " of Wurtemberg will follow with the cuiraſſier regiments, under " his command, and the huſſars of Kleiſt upon the right flank of " the firſt line, namely, that of the Markgrave Charles's regi- " ment. During the march acroſs the heath, the right wing " of the army muſt be ſomewhat advanced, and the left kept " back. When the army ſhall have marched off, the duke of " Wurtemberg will poſt himſelf with his cavalry behind the right " wing of the ſecond line; Kleiſt's huſſars muſt extend beyond " that flank; General Seidlitz with his cavalry, will place himſelf " behind the left wing of that line.

" But ſhould the enemy not remain in his preſent poſition, " but ſhould march to Reppin in the courſe of the night; then " the army will march thither at three o'clock in the morning, " in three columns. The king imagines the enemy will in that " caſe, place his right at Reppin, his left at Nollendorf, and " cover his front by a ſmall rivulet, but which is no ways a " conſiderable obſtacle. The infantry will march in two lines, " the cavalry will form the third, the whole marching by their " left. Lieutenant General Seidlitz, will be at the head of the " column of cavalry, after him will follow the diviſions of the

" duke

" duke of Wurtemberg, and General Schorlemmer. The ad-
" vanced guard will be formed by Neuendorf, and the attack
" will be commenced by the right wing of the army."

The following is a list of the Pruſſian forces on this memorable day.

Vanguard.

1 Grenadier batallion Billerbeck
1 Ditto —— Lubath
1 Ditto —— Heyden
1 Ditto —— Bornſtädt
1 Ditto —— Schwarz
1 Ditto —— Oeſterreich
5 Squadrons Bredow

First Line.

5 ſquad. life regiment
5 —— Schlaberndorf
2 bat. Markg. Charles
2 —— Hülſen
2 —— Finck
2 —— P. Henry
2 —— Knoblock
2 —— Golze
2 —— Schenkendorf
2 —— Leſtwitz
2 —— Kanitz
2 —— Bevern
2 —— Wiedt
5 ſquad. Horn
5 —— P. Frederick
5 —— P. Henry

Second Line.

10 ſq. Puttkammer h.
5 — Krokow
5 — Old Platten
1 bat. Tanne
1 —— Loſſow
1 —— Bayer
2 —— Grabow
2 —— Diericke
2 —— Sylow
2 —— Bülow
2 —— Dohna
1 —— Buſche
1 —— Nöſſe
5 ſq. Schorlemmer
10 — Kleiſt

General

General Finck's corps.

5 ſquadrons Ziethen
5 ——— Möhring
5 ——— Spahn
5 ——— Meinicke

2 batallions Lehwald
2 ——— Zaſtrow
2 ——— Bevern
2 ——— Hauten

5 ſquad. Y. Plathen
5 ——— Belling

Count Flemming's corps.

7 ſq. Malachouſky
7 — Rueſch

2 bat. Wunſch
1 —— Kollignon
2 —— Gablenz
2 —— Bernburg
2 —— Treſkow

Note F.

OUR author's criticiſms here ſeem perfectly juſt, at leaſt as far as they regard the king's firſt diſpoſitions. His majeſty according to the liſt contained in the foregoing note, had fifty-four batallions in the field, excluſive of the grenadiers, and Bredow's dragoons, (who on this occaſion appear to have acted on foot), his cavalry conſiſted of one hundred and four ſquadrons.

The ground between the Bäcker Mill and the Cunnerſdorf Wood, does not appear to be above three thouſand ſix hundred paces wide: from the Great Mill, acroſs the Cunnerſdorf meadows, to the little rivulet which ſeparates them from the Elſbrug belonging to Franckfurt, is about one thouſand two hundred: if the king therefore had increaſed Finck's corps to ſixteen batallions, he would ſtill have had thirty-eight remaining to ſupport his advanced guard, which ſhould have attacked the Mühlberg or Windmill Hill, in conjunction with the ſixteen batallions under Finck; theſe ſhould have paſſed the Hüner Brook, not only at the Great Mill, but wherever a bridge could be thrown; and being ſupported by the thirty ſquadrons of huſſars and dragoons, which were attached to them, might perhaps from the very firſt moment, have enſured the victory; for Colonel Tempelhoff ſays, "that the want of cavalry, and light artillery, prevented the Pruſſians from profiting by the firſt ſucceſs of their grenadiers, and gave the enemy time to rally, and make a new diſpoſition." Suppoſing now the king's thirty-eight batallions, had been formed twenty in the firſt line, and eighteen in the ſecond, which would have more

than

than ſufficed to occupy the ſpace above mentioned, ſixty-nine ſquadrons of cavalry being in two lines behind them, and a regiment of huſſars on their left flank to patrole the woods, and keep a look out after the Coſſacks; in this order they might have followed the progreſs of their grenadiers, ſuſtaining them as they advanced, till ſtopped by the chain of Ponds, which ſtretch from Cunnerſdorf quite into the wood, here the Pruſſians being once maſters of the village, ſix batallions would have been ſufficient to have maſked the Pond heads, and prevented the enemy from returning, particularly if ſuſtained by fifteen or twenty ſquadrons of dragoons and huſſars, the remaining thirty-two batallions then, and forty-nine ſquadrons, might by inclining conſtantly to the right, have effectually ſeconded the efforts of the grenadiers and Finck's corps, who by turning the *Kub Grund* or Cow Bottom, (the hollow way where Laudohn firſt effectually ſtopped them) would have come on the flank and in the rear, even of that formidable maſs formed acroſs the camp, which muſt therefore probably in the end have given way; the ground does not appear to have been impracticable, for (as General Lloyd obſerves very juſtly) the laſt attacks actually took place there. Could the king at the ſame time have ſpared any part of his troops and artillery, to have marched in the night through the wood, and made a falſe attack upon the enemy's right flank, as our author propoſes, it would probably have drawn Count Soltikow's attention that way, and very much facilitated the above mentioned operations, but his majeſty was ſo extremely inferior in numbers, that, perhaps, he could not afford to ſpare ſuch a detachment.

It is not unlikely this would have been the very diſpoſition the king would have made, had he been acquainted with the ground, but alas, he was not; and he was deceived, as Colonel Tempelhoff aſſures us, by an officer, who having been conſtantly

quartered

quartered during the peace at Franckfurt, was ſuppoſed to know the ground, and who had deſcribed it to his majeſty as a perfect plain, between the woods and the village, making no mention of the ponds; it is very probable the king did not know of theſe till after the battle, for his majeſty was during the greateſt part of the action, at the extremity of his right wing, which he himſelf led into fire; and Tempelhoff ſays, they are ſo ſituated as not to be diſtinguiſhed till you come cloſe to the brink of them. Hence the circumſtance of all the cavalry being thrown into the left wing, with which it is evident the king thought to turn Cunnerſdorf, and menace the front and right wing of the enemy; hence the orders for that impracticable movement of the cavalry, in which Seidlitz was wounded, it was obliged to file off over pond heads, where the king thought they could advance in line; his majeſty was without doubt deceived in the idea he had formed of the ground, and his diſpoſitions having been made upon falſe *data*, were conſequently defective.

With reſpect to what our author, in common with many other military critics, ſuggeſts of the propriety of his majeſty contenting himſelf with his firſt advantages, and halting on the ground he had already gained from the Ruſſians, without driving them to deſperation by his laſt attack, I ſhall give the reader Colonel Tempelhoff's arguments on that head, always chuſing to give him better authority than my own, whenever I find the ſubject has been treated of before. He ſays in his obſervations on the battle of Cunnerſdorf—

"Many men are of opinion, that the king after having ſtormed "the enemy's batteries on the Windmill Hill, and after he had "cleared the whole field of the Ruſſians quite down to Cunnerſ-"dorf, ought to have halted, and been contented with the advan-"tages he had already obtained. The enemy, it is ſaid, would

" have retreated in the night, and have abandoned the whole camp
" to the king; this battle would then have proved as decisive
" in its consequences, as that of Zornsdorf; and whilst the enemy
" filled the gazettes of their party, with fruitless disputes about
" maintaining the field of battle, his majesty would, as on the
" former occasion, have reaped all the fruits of an undisputed
" victory.

" This opinion is for the most part founded on the false sup-
" position, that the enemy was already driven back as far as the
" Judenberg, and had there formed his last disposition. Had
" this really been the case, it would indeed have been highly
" dangerous to hazard still another attack, with troops who had
" been so long already in the severest fire that perhaps was ever
" seen, and had exhausted their strength by their exertions du-
" ring the hottest day ever felt, having fought with prodigious
" resolution, valour and steadiness, and that attack too, such as
" might well have startled the freshest troops. According to these
" suppositions the enemy would have stood on a perfect mountain,
" his left flank would have been covered by the hollow, in which
" General Laudohn's corps had spent the night under arms, which
" is not only very deep but extraordinary steep on both sides; his
" right flank also would have been to the full as difficult of access;
" for the hills on which the enemy would most probably have
" posted it, are also very steep, and those too in the center are not
" to be climbed without much difficulty. But these hills lie from
" three to four thousand paces behind Cunnersdorf; and if the
" king had driven back the enemy as far as this, I doubt much
" whether he ever would have been in a condition to make any
" further resistance; it was upon these hills, that in the com-
" mencement of the action his right wing was posted, so that to
" have driven him as far back as here, would have been to drive

" his

" his army up quite from left to right, that is to ſay, to drive it
" on an heap. But in fact, the enemy was very far indeed from
" ſuffering ſuch an overthrow; the left wing, and the center of
" the Pruſſian army, had not advanced above a few hundred paces
" beyond Cunnersdorf, the right wing ſtood in a cloſe diſorderly
" heap behind the Cow Bottom, and Finck's corps on their right
" hand in the hollow, having the heights of Elſbruch before them,
" which they were never able to ſurmount, though they ran up
" to them with great intrepidity; on the other hand the enemy
" ſtill maintained his ground on the Spitzberg, to which he en-
" tirely owed his deliverance. Beſides, where ſhould the king
" make this halt? If it was to be done at all, the moment choſen
" for doing it, was when the grenadiers had ſtormed the Wind-
" mill Hill, and had made themſelves maſters of a conſiderable
" part of the enemy's artillery; this in truth is ſaying, the king
" ought to have halted in the very moment, when he had every
" appearance on his ſide of attaining the moſt complete, the moſt
" deciſive victory, a victory which would have for ever delivered
" him from the enemy, that of all others, the moſt ſeverely
" preſſed him during the whole war. Nothing is more unjuſt, than
" to judge of the merits of a general by the event of an action;
" how many battles have not been loſt by men, who had weighed
" their enterprize with the utmoſt attention, had formed it on
" the beſt principles, had made their diſpoſitions according to the
" moſt approved rules, and in the execution had neglected nothing
" by which their ſucceſs might be enſured; while the adverſary,
" who perhaps had done no more than draw out his troops in
" order of battle, according to the Roſter, gains in the ſame
" degree that the other loſes, and is indebted to ſome unforeſeen
" circumſtance, ſome accident, which perhaps he was not even
" informed of, for the reputation of having acted like a great and

" very able general. If a man would form a juſt and impartial
" judgement, he muſt go upon the field of battle, he muſt imagine
" himſelf in the ſituation of the generals and the troops, on either
" ſide, both the aſſailants and thoſe on the defenſive part, and
" combine all this according to the true principles of war.

" After the grenadiers had ſtormed the Windmill Hill, there
" were but eight batallions as yet in action, all the reſt of the
" army had not loſt a ſingle man; they ſaw victory before them,
" the moſt conſiderable difficulties ſurmounted, and the enemy
" in the greateſt diſorder. And was this a moment for the king
" to order a halt! ſhould he now forgo at once all his proſpects
" of a moſt complete victory! ſhould he ſtop ſhort in the midſt
" of their career, his brave troops who with rapid ſteps were
" moving up, and preſſed forward to victory, and thus make
" before their eyes an open avowal, that he feared his enemy?
" would not that have been to ſhew a miſtruſt of the courage
" of his troops, nay, in plain words to declare them mere cow-
" ards? Then the enemy had behaved himſelf ſo miſerably in
" the defence of this very ſtrong poſt, that the king might with
" good reaſon expect his further reſiſtance to be no better, and
" therefore without difficulty to be ſurmounted, by the zeal and
" bravery of freſh troops? Though I myſelf was preſent at the
" action, yet I had not till laſt ſummer a competent knowledge
" of the field of battle, and even now I find not the leaſt reaſon,
" which could prevent the king from puſhing on his attacks,
" after the ſtorming the firſt entrenchments of the Ruſſians.
" The right wing of the Pruſſian army ſtood on the heights,
" which command the whole field quite to Cunnerſdorf; nothing
" preſents itſelf there to the eye, which ſhould prevent a further
" attack: the whole ground quite to the village is a plain, no
" more intrenchments remained to be ſtormed, the village itſelf

" was

" was unoccupied and burnt; the enemy under the embarraſſment
" of changing his front, cooped up in a narrow ſpace, where he
" could take no advantage of his ſuperior numbers; the Pruſſian
" army in a poſition by which it was enabled to attack him at
" once, in front, in flank, and in rear; and would you have had
" the king by an abſolute inaction forego all theſe advantages,
" which were before his eyes? In that caſe it would have been
" better, not to ſuffer himſelf to be engaged to fight at all. The
" king was however ſo circumſtanced, that he had now more
" than ever, good reaſon to put ſomewhat to the riſk, for the
" ſake of preventing the Ruſſians, from undertaking any thing
" further this campaign. A ſtrong corps of Auſtrians encamped
" in Lower Luſatia under General Haddick, threatened the
" Marches and Berlin itſelf, and was in a poſture to join the Ruſſians,
" wherever it ſhould be thought adviſeable. Saxony was totally
" unprotected, the army of the Empire having it in their power
" to take Torgau and Wittenberg, cities which could make no
" defence, but which if they ſhould fall into the enemy's hands,
" would leave the road clear for him to Berlin. Dreſden, where
" the chief depots, were of all the ſtores neceſſary for maintaining
" an army in Saxony, was in danger of ſharing the ſame fate with the
" other cities of this electorate; all communication with the army
" in Sileſia cut off, and it beſieged as it were by the Auſtrian
" grand army under Marſhal Daun. Had the king now remained
" on the left of the Oder, and confined himſelf to a ſtrict defence
" to cover Berlin, and to prevent the further progreſs of the
" Ruſſian army in the march of Brandenberg, he would have
" found himſelf compelled to retire by degrees quite back to Ber-
" lin; eſpecially if General Haddick had been reinforced from
" the grand army, and had directed his march thither: all this
" muſt evidently have happened, unleſs one can ſuppoſe it poſſible

for

" for the Auſtrian Generals, to have been ſo ſhort-ſighted as not " to have ſeen their own advantages. Had his majeſty on the " contrary, continued on the other ſide of the Oder and ſought " to cut off the ſupplies, which the Ruſſians drew out of Poland, " he could not however prevent them from paſſing the river, and " detaching both Haddick's and Laudohn's corps to Berlin, which " they might have done without too much weakening themſelves, " and the contributions this detachment would have levied on " their way back, would have ridden them of all embarraſſment " ariſing from want of proviſions; beſides, ſuch a diſpoſition " would have totally diſabled him from ſecuring Saxony, and " having no magazines along the Wattha, he could not long have " remained in that neighbourhood. He could not in theſe cir- " cumſtances, accompliſh much by the moſt ſkilful marches, or " the beſt choſen poſitions, whereas the gain of a deciſive battle, " would at once have delivered him out of all his difficulties; " hence it was not raſhneſs to hazard it, prudence abſolutely " required it. It may be ſaid, the king would be obliged after " the loſs of a battle, to do that with an army diminiſhed by one " half and under much worſe circumſtances, which he might " have done before: certainly; but was not the ſituation of the " enemy alſo conſiderably changed? The Ruſſian army, which, " including the corps of Auſtrians, might conſiſt before the battle " of about ſixty thouſand, was now leſs by eighteen thouſand, the " men had expended all the ammunition which they carried in " their pouches, and had been obliged to take a conſiderable part " of what they had with them in their ſtores; it muſt be con- " ſidered too, that if theſe were ſufficient to ſupply their army " once, that was all, they could ſupply them no more. The " Pruſſians indeed were in the ſame caſe, but theſe wants might " be ſupplied in a few days, from their magazines in Cuſtrin, in

Stettin,

" Stettin and in Berlin. The Ruſſians on the contrary, were " too far diſtant from their depots, for this to be done in ſo ſhort " a time; they muſt therefore of neceſſity remain ſometime in- " active, which the king might take advantage of, to repair his " ſhattered forces. One may from hence in ſome meaſure, ex- " plain why the Ruſſian Generals did not perform all that the " public expected from them, which has commonly little, or no " idea of the difficulties attending military operations. Had Field " Marſhal Soltikow after the battle, ventured to move forward " too haſtily, he might reckon upon being once more atttacked " by the king; and then had his good fortune deſerted him, but " a ſmall part probably of the Ruſſian army would have eſcaped; " he had therefore the moſt urgent motives to be wary in his " conduct, and not totally to ſacrifice the remnant of his troops, " who had ſo bravely fought at Kay and Cunnerſdorf. He might " with great reaſon expect that his allies ſhould alſo do ſomething, " and not leave him to bear alone the whole burthen of the war. " Beſides, the whole Ruſſian army was convinced that the Count " of Vienna, meant only to make a tool of them, and cared little " how many or how few of them returned home, provided they " themſelves reaped the fruits of their labours. A natural con- " ſequence of this idea, was that the enemy had no longer any " great inclination to fight, and rather longed for their return " into winter quarters in Poland. One may aſſume it as a fact, " without doing any violence to probability, that the king was " well acquainted with the diſpoſitions of the Ruſſians; now " theſe had already exiſted before the battle, and Frederick's " penetration could eaſily diſcover the future conſequences, which " muſt reſult from them. Whilſt therefore his enemies expected " the march of the combined army to Berlin, the irruption of " Marſhal Daun into Sileſia, the recovery of Saxony, the ſiege

" of

" of Magdebourg, Stetten, and ſo on, and his friends ſhuddered for " him; his genius on the very morrow of the battle, ſhewed " him that nothing of all this would happen; hence alſo with " his uſual ſerenity and temper, which never left him in the " midſt of danger, he was enabled to ſend word to Duke Fer- " dinand by the ſame officer, who had brought him the news " of the victory of Minden. *I am ſorry the return of ſo good a* " *piece of news ſhould not be more lucky. But if you get ſafe back,* " *and dont find Daun in Berlin, and Contades in Magdebourg, you* " *may aſſure Duke Ferdinand from me, that there is no very great* " *loſs ſuſtained.* Thus a great man may always with ſafety " riſk more than another, being ſure that in the greateſt " calamities his reſources will not fail him. This accounts " for the exploits of an Alexander, and a Cæſar, and explains " to us the principle upon which Guſtavus Adolphus ventured " into Germany, and Condé hazarded the battles of Rocroy, " Freyburg, Nordlingen, and Senef, and how Frederick was " enabled to extricate himſelf with glory out of a ſeven years " war, carried on againſt the moſt powerful forces of Europe." "

Such are the arguments Colonel Tempelhoff uſes, in ſupport of the king's conduct on this occaſion; and indeed, I think completely juſtifies his majeſty, from the imputation of having raſhly attempted to puſh his advantages too far, which our author in ſome meaſure lays to his charge, though it muſt be obſerved, he does not venture to ſpeak very deciſively on this point.

With reſpect to the difference of ſentiments between the Colonel and our author, on the neceſſity of the king's fighting at all, I have given the arguments on both ſides of the queſtion, and ſhall not preſume to deliver any opinion of my own, but leave it to the reader to judge for himſelf.

Note G.

THESE hardy, ſkilful, and rapid movements, by which, with a twice beaten corps, not one third of the enemy's army, the king of Pruſſia contrived to prevent him reaping any advantages, from a moſt bloody victory obtained in the midſt of the ſummer, on the moſt expoſed part of his frontier; render this part of the campaign of one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty-nine too intereſting not to make it a deſirable thing for our readers to follow his majeſty ſtep by ſtep through all theſe marches; we ſhall therefore add to the journal of the Ruſſian movements, which our author gives us, a ſimilar one of each poſition taken up by his majeſty, extracted from a military magazine publiſhed at Berlin, a work of acknowledged merit and authenticity.

" On the enemy's leaving his camp at Mühlroſe, and occupying " another at Liebroſe, the king on the thirtieth of Auguſt marched " with the army in three columns to a village called Borne, near " Beeſkow, from which laſt the enemy was immediately diſlodged; " the town was then occupied by a free batallion, a body of huſſars " were poſted behind it, and the army itſelf encamped by Borne, " with this village between the two lines.

" On the thirty-firſt the army broke up once more and marched " in three columns to Waldow; in this camp the right wing was " placed at the village called Kannichen, facing the Spree Walde, " and the left at Waldow, before which laſt place Kleiſt's and Put- " kammer's huſſars, and the free batallion of Collignon were

" poſted in a wood for the better protection of the left flank of the " army.

" On the ſecond of September the bakery was eſtabliſhed at " Lübben, under the protection of two batallions and about one " hundred and fifty dragoons. The enemy having by his march on " the fifteenth to Guben diſcovered beyond a doubt his intention " of going into Sileſia, the king broke up his camp on the ſix- " teenth, and marched in two columns by Lübben to Vetſchow, " and on the ſeventeenth to Cotbus, where he encamped behind " the town, having his front covered by the Spree; here the " Pruſſians took a Ruſſian officer and twenty men priſoners. The " eighteenth was a halting day, to give time for the ſecond line to " join, which had been left behind in the camp of Waldow. On " this day his majeſty detached Colonel Kleiſt with ten ſquadrons " of huſſars, and the regiment of old Plathen, together with two " batallions of foot, under the command of Colonel Linden, to " Spremberg; and Major General Linſtädt with two batallions and " eight ſquadrons of huſſars to Forſte. On the nineteenth the " whole army marched to the laſt mentioned place, and took up a " camp with the front covered by the Neiſſe. Colonel Kleiſt on " the ſame day marched from Spremberg to Moſqua, to cover the " right flank of the army in caſe of neceſſity. On the twentieth " the army marched to Linderode, and Colonel Kleiſt from Moſqua " to Sorau, from whence he marched again that night, and ad- " vanced with his cavalry to drive the enemy out of Sagan, which " he effected compleatly, cutting many of them to pieces, and " making the reſt priſoners. On the twenty-firſt, at ten in the " morning, the king arrived at Sagan with the whole cavalry; the " infantry followed ſoon after, and encamped with the left wing " at Eckerſdorf, and the right on the Galgenberg (or Gallows Hill)

" near

" near the town. Many of the enemy's patroles (who was un-
" apprized of our rapid march), were made priſoners.

" The king's movements after the battle of Frankfurt, to cover
" Berlin and afterwards Sileſia, from the invaſion of the Ruſſian
" army, are worthy the higheſt admiration, the conduct of his
" adverſary on the contrary, is ſubject to much juſt cenſure. The
" enemy's generals ought to have exerted all their efforts to oc-
" cupy the poſt of Sagan, before the king's arrival, and to that
" end, they ſhould have detached a corps of ten thouſand men
" thither, which from the natural ſtrength of that poſt, might
" have ſtopped the Pruſſian army long enough to give time to the
" Ruſſians, and General Laudohn to reach Glogau. Such a con-
" duct in the enemy's generals, would have obliged the Pruſſian
" army to take a long detour, and if they had ſought to turn this
" corps in the neighbourhood of Sprottau, it need only march
" by its left, and place itſelf behind the Sprottau river, in which
" caſe its communication with the grand army, could not poſſibly
" be cut off.

" On the twenty-third the king marched with the army in two
" columns to Suckau, a village not far from Neuſtadt; the Coſ-
" ſacks which had penetrated as far as here, were driven back.
" Both wings of the army were poſted on heights, the center was
" cut in two by the village. The vanguard on their arrival in the
" new camp, ſaw the heads of the enemy's columns on the heights
" of Wendiſchborau, they halted as ſoon as they preceived the
" Pruſſians, and pitched their camp on the above named heights.

" Several priſoners reported that the enemy's intention was to
" have encamped on the heights near Milkau, and that their ge-
" nerals had received no intelligence of the king's march. His
" majeſty's object in taking the camp of Suckau ſeems to have
" been, to march by his flank to the heights of Milkau, when-

" ever the enemy ſhould attempt to paſs the defilé of Neuſtadt, to " attack their army on its coming out, and thus utterly deſtroy it.

" On the twenty-fourth the enemy having put his troops under " arms at the head of his camp, the Pruſſians did the ſame, and " upon patroles being ſent out to diſcover what his intentions were " in this, they learnt that he was about to occupy a new camp, " traced out between Nenkerſdorf and Malſchwitz.

" It being by this time certain that the enemy would not paſs " the defilé of Neuſtädt, the king made the army advance to the " heights of Milkau, at which village their left flank was placed, " while their right came to Baune, by this advantageous poſi- " tion, the enemy was ſhut out of the road to Glogau, and now " took up a camp between Neu-Tſchoe, and Keltſch. In this " poſition both armies remained ſome time under arms, each " expecting to be attacked, but at length the tents were pitched, " and both camps ſtrongly fortified.

" On the twenty-ſeventh and twenty-eighth the king was " joined by Generals Maier, and Queiſt, with three ſquadrons, " and ſeven batallions; this reinforcement enabled his majeſty to " extend his right wing to Nenkerſdorf, before which village an " entrenchment was thrown up.

" On the twenty-ninth ſeveral movements were obſerved in the " enemy's camp, the object of which could not at firſt be diſ- " covered, but as we diſcerned during the night, many fires on " the other ſide the Oder near Carolath, it was plain that he " had paſſed that river with a part of his forces. On the thirtieth " the enemy continued in motion, and the king determined to " attack his rear guard; for this purpoſe on the following morning " (October the firſt) he marched with ſix batallions, fifteen ſqua- " drons of dragoons, and ten of huſſars, and marched by Neuſtädtel " as far as Keltſche, the enemy had however already paſſed the

" Oder,

" Oder, and his majeſty made priſoners only ſome trainers and a " part of the baggage train. Major General Plathen was detached " that ſame day by his majeſty, with ſix batallions, two regi- " ments of cuiraſſiers, two of dragoons, together with the huſſars " of Kleiſt and Malachowſki to Glogau, to occupy a poſition at " Klein Zaerbau, a village near that town on the other ſide the " river. This corps was reinforced the next day by all the dra- " goons and huſſars, a picket of one thouſand cuiraſſiers, and " eleven batallions of foot, it formed in ſuch a manner, that " both flanks were covered by the Oder; and in this ſituation " protected that town from a bombardment, and was at hand to " cut off the enemy from the Hund paſs, and thus prevent him " from penetrating any further into Sileſia."

Note H.

AS the reader will perhaps be deſirous of comparing the narrative and ſentiments of our author, on this very remarkable tranſaction, with thoſe of Captain Tielke, and at the ſame time may poſſibly not have that book to refer to; I ſhall trouble him with this one more note, extracted from Lieutenant Chriſtian's tranſlation, of that very intereſting author.

" On the ſeventh of November the Auſtrian army under Marſhal " Daun, was advantageouſly encamped upon the heights of Plauen, " the ravin and gorge of which were in its front.

" This ravin is lined by very high and ſteep rocks, in ſome " places perpendicular, in the midſt of which runs the Weiſſritz; " a few rugged roads, ſcarcely paſſable, lead up to the heights, " which are eaſily defended.

" The gorge begins at Plauen, and continues almoſt without " interruption to the village of Potzchappel; from thence it ex- " tends to a mountain called the Windberg, that commands all " this country, and covers the flank of this valley. Though the " rocks ceaſe to line the ravin at this part, the heights are not- " withſtanding rather ſteep, and the roads and paſſages trouble- " ſome and difficult.

" This extenſive ravin opens towards Dreſden, and terminates " on the left of the Weiſſritz, in a gentle ſlope at the Fauxbourg. " On the right, this height (at whoſe foot ſtands the village of " Plauen) forms a ridge reſembling a parapet, which reaches from " Plauen to the Fauxbourg, and is called the Haneberg.

" The

" The whole of the Imperial cavalry encamped in the plain be-
" tween Plauen and the Fauxbourg, with its right flanked by the
" latter, and its left covered by the village of Plauen.

" This advantageous poſition of the Imperial army, rendering
" its attack difficult, dangerous, and almoſt impracticable, his
" Pruſſian Majeſty, in order to force it to retreat, endeavoured
" to cut off its forage, and communication with Bohemia. For
" this purpoſe he ſent Colonel Kleiſt, with a light corps, into Bo-
" hemia, who deſtroyed ſome magazines, and raiſed very heavy con-
" tributions. On the fifteenth General Finck was detached by Frey-
" berg to Dippoldiſwalda; the king advanced in perſon with the
" main army to Wilſdruff, and puſhed his advanced guard,
" commanded by General Ziethen, to Keſſelſdorf. The ſix-
" teenth Major General Wunſch had already advanced to Maxen,
" with the half of Finck's corps as an advanced guard, and the
" eighteenth ſucceeded in driving Major General Kleefeld of the
" army of the Empire from his advanced poſts, from Dohna to
" Cotta.

" To this corps of the enemy, poſted at Maxen, Marſhal Daun
" immediately oppoſed a body of light troops, commanded by Ma-
" jor General Brentano; and as the Pruſſian forces near Dip-
" poldiſwalda and Maxen amounted to thirty-five ſquadrons and
" eighteen batallions (ſee the order of battle), Marſhal Daun
" was obliged to ſecure the rear of his army, by poſting another
" corps at Rüppchen, under the command of Baron de Sincere,
" General of infantry.

" The eighteenth Lieutenant General Finck followed General
" Wunſch to Maxen with the remainder of his corps, and, to
" ſecure the road to Freyberg, left four batallions and a regiment
" of cuiraſſiers at Dippoldiſwalda, under the command of Major
" General Lindſtaett: theſe troops however rejoined the corps

" at

" at Maxen the ſame night, in conſequence of an order from the " king, ſent to General Lindſtaett by a chaſſeur. General Finck " afterwards detached Major General Wunſch, with five batallions " and five ſquadrons towards Dohna, and on the nineteenth " diſpatched Major General Platen, with three batallions and " a regiment of dragoons, towards Reinhardſgrimme, poſting " himſelf with the remainder of the troops near Maxen.

" By this poſition the whole of the Imperial army was prevented " from entering into cantonments, its forages were alſo much " ſtraitened, and the Pruſſians enabled to make incurſions into " Bohemia at pleaſure.

" This ſituation determined Marſhal Daun to reinforce the " corps under the command of Sincere, in order to diſlodge Ge- " neral Lindſtaett from Dippoldiſwalda, that he might afterwards " more eaſily diſpoſſeſs the Pruſſians of the poſts of Maxen and " Dohna. It was ſuppoſed General Lindſtaett would defend Dip- " poldiſwalda, being judged ſtronger than he really was.

" Sincere's corps conſiſted of

The Huſards	- of Scezeni.
Dragoons	- of the Staff and Young Modena.
Cuiraſſiers	Serbelloni, Pretlach, Schmertzing and Old Modena.
Infantry	Anger, Marſchall, Giulay, Clerici, Ligne, Wied, Hartſch, Botta and Young Colloredo.

" Which were reinforced by the regiments of Anhalt Zerbſt " Cuiraſſiers, and thoſe of Durlach, Haller and Tillier, infantry.

" In conſequence of the abovementioned plan, Sincere's corps " received orders to quit Rüppchen the nineteenth, at ſeven " o'clock in the morning, and advance to Dippoldiſwalda, which " was executed.

" In

" In the mean time the Marſhal joined the army of Sincere, " and occupied a very advantageous camp, before Dippoldiſwalda, " its right being flanked by the heights of Maltern, and its left " by Haeſelich; three batallions were alſo poſted in the town of " Dippoldiſwalda. If another Pruſſian corps had occupied this " town whilſt General Finck marched to Maxen, or the troops " under the command of Linſtaett had been reinforced, Marſhal " Daun muſt have been greatly embarraſſed: he would have found " the attack by Reinhardſgrimme impracticable, without expoſing " his right flank to the Pruſſians, and putting himſelf between " two fires; and as the left flank of the poſition at Plauen was " threatened at the ſame time, had the Imperialiſts intended at- " tacking Finck's corps by Roehrſdorf and Wittgendorf, they " would not have ventured to detach a ſufficient body of troops to " aſſure its ſucceſs.

" As it was to be feared that his Pruſſian Majeſty would diſco- " ver the enterprize of the Imperialiſts, either by the cannonade, " or by ſome other means, and that he might in the interim at- " tack the principal army, at this time weakened by a conſidera- " ble detachment, the Marſhal rejoined it, leaving orders with " Sincere's corps to march to Reinhardſgrimme the next day, " November the twentieth, at ſeven o'clock in the morning. " The troops had began their march, and the heads of the " columns were arrived at Ringelſhayn, when Marſhal Daun " (attended by their Royal Highneſſes Princes Albert and " Clement of Saxony) returned to take the command of this " corps; having previouſly made the neceſſary diſpoſitions at the " grand army, in caſe of an attack, and obſerved that the enemy " had not changed their poſition. The Marſhal placed Count " O'Donell at the head of the cavalry, and Baron de Sincere com- " manded the infantry. The order of March was in four columns,

" viz. two of cavalry and two of infantry. The advanced guard,
" commanded by Major General Baron de Siskowitz, consisted of
" Scezeni's regiment of hussars, some squadrons of carabiniers,
" a few croats, and a brigade of grenadiers of five batallions.
" Lieutenant General Baron de Seckendorf remained upon the
" height of Maltern, with the regiments of Botta and Young
" Colloredo, infantry, one squadron of Stampach, one of Anhalt
" Zerbst, and one hundred hussars and dragoons, detached from
" the regiments of the Emperor, Esterhasi, and dragoons of the
" Staff, to cover the rear of the Imperialists, in case a detachment
" of Prussians should advance from Freyberg, to Dippoldiswalda.
" Brentano's corps, posted near the Red-House and afterwards at
" Roehrsdorf, received orders to approach Maxen, and endeavour
" to take Finck in flank and rear, whilst the Marshal attacked him
" in front. It had been previously concerted with the army of the
" Empire, part of which was posted at Gieshubel, under the com-
" mand of the Prince of Stolberg, that a corps should be detached
" to Dohna, to inclose Finck's army on this side. Reinhardsf-
" grimme was occupied by three squadrons of Prussian hussars,
" commanded by Major de Hauschwitz; and General Platen was
" posted in the rear of this village. Marshal Daun arrived near
" this spot, formed his order of battle in two lines, and immediately
" reconnoitred Reinhardsgrimme, which he afterwards attacked
" with his advanced guard.

" The enemy's troops posted within and in the rear of this vil-
" lage, abandoned it at his approach, without defending the im-
" portant gorge in which it is situated, the passage of which
" must have been attended with the greatest difficulty; they re-
" tired into the wood, and from thence to Hausdorf, a retreat
" which permitted the Imperialists to reconnoitre the roads through
" this village and the forest. The passages were found narrow;

" and

" and the more inconvenient, as the ſharp froſt, attended with " little ſnow, had rendered the ſlope (which is naturally very " ſteep) ſo ſlippery, that it was thought impoſſible to aſcend it " with the artillery and cavalry, whoſe horſes were not ſhod for " that purpoſe; but M. de Fabri, at that time Major of the Staff " (or corps of Field Engineers) having aſſured the Marſhal that " he had examined the roads, which, though inconvenient and " difficult, he had found practicable, the order to march was " immediately given; and, after having garniſhed the woods with " croats and huſſars, who drove the Pruſſians from the neareſt " heights on the other ſide, the corps continued to advance in four " columns by Reinhardſgrimme to Maxen.

" General Finck had occupied the heights in front of Maxen " with three batallions, (c) four howitzers, and five twelve-pound- " ers. (N°. 27) General Platen was poſted in front near Hauſ- " dorf, with two batallions; and the remainder of the troops " faced General Brentano. A battery of four ſix-pounders was " eſtabliſhed upon the ſteep hill on the right of Maxen, (N°. 28) " and two others of two twelve-pounders each, oppoſite Brentano's " corps. (N°. 29 and 30.)

" General Finck's not having occupied the two mountains, ſitu- " ated between the wood of Reinhardſgrimme and Hauſdorf, ren- " dered his poſition very defective, by favouring the debouché " and deployement of the Imperial troops from the abovemen- " tioned wood, which could neither be ſeen nor prevented, on " account of the two mountains I and F, ſituated between the " debouché of the wood of Reinhardſgrimme and the mountains " C and H, upon which he was poſted.

" It muſt be acknowledged, that after having detached M. de " Wunſch, he was not ſtrong enough to occupy them; but with " what view he poſted the General at ſo great a diſtance, or why

" the latter did not afterwards ſupport him, I cannot account for.
" I was informed by the Pruſſian officers, that as ſoon as General
" Finck found himſelf attacked by the Imperialiſts, he diſpatched
" ſucceſſively two or three officers to General Wunſch, to de-
" mand the two batallions of Munchow as a ſupport, during the
" attack of the hill of Maxen, and that the General refuſed to
" comply with this order, alledging that he could not ſpare them.
" It would perhaps have been more prudent, if General Wunſch had
" not only ſent theſe two batallions, but followed with his whole
" force to the aſſiſtance of General Finck; for ſuppoſing the army
" of the Empire had paſſed the defilé of Müglitz, which the ſmall
" force under the command of M. de Wunſch could not have
" prevented, the reunion of a numerous body of troops on a
" ground ſo narrow and interſected as that near Maxen, far from
" being formidable, would have been rather advantageous to the
" Pruſſians; but M. de Wunſch's corps remained at its poſt near
" Bloſchwitz during the whole action, ſatisfied with cannonading
" the troops of the Empire, which had advanced to Dohna, from
" the two batteries of four twelve-pounders, N°. 57 and 58.

" As ſoon as the batallions of grenadiers of the advanced guard
" had cleared the wood, they occupied the height on the right,
" which the Marſhal aſcended in order to reconnoitre General
" Finck's poſition, and make the neceſſary diſpoſition for the at-
" tack. He ordered the batallions of grenadiers, as they came
" up, to halt at the foot of the mountains, to prevent their be-
" ing incommoded by the enemy's fire till the moment of attack.
" In ſpite of the very ſteep aſcent, rendered ſtill more ſlippery by
" the ſharp froſt, ſnow and ice, Captain Schroeder of the Impe-
" rial artillery, by his ſkill and exertions, in a ſhort time eſta-
" bliſhed a battery of eight twelve-pounders, upon the height,
" N°. 23, which enfiladed the left flank of the Pruſſians, and made

" conſiderable

" conſiderable havock. The cannonade became very briſk on both " ſides; but that of the Imperialiſts, having the advantage of " ſituation, did the moſt execution. As ſoon as this battery " opened, General Platen retired with his two batallions from d, " and entred into the line f. The troops on the other ſide of " Maxen faced Brentano's corps, which had advanced from Ro- " erſdorf to F.

" In the mean time the Imperial grenadiers, followed by the " infantry, advanced in columns, their cavalry on the left; being " debouched entirely from the wood G, they formed in order of " battle, and brought eight howitzers and ſix ſix-pounders upon " the height, (N°. 24) ſituated at a ſmall diſtance in front of their " right, and upon that (N°. 64) twenty-ſix pieces of different ca- " libres. The fire of theſe batteries, being extremely well nou- " riſhed, muſt have carried ſlaughter and confuſion through the " Pruſſian ranks. Brentano's corps, in the mean time, continued " its approaches, firing from eight eight-pound culverins, placed " at N°. 26 and 65, upon that part of Finck's corps which oppoſed " him near Wittgendorf. The ſhot from the two attacks having " occaſioned ſome confuſion amongſt the baggage placed at (h), " which communicated to the batallions, the enemy were obliged " to remove it to (i). The cannonade having continued three " quarters of an hour, the Marſhal ordered the grenadiers com- " manded by General Siſkowitz, and ſupported by M. de Ainſe " with his brigade of infantry, to attack on the right, and the " brigade of Major Dombaſle on the left. The cavalry marched " in the hollow, under cover from the enemy's fire, and paſſed " Hauſdorf.

" Whilſt the Imperialiſts were deſcending the height to attack " the Pruſſians, two batallions of the latter deſcended the hill of " Maxen to take them in flank, g; the firing between theſe troops

" hardly

" hardly laſted a quarter of an hour, the Marſhal having left one " batallion upon the height, N°. 24, to ſecure this flank; the " battery likewiſe enfilading the Pruſſian batallions, who being " at the ſame time charged in front by the grenadiers, were forced " to retreat with precipitation into the village of Maxen.

" General Finck immediately ſupported them with a batallion of " grenadiers from the right, and two of infantry from the left of " the line oppoſite Brentano's corps, N°. 36, 37, and 38, with ſix " ſquadrons of dragoons, 54, who marched through the village " of Maxen to the height; but the two batallions who had been " repulſed, threw theſe troops into diſorder, and the greateſt part " of them were made priſoners. The Pruſſian Major Generals de " Rebentiſch and Moſel uſed their utmoſt endeavours to prevent " the diſorder, and rally the flying troops; but their efforts were " uſeleſs againſt the diſtinguiſhed bravery of the Imperial grena- " diers, which ſeemed to increaſe with the difficulty they en- " countered in climbing the heights, particularly thoſe occu- " pied by the enemies; in ſhort, they carried every thing before " them.

" The enemy's cannon could do but little execution, and the " Pruſſian cavalry was entirely uſeleſs, from the want of ſpace on " the ſteep height on which it was poſted, and from whence it " muſt neceſſarily deſcend to the charge, whereas that of the " Imperialiſts attacked and charged aſcending.

" There were ſome fleches * upon the heights of Maxen, con- " ſtructed entirely of ſtones, great quantities of which are found " in

" * Theſe fleches were ſuppoſed by many to have been conſtructed by Finck's corps; but " I can with truth aſſert, that they were thrown up the year before, by the Pruſſian Major " General de Knoblock: beſides, I have too much reſpect for Field Engineers in general " (even

" in theſe environs: far from aſſiſting the Pruſſians in their defence, " they were certainly hurtful.

" The grenadiers and Imperial carabiniers carried the principal " height (k) with but little loſs, and obliged the Pruſſians to " abandon their cannon. Fluſhed with ſucceſs, they purſued " them with too much ardour, and were falling into confuſion; " which the Marſhal perceiving, checked the purſuit, and formed " the infantry in order of battle upon the height L, abandoned " by the Pruſſians. The Imperial cavalry turned the left of this " height M, and purſued the advantage already gained with the " utmoſt intrepidity.

" As the attack of Brentano's corps became during this time " more ſerious, General Finck ordered fifteen ſquadrons of cuiraſ- " ſiers to advance, commanded by Major Generals de Bredow and " Vaſold (m); but being obliged to turn ſome ponds, and paſs " through marſhy meadows and thick furze, they could neither " form nor attack with the neceſſary ſhock and impetuoſity; they " were conſequently repulſed, and obliged to retire with precipita- " tion to (n). The Imperial grenadiers purſued the victory ob- " tained on their ſide at Maxen, and continued puſhing the Pruſ- " ſians beyond the village.

" General Finck collected the routed and ſcattered troops in the " beſt manner he could, and ordered General de Lindſtaett to " form them again near Schmorſdorf (o); Brentano's corps con- " tinued advancing, and during this time arrived at N, and laſtly " at (O,) where it joined Marſhal Daun's. The new poſition,

" (even were they Turks) to ſuppoſe they conſtructed them to be defended; and I hope to " do them juſtice by ſuppoſing they were only intended as a maſk. I am more inclined to be " of this opinion, as I have entered a camp abandoned by the Pruſſians, which at firſt glance " appeared to be fortified; its parapet conſiſted of a few faggots, and the cannon were trunks " of trees.

" on

" or rather halt of the Pruſſians, was but of ſhort duration; for " the Imperialiſts, elated with ſucceſs, advanced with ſo much " bravery, that nothing could reſiſt their efforts: they charged " the Pruſſians; broke their ranks; and, without giving them " time to breathe, drove them from height to height, and took " the greateſt part of their artillery and ſome colours. The " Pruſſian cavalry, which threatened to fall upon the Imperial " infantry, was repulſed by the cavalry of the Imperialiſts, par- " ticularly by the regiment of dragoons of Young Modena, who " afterwards charged and cut up the Pruſſian infantry, took two " batallions and their colours, together with ſome ſtandards and " cannon.

" Count Palfy, Lieutenant General of the army of the Empire, " had advanced from Zehiſta towards Dohna with the two regi- " ments of huſſars, Spleni and Haddick; and Major General " Kleefeld was poſted at the ſame point of Zoſchendorf with " ſome batallions of croats and the Sclavonian huſſars. The " prince of Stolberg, having under his command the Counts d'Ef- " fern and de Fugger, had advanced to Buckerſwalda, where he " took poſt with the regiment of infantry of Mayence, one ba- " tallion of Darmſtadt, two batallions of Füſtenberg, the regiment " of Imperial dragoons of Savoy, commanded by Major General de " Voghera, and ſome large field-pieces; he alſo cannonaded " Wunſch's corps from the batteries eſtabliſhed at 59, 60, 61, " 62, and 63.

" The light troops, commanded by Major Generals de Palfy and " de Kleefeld, afterwards paſſed the ravin, and advanced towards " Sirſen, to incloſe General Finck on this ſide; the latter, who " was purſued great part of the night, took poſt in the plain be- " tween Falkenhayn and Bloſchwitz.

" The

" The Marſhal detached two regiments of cavalry towards the " Elbe, to prevent the Pruſſians from eſcaping on this ſide by " croſſing the river.

" Theſe diſpoſitions threw General Finck, with the remainder " of his corps, into the moſt diſtreſſed ſituation poſſible; ſur- " rounded on all ſides by gorges and defilés, whoſe heights were " occupied by the Imperialiſts, there was not a ſingle opening left " him to retreat.

" The night being too far advanced for the Imperialiſts to con- " tinue their attacks, the troops were formed in order of battle " upon the heights, and paſſed the night under arms. (T.) The " ammunition which arrived from the camp at Plauen, was diſ- " tributed to them, and every preparation made for renewing the " attack at day-break.

" The ſame night General de Seckendorf, poſted near Maltern, " ſent word that his huſſars and dragoons in front of Dippoldiſ- " walda had been drove in, and that they diſcovered the enemy's " infantry and cavalry*. He immediately received orders to de-

" * Colonel Kleiſt returning from his expedition in Bohemia with his corps, conſiſting of " ten ſquadrons of green huſſars, ten ſquadrons of dragoons of Schorlemmer, and the free " batallion of Corviere, received orders at Sayda to ſupport General Finck, and had there- " fore immediately directed his march to Dippoldiſwalda, where he arrived very late at night " on the twentieth. The town was not occupied by the Imperialiſts, and there was only a " picket of one hundred men poſted in a houſe contiguous to the bridge, without the town. " The Sieur Kempel, Lieutenant of the batallion of Corviere, with fifty men, approached " under favour of the night without being perceived, ſupported by Captain le Grange, with " one hundred more and a piece of cannon; he killed the two centinels poſted at the foot of the " bridge, ſurprized the picket before it could get under arms, killed ſeveral and made a great " many priſoners, entering the town with thoſe who fled, which he occupied.

" General Hülſen, who had likewiſe received orders to aſſiſt and diſengage Finck, marched " the twentieth from his cantonment at Sora, near Wildſdruff, to Collmitz, and puſhed his " advanced guard on to Klingenberg; the twenty-firſt he arrived with the latter at Dippoldiſ- " walda, and ſeeing there was no poſſibility of ſaving Finck's corps, he retreated with Colonel " Kleiſt to Freyberg.

" fend his poſt and the debouché to the laſt extremity, and in caſe
" he found himſelf abſolutely obliged to abandon it, to fall back
" upon Reinhardſgrimme and Hauſdorf. In the mean time the
" Marſhal occupied the heights of the latter, with ſix batallions
" and two regiments of cavalry, under the command of General
" Plonquet, and ſent orders to Count Buccow (General of cavalry,
" commanding the army near Plauen in his abſence) to detach
" General Baron Anger immediately with four bataſlions to Rüp-
" chen, and to reinforce this poſt, according as circumſtances and
" the ſtrength of the enemy at Dippoldiſwalda might require,
" without riſking the ſafety of the grand army. He was ordered
" likewiſe to keep up the communication between the latter and
" the corps poſted at Maxen and Blochwitz, and to cover their
" left flank. The Generals Anger and Plonquet were to conſult
" on the proper ſteps to be taken to anſwer theſe intentions.

" I have been aſſured General Finck had formed the reſolution
" of cutting his way through the Imperialiſts with the remainder
" of his corps towards Schmorſdorf*, and that he had iſſued or-
" ders to the Generals under his command, to diſtribute cartridges
" amongſt the troops for that purpoſe; but upon their repreſen-
" tation, that his forces were too much weakened to attempt this
" enterprize with ſucceſs, he ordered them to be muſtered in the
" night, and found the whole of his infantry amounted but to
" two thouſand eight hundred and thirty-ſix men; the troops
" poſted upon the height of Maxen having been taken or deſerted
" in great numbers.

" Finding, therefore, that he could not riſk ſuch an attack
" with any hopes of ſucceſs with ſo ſmall a force, and having

" * Probably by Muhlbach and Cunnerſdorf: it is true that he would have been oppoſed
" only by the light troops of Colonel Reid, but at the ſame time would have found impracticable
" roads.

" only

" only eight pieces of cannon remaining, againſt ten times the " number of troops, furniſhed with a numerous artillery, and the " poſition of the Prince of Stolberg at Buckerſwalde, rendering " the paſſage at this place equally impracticable, it was determined " that the regiments of cavalry ſhould file off by the gorge, un- " der favour of the night, paſs the corps of Imperial light troops " at break of day near Sirſen, and then purſue their March by Lug " and Lockwitz. M. de Wunſch, though General of infantry, " was ordered by General Finck to execute this manœuvre, having " the moſt perfect knowledge of the country*.

" An hour before day-light, the Marſhal ordered the cannon to " advance as near as poſſible, and the grenadiers to hold them- " ſelves in readineſs to renew the attack at day-break.

" A general officer of the Pruſſians arrived at the advanced poſt, " and deſired to be admitted to the Commander in Chief. The " Marſhal being informed of it, ſent General Laſcy to acquaint " him they muſt lay down their arms, and ſurrender at diſcretion. " The cannonade had began before the Marſhal could give orders " to poſtpone the attack, but was immediately ſilenced. General " Laſcy ſoon after returned, with the anſwer that Finck's corps " would ſurrender priſoners, on condition they might retain their " baggage, which the Marſhal granted.

" In the mean time General Wunſch had endeavoured to eſcape " with the cavalry in the manner indicated, but had met with in- " ſurmountable obſtacles in the attempt; being obliged to lead the " horſes one by one acroſs the ice, only a few ſquadrons of huſ- " ſars had paſſed the firſt gorge when the Imperialiſts perceived " them. The Marſhal inſiſted that Wunſch's corps, or rather

" * I have no doubt of this plan being thought of, as I had the information from the Pruſ- " ſian officers themſelves; but I cannot conceive how the paſſage of the cavalry could have " been practicable on this ſide, ſtill leſs which way it could have joined the king's army.

" the ſix regiments of cavalry which he then commanded, ſhould " be included in the capitulation, upon which General Finck ob- " ſerved, that he could not capitulate for M. de Wunſch, who " was commandant of a ſeparate corps.

" During this treaty, which Finck prolonged as much as poſſi- " ble, to give M. de Wunſch time to execute the intended paſſage, " he ſent different officers, in the preſence of M. de Laſcy, under " pretence of informing Wunſch of his capitulation, but in fact to " ſee if he had already paſſed the defilé of Sirſen. M. de Laſcy " perceiving the ſtratagem, threatened to renew the cannonade, if " M. de Wunſch continued his retreat.

" The difficulty of penetrating through a ground ſo interſected, " and whoſe ravins were covered with bruſh-wood and occupied " by croats, augmented every inſtant; and the laſt officer whom " General Finck ſent, returned with the information, that ſcarce " half a ſquadron had paſſed Sirſen, and that General Wunſch " found the paſſage impacticable. Upon which General Finck, " and the generals under his command, ſigned the capitulation at " Blochwitz, General Wunſch excepted, whoſe corps was not- " withſtanding included; even thoſe who had paſſed the gorge " were obliged to return, and lay down their arms with the reſt: " but he being near Sirſen when the capitulation was ſigned, could " afterwards avail himſelf of this circumſtance, and aſſert that he " had no ſhare in it.

" The whole corps having laid down their arms, the priſoners " were conducted to the great garden near Dreſden, by the troops " ordered on this duty. The Marſhal then poſted the principal " part of his corps upon the heights of Maxen, ſent Brentano's " diviſion towards Dippoldiſwalda, and himſelf rejoined the grand " army near Dreſden.

" The

"The number of killed and wounded, was inconsiderable on both sides.

"The Imperialists took

3 Pair of silver kettle drums.
1 Pair of brass ditto.
24 Standards.
96 Pair of colours.

"ARTILLERY.

25 Three-pounders,
2 Four-pounders,
18 Six-pounders,
17 Twelve-pounders,
9 Howitzers,

71 Pieces of cannon, and 44 ammunition waggons.

"PRISONERS.

"PRISONERS.

1	Lieutenant General -	Finck.
8	Major Generals - -	Rebentiſch, Linſtaett, Moſel, Wunſch, Platen, Vaſold, Bredow, and Gerſdorf.
9	General officers	
6	Colonels.	
3	Lieutenant Colonels.	
32	Majors.	
88	Captains.	
168	Firſt Lieutenants.	
85	Second Lieutenants.	
100	Enſigns.	
50	Officers of the Staff.	
8	Officers of the Artillery.	
549	Total of officers.	

" According to the account publiſhed by the Imperialiſts, the " total number of priſoners, including the non-commiſſioned of- " ficers, amounted to fourteen thouſand nine hundred and twenty- " two men.

Teilke concludes this account with obſerving,

" Every witneſs of this affair muſt allow, that the Imperialiſts, " independent of their good and judicious diſpoſitions, and the ad- " vantages they derived from the ground and their artillery, fought " with the greateſt bravery. On the other hand, notwithſtanding " the poſition of the Pruſſians, and the ground they occupied, " rendered them incapable of uſing their arms with ſucceſs, they " certainly diſplayed a great deal of firmneſs and intrepidity."

FINIS.

A MAP of the THEATRE of the KING of PRUSSIA's CAMPAIGNS: Engraved for GEN.L LLOYD's HISTORY of the SEVEN YEARS WAR in GERMANY.

SCALE of German Leagues 15 to a Degree.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

15 14 53 52 51 50

Drunsberg Nörenberg Jacobshagen N.Stargard Zachan Reetz Neu Weidel Cales Arenswalde Pyritz Bernstein Berfinche Lippehne Soldin Friedberg Dramburg Wielin Neu Damm Landsberg Blumberg Tamsel Wirtz Warthe R. Sonnenburg Kamjonwalde Swierfzyna or Schwerin Miedzychod or Birnbaum Kamionna Drosen Zielenzig Lagau Paradies Liebenau Reppen Sternberg Schwiebusen Plaue R. Pleiske R. Paltzig Kaltzig Kay 1750 Mose Zullichau Oder R. Crossen Rottenburg Tzicher R. Boberlberg Sabor Grunberg Naumburg Christianstadt Sommerfeld Sturmfeder Lungen Hermsdorff Wartenberg Neusalz Neu Tzicher Lusitzer R. Freystadt Ketzerb Bunzlau Windisch Bohrau Sorau Triebel Sprottau Halbau Priebus Freywald Primkenau Tempelburg Jastrowo Frydlancik Marczynow Walecz Tuczno Slopa Uyscie Netze R. Chodziesz Ryczwol Wagrowiec Wirsitz Obersycko Stobnica Obornika Rogozno Wronki Warthe River Sierakow Objezyrze Babinkow Morownio Pniew Kazimierz Wilczyno Tarnowo Posnan Gr.Gloga Trziel Neustadt Borowki Opalinica Woymovice Steszew Moszyn Zbaszyn Czempin Kopaynica Wielichw Kosczian Kebliew Przemec Schlawa Wschowa or Frauenstadt Lissa or Leszno Rydzyna Goslyn Labiszyn Lekno Znim Pakosc Janowiec Kruszwica Klecki Gniezno Pamiedzysko Mnichow Mielzyn Wrzesnia N.Brudzew Kleczow Slupce Szroda Miloslow Zagersw Pizdry Nowemiasto Kfiaz Szrem Zymiky Chocz Jaroszyn Borok Pleszow Kalisz Krobia Biskapie Kobielin Kroloszyn Rafzkow Jutroszyn Zduny Freyhan Salmierzycze Sarnowa Militsch Zelazn Mittelwalde Wartenberg Brslin Gr.Tschirne Guran Rutzen Hegenstadt Randten Polkwitz Kolbers Winzig Trachenberg Gr.Gloga Oder R. Bober R. Neisse R. Lusitzer R. Tzicher R. Warthe R. Netze R. Pilica R. Schlichtingsheim Handpass Gros Osten Ratzkaw Sprottau Quargs Sagan Naumburg Bunzlau Liegnitz Lissa Fraustadt Glogau Posen Kalisch Breslau

P A R T O F P O L A N D

S T A D T C H

DUCHY OF MECKLENBURG

UCKER

MARCK

DUCHY OF MAGDEBOURG


PRINCIPALY OF ANHALT

CIRCLE OF ELECTORAL

LOWER LUSATIA


COUNTY OF MANSFELD

Neu Brandenburg
Stargard
Woldeck
Pasewalck
Stettin
Lubitz
Plau
Parchim
Neustadt
Wahren
Strasberg
Brusso
Fürstenwerder
Penkun
Greiffenhagen
Grabow
Elde R.
Melenberg
Robel
Mirow
Wesenberg
Sternitz
Prentzlo
Oder River
Canal
Garz
Putlitz
Boytzenburg
Liechen
Potzlo
Vierraden
Bahnen
Domitz
Lenzen
Pritzwalk
Witstock
Templin
Schwedt
Perleberg
Stour R.
Angermunde
Schoenfliess
Wittemberg
Königsberg
Rhinsberg
Granse
Zehdenick
Lindau
Zenden
Wilsnack
Alland R.
Elbe R.
Kyritz
Neu Ruppin
Alt Ruppin
Oderberg
Neustadt
Canal
Mohrin
Genzin
Wusterhausen
Wildberg
Liebenwalde
Berwalde
Arendsee
Seehausen
Neustadt
Freyenwalde
Custrinese
Furstenfelde
Werben
Havelberg
Havel R.
Kremmen
Wriezen
Zellin
Osterburg
Frisack
Oranienburg
Biesenthal
Salzwedel
Sandau
Rhin
Berno
Dosse R.
Bismarch
Bateno
Strausberg
Kustrin
Oder R.
Uchte R.
Elbe R.
Arneburg
Alt Landsberg
Bucko
Seelo
Kalbe
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Spandau
Liezen
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Fangermunde
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Burg
Ziegeser
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Hohenwalde
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Lukenwalde
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Frose
Schonbeck
Gr Salze
Waldau
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Grabno
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DUCHY OF MECKLENBURG
DUCHY OF MAGDEBOURG
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Koniginof
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Neustatt
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Hohenbruck
Solnitz
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Reichenau
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Wambierz
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Sweitenberg
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Setschenitz
Bernhardsdorf
Neu Hollitsch
Dasenitz
Pardubitz
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Bechanitz
Tanitz
Kolin
1757
Pelschkau
Kaurzim
Kuttenberg
Suchdol
Kank
Neuhof
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Pod Heraldy
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Uzdetz
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Tschesetin
Golzch Jenikow
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Wegmanestetsch
Deutsch Brodt
Senosatz
Humpoletsch
Stecken
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Sazz
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Pattschow
Pilgram
Neustift
Iglau
Neu Reichenau
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Potschaken
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Budischau
Gr. Meseritsch
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Pauchkau
Neisse
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Ziegenhalf
Johannsthal
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Hotzplotz
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Landskron
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Muglitz
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Marisch Trubau
Aller Heiligen
Leschen
Loschitz
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Tittau
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Ingrowitz
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Holeschau
Hulein
Cremsier
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Napagedla
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Lichten
Nieschembroda
Lommatzsch
Grimma
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Nerchau
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Roder R.
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Radeburg
Camenz
Elstra
Pulsnitz
Bautzen
Barutz
Weissenburg
Kotitz
Kittlitz
Hochkirch
Gr. Postewitz
1758
Gaudenbalds
Loban
Kl. Postewitz
Nid
Sprembergs
Neustadt
Radeberg
Bischofswerda
Arensdorf
Fischbach
Ottendorf
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Wehlen
Rabenau
Dohna
Gr. Sedlitz
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Rombirg
Schönlind
Kreibitsch
Gr. Hennersdorf
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Reinholdsgrimma
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Berg Gieshübel
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Gottleube
Schmiedeberg
Barenstein
Neu Geifsing
Lauenstein
Ah
Frauenstein
Altenberg
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Pirnen
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1756
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Brosenan
Libochowitz
Raudnitz
Mehuk
Budin
Eger River
Lutuy
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Lauditz
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Schebrak
Hoftomitz
Knin
Netvorzitz
Newklow
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Mauth
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Kamayk
Ambschelberg
Selcschan
Wotitz
Ohnietz
Neustupow
Miltschin
Preschitz
Sedletz
Brfesnitz
Sudomirtz
Gostenitz
Borystau
Tabor
Chesnum
Muhlhausen
Bechin
Sobiesław
Teyn
Iser R.
Moldau R.
Mies
Taurkow
Haid
Kladrau
Neustaul
Stab
Radenz R.
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Prefestits
Stankowy
Swishow
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Teinitz
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Retz
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Furt
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Pfreimbt
Amberg
Sulzbach
Hirschau
Wilfeck
Pegnitz R.
Nab R.
Bottenstein
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Georgen
Gold Cronach
Culmbach
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Roth Mayn R.
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Plan
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Chesnum
Iserbritz R.
Moldau

Plan of the Affair near MAXEN

20th and 21st Novembr 1759.

1 ..... Foot path ——— Country Road across fields &c.
2 ——— Village Roads ——— Great Road
3 ⊓⊓⊓ Villages accurately surveyed by the Author,
4 ⊔⊓ ⊞ in which all the Houses, Walls, &c. are particularly marked.
5 ▰▰ Villages
6 ▰▰ taken from the Map of Mr Petrie.

A, C, D, E, G, H, I, K, M, N, The advancing and first attack of Genl Sincere's Corps on b, c, d, f, g, k, l, Genl Finck's Corps.
L, O, Second attack of Genl Sincere's Corps on i, p, o, Genl Finck's Corps.
P, Q, R, Attack of the Army of the Empire on a, Major Genl Wunsch.
T, 3d Attack of Genl Sincere's Corps, and p, q, marks the Situation where Genl Finck's Corps surrendered.

№ 23, 24, 25, 26, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 & 65, Batteries of the Emperors Army, and that of the Empire.

№ 27, 28, 29, 30, 57 & 58, Prussian Batteries.

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Pentewiz
Kleba
Kautzschun
Burgstadel
Kl
Gr
Borthen
Welck
Gemmern
Kreischa
Compsen
Hill called der lange Berg
Kl. Bohrsdorf
Bosewitz
Seyda
Gahmig
Gurcknitz
Wittgendorf
Hill called der Sandberg
Sirsen
Dronitz
Dohna
Maxen
Hill called Kaufsdorfer Hohe
Schar Berg
Bloschwitz
Falckenhain
Schmors dorf
Grotte
Kottwitz
Belvedere
Wesenstein
Ober-meufe-gaul
Burckardswalda
Mühlbach
Hoeselich
Stone Quarry
Lime Kilns
Vineyards
Machine for drawing Water
to Pirna
to Zehist
to Kirchs
to Toplitz
Scale of 3000 paces, of which 10,000, make a German Mile
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 2000 3000.

P. Mazell Sculpsit.

PLAN of the SIEGE of OLLMUTZ by the Prussian Army, Commanded by F.M.KEITH, from 20th May to 1st July, 1758.

REFERENCES.

A. *Catherine Gate.*
B. *Theresian Gate.*
C. *Gate of Littau.*
D. *Kreindel Gate.*
E. *Burgers Gate.*
F. *Water or Water Fort.*
G. G. *The dotted Lines shew the Attack which, according to Col.l Templehoff, ought to have been made.*

Closter Hradisch
Holitz
Zernovir
Gros Ostrow
Klein Ostrow
Suburb Called Deutscher Pobel
Neustift or Neuwied
Hatschein
Littau Street
Wagenstriesel
Repschein
Chomotau
Sedlowsky
York
Nimlau
Giesshübel
Schnabellin
Artillery Depot
Park of Artillery
Krenau
Kirbein
Bruchotin
Nedweis
Imperial Road
Tobitschau
Nebotin


100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Toises


The BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, on the 25th of August 1758.


500 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
3000 Paces or half a German Mile.

Kunzdorf
Schaumburg
Drewitz
CUSTRIN
Kurtze Vorstadt
Lange Vorstadt
Tile Kiln
Gallow
Causeway
WOOD
Zornsdorf
Wilckersdorf
Tamsell
Zicher
Nabern
New Dam
Dam Mill
Paper Mill
Kersten
Mayson
Cross Camin
Blumenberg
To Massin
To Gr. Camin Mill
Sheepfold
through Vietz to Landsberg
from Gallitzig
Oder R.
Warthe R.
Nº 1
Nº 2
Nº 3
Nº 4
Nº 5
Nº 6
Nº 7
Nº 9
Nº 10
Nº 11

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Prussian Camp after the Battle
Explanation
Prussian Army
Austrian Army.
PLAN OF THE BATTLE
of
HOCHKIRCHEN
October 14th 1758.
LÆBAU
KITTLITZ
REICHENBACH
Lang Soland
Toises


PALZIG
Cuirassiers
Cuirassiers
Road from Crossen
Huſsars
Huſsars
Dragoons
Heath
Heath
Heath
Retreat
Retreat
Village
BATTLE
of
PALZIG.
July 23.th 1759.

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PLAN OF THE BATTLE of CUNERSDORF,

August 12.th 1759.

Oder R.
Common
Common
Reipzig Field
Dubberow
Schwete
Reipzig
Frietschen
Die Nunen
Karlsmühl Mill
Kogel Mill
Wagners M.
Dubberow M.
Boosen
Rohr Pond
Igel Pond
FRANKFORT
Kliestow
Kling Berg
Holy Pond
Ober M.
Cow
Meadow
Pichten Berg
Horn
Marsh
Meadow
Oder River
Marien Meadow
Kehrer H.
Kehrer Dam
Tretzin
Gross Busch
Cossacs
Russian Cast
Rothen Vorwerk
Meadow
Cunersdorf Meadow
Cunersdorf
Bischofsberg
Prussian Army
Leppsow
Pond
Reetsch Mill
First Position
Second Position
Advanced Guard
Intrenchments
Shepherds Cot
Austrian Cav.y
Austrian Cav.y
Intf.y
Austrn
Generine Common
Venerate Dam
Mirander
Bridge of Boats
Scale